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Executive summary 
BACKGROUND 
Over the past three decades, microfinance activities have spread across the globe, 
reaching tens of millions of poor households with tailored financial services. 
Microfinance can best be described as a field of intervention rather than a particular 
instrument. Initially, microfinance usually meant microcredit for working capital and 
very small investments, but increasingly it has been broadened to include 
savings/deposits, a limited range of micro-insurance and payment services (including 
micro-leasing) as well as a somewhat broader range of credit products for more 
substantial investments. In this study we focused on microcredit activities, 
constituting the bulk of microfinance activities across the globe.  
 
Microcredit activities have affected the lives of clients and others in multiple ways. 
The most frequently reported types of effects of credit at individual, enterprise and 
household level are the following: income, expenditure smoothing, and poverty 
alleviation effects; business growth and employment effects; schooling effects; and 
effects in terms of women’s empowerment. 
 
Despite the diversity in microcredit schemes, many share two characteristics: they 
target poor women and often rely on some type of group-based lending. Women’s 
empowerment in relation to microcredit has been studied extensively within the 
context of this type of microcredit scheme. Most of these studies have been carried out 
in the context of microcredit group schemes in South Asia. It has been argued that 
access to microcredit can foster changes in individual attitudes of women (e.g. 
increased self-reliance), power relations within the household (e.g. control over 
resources) and social status. 
 
An important dimension of empowerment concerns women’s control over household 
spending. The main assumption is that by providing credit to poor women, their 
direct control over expenditures within the household increases, with subsequent 
implications for the status of women and the well-being of women and other 
household members. Women’s control over household spending is a frequently 
recurring aspect analyzed within the context of microcredit interventions, which 
allows us to study whether microcredit targeted at women affects women’s control 
over household spending decisions and the circumstances in which this occurs. 
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Despite the central and recurrent role across studies of this aspect of women’s 
empowerment in relation to microcredit activities, there has been no previous review 
on this topic. 
 
The growing importance of microcredit has resulted in a vast number of research and 
evaluation studies, including impact studies. Consequently, the microfinance 
literature harbors a substantial number of synthesis studies which discuss a set of 
microcredit interventions and aim to generate overall conclusions on their effects. 
However, most of these studies face limitations in terms of depth of empirical 
assessment and the extent to which the identified effects can be attributed to 
microcredit. Moreover, methodological principles regarding comprehensive searches 
and principles of selection, coding, extraction and aggregation are often lacking in 
review studies.  
 
Partial exceptions are three recent systematic reviews which all differ in scope from 
the present one (Stewart et al., 2010; Duvendack et al. 2011; Stewart et al., 2012). The 
reviews respectively focus on microfinance (credit and savings) in Sub-Sahara Africa, 
microcredit worldwide, and microfinance worldwide (credit, saving and leasing). 
Overall, these reviews suggest that the effects of microcredit on women’s 
empowerment are at best mixed. In part this can be explained by the heterogeneity in 
microcredit interventions, contexts and target groups. However, the existing reviews 
did not use statistical meta-analysis to synthesise evidence of effects, nor context-
mechanism-outcome synthesis to understand the variation in effects. 
 
OBJECTIVES 
The main objective of this study was to provide a systematic review of the evidence on 
the effects of microcredit on women’s control over household spending in developing 
countries. More specifically, we aimed to answer two related research questions: 1) 
what does the impact evaluative evidence say about the causal relationship between 
microcredit and specific dimensions of women’s empowerment (women’s control over 
household spending); and 2) what are the mechanisms which mediate this 
relationship. We prioritise depth of analysis over breadth, thus the scope of this 
review is narrower than previous systematic reviews on microfinance (Stewart et al., 
2010; Duvendack et al. 2011; Stewart et al., 2012). We focused on specific aspects of 
women’s empowerment which allowed us to combine statistical meta-analysis and 
realist (context-mechanism-outcome) synthesis. 
 
CRITERIA FOR CONSIDERING STUDIES FOR THIS REVIEW 
We included studies that analyzed the effects of microcredit schemes targeting poor 
women in low and middle income countries, as defined by the World Bank. Studies 
that did not include analysis on microcredit and the effect on one or more dimensions 
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(specified in main body of the report) of women’s control over household 
expenditures were excluded. Studies which gave evidence of addressing the 
attribution problem either through randomised design, quasi-experimental matching, 
or regression analysis, were included. In practice, women’s control over household 
spending (as a key dimension of empowerment) is influenced by many different 
factors. By focusing on those studies which explicitly addressed the challenge of 
separating the effect of microcredit from other influencing factors, we developed what 
we consider to be the most credible evidence base for drawing conclusions about the 
effects of microcredit on women’s control over household expenditures in different 
contexts.  
 
SEARCH STRATEGY 
We conducted a comprehensive search covering all relevant academic databases, 
internet search engines and web sites with published and unpublished research, and 
also carried out extensive manual searches of books and additional journals not 
included in electronic data bases (searches were concluded on December 31, 2011).  
We used back-referencing from recent studies as well as citation-tracking to identify 
additional relevant studies. Finally, authors of studies which we were unable to 
retrieve were contacted. In addition, we contacted experts on microcredit and 
women’s empowerment for additional references which we might have missed. 
 
Search strategies in databases and journals were adapted for each source. Where 
possible we used the existing keyword indices of particular databases. In addition, we 
applied our own list of combinations of keywords covering all relevant terms relating 
to the independent variable (i.e. credit and its variations) and the dependent variable 
(i.e. dimensions of women’s control over household spending, empowerment). 
 
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
From the different searches we identified an initial number of 310 papers that were 
selected for full text examination. Eventually, 29 papers were retained for further 
analysis, corresponding to 25 unique studies. These 25 independent findings were 
included in the synthesis. However, based on a systematic risk of bias assessment we 
found that more than half of the included studies had high threats to internal validity. 
Moreover, only about half of the studies show a clear and coherent link between a 
theoretical framework on microcredit and women’s control over household spending 
and empirical data analysis. 
 
It should be noted that reviewing and synthesizing quantitative results from studies is 
only one side of the coin. The other side is to understand what makes them work, or 
what prevents them from working. Consequently, we conducted a qualitative 
synthesis of the included studies, which focused on identifying the mechanisms which 
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underlie the causal relationship between microcredit and women’s control over 
household spending. 
 
RESULTS 
The results of the meta-analysis indicated that the effect sizes from experimental 
studies examining effects of microcredit on women’s control over household spending 
are not statistically significantly different from zero. The effects from quasi-
experimental studies are statistically insignificant overall, and at best of small 
magnitude for those studies assessed of being of high risk of bias.  We conclude that 
there is no consistent evidence for an effect of microcredit on women’s control over 
household spending.  
 
In the qualitative analysis, using Coleman’s (1986, 1990) typology of mechanisms, we 
identified five different situational mechanisms and eight different action-formation 
mechanisms. Due to the combination of substantial heterogeneity in contexts (e.g. 
existing gender relations) and interventions (e.g. microcredit versus microcredit and 
additional services), and the lack of information in the studies on this heterogeneity, it 
was not possible to go beyond the identification of mechanisms, in terms of 
generating empirically tested articulated theories of change which are representative 
beyond a specific study context. 
 
AUTHORS’ CONCLUSIONS 
In line with three recent other reviews on microfinance (Stewart et al., 2010; 
Duvendack et al., 2011; Stewart et al. 2012) we found that the microcredit evidence 
base is extensive, yet most studies are weak methodologically. From those studies 
deemed comparable and of minimum acceptable quality, we concluded that overall 
there is no evidence for an effect of microcredit on women’s control over household 
spending.  
 
Women’s control over household resources constitutes an important intermediary 
dimension in processes of women’s empowerment. Given the overall lack of evidence 
for an effect of microcredit on women’s control over household resources it is 
therefore very unlikely that, overall, microcredit has a meaningful and substantial 
impact on empowerment processes in a broader sense. While impacts on 
empowerment may appear to have occurred in particular studies, the high risk of bias 
of studies providing positive assessments suggests that such findings are of limited 
validity. Our conclusions on the effects of microcredit on empowerment are also in 
line with previous systematic reviews by Duvendack et al. (2011) and Stewart (et al. 
2010) who report to a limited extent on empowerment effects. Consequently, there 
appears to be a gap between the often optimistic societal belief in the capacity of 
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microcredit to ameliorate the position of women in decision-making processes within 
the household on the one hand, and the empirical evidence base on the other hand. 
 
However, our review markedly differs from previous reviews in two regards. First, we 
specifically focused on microcredit and women’s empowerment captured through 
women’s control over household expenditures. Second, as a result of this narrower 
focus, we were able to conduct statistical meta-analysis and extract behavioral 
mechanisms which can help to explain why and how microcredit can make a 
difference. The advantage of our approach was that the identified mechanisms all 
stem from studies which show evidence of addressing the attribution problem. 
Consequently, we can be quite confident of the insights that they provided on the 
effects of microcredit on women’s control over household spending for particular 
populations of microcredit female clients and their families. 
 
Those studies that showed evidence of addressing the attribution problem were 
relatively weak on underlying theory. Moreover, they often lacked essential 
information such as the nature of the intervention and how it related to 
empowerment (e.g. how solidarity groups affect empowerment processes) or the 
slowly evolving gender relations in different contexts (e.g. the evolution of societal 
norms and the relationship with power relations in the household). A next logical step 
would be to undertake a systematic review of qualitative studies which often provide 
rich and context-specific information on microcredit and women’s decision-making 
power in the household. Such a review should ideally build on the mechanisms 
identified in the present review and would bring us closer to uncovering credible 
theories of microcredit and the circumstances in which it may change women’s 
decision-making power.
12 
 
1 Background 
1.1  INTRODUCTION 
Over the past three decades, microfinance activities have spread across the globe, 
reaching tens of millions of poor households with tailored financial services. Current 
estimates vary between 133 and 190 million microfinance clients worldwide1
 
. This 
growing importance has resulted in a vast number of research and evaluation 
studies, including impact studies. Microfinance can best be described as a range of 
financial services rather than a particular instrument. Initially, microfinance usually 
meant microcredit for working capital and very small investments, but increasingly 
it has been broadened to include savings and deposits, a limited range of micro-
insurance and payment services (including micro-leasing), as well as a somewhat 
broader range of credit products for more substantial investments. In this study we 
focus on microcredit activities, constituting the bulk of microfinance activities across 
the globe. 
For millions of poor and very poor households microcredit can constitute a 
potentially powerful tool for development and an escape from the poverty trap. 
Claims and supporting evidence can be found in the literature on microcredit – 
provided with or without complementary services – resulting in a range of positive 
effects, from income growth and consumption smoothing effects to gender and 
social empowerment (e.g. Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). At the same 
time, concerns about the independence of some of the impact studies commissioned 
by microfinance organizations2
 
, the fact that certain aspects such as employment 
effects are under-analyzed (Balkenhol, s.d.), the limited macro-economic impact 
(Honohan, 2004) and an increasing body of evidence on the negligible and even 
negative effects (mainly on the extreme poor) as well as lack of rural outreach of 
microfinance, are some of the more recent critical signals emerging in the debates 
(e.g. Dichter and Harper, 2007). 
The number of studies addressing the role of microcredit in development processes 
at micro- and meso-scales, as well as more specific studies addressing the impacts of 
                                                        
1 Number of microcredit borrowers according to several sources, see at CGAP: 
http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.11.1792/1.26.1301/ (last consulted 14.03.2011). 
2 The microfinance sector counts an increasing number of mid-size and big microfinance organizations 
many of which continue to depend in part on development assistance, private capital and other sources 
of finance to fund their growing portfolios. 
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credit on livelihood processes and small enterprise development has increased 
substantially over the years. Microcredit activities have affected the lives of clients 
and others in multiple ways. The most frequently reported types of effects of credit 
at individual, enterprise and household level are the following: income, expenditure 
smoothing, and poverty alleviation effects; business growth and employment effects; 
schooling effects; and effects in terms of women’s empowerment.  
 
One of the first comparative studies addressing effects of microfinance using quasi-
experiments was Hulme and Mosley’s (1996) Finance against Poverty, bringing a 
new critical voice to the debate by showing the limitations of microfinance in 
bringing about poverty alleviation. Subsequently, more and more quasi-
experimental and regression-based analyses have followed (e.g. Pitt and Khandker, 
1998; Khandker, 2003)3
 
. More recently, randomised controlled trials (RCTs) have 
been used to assess particular aspects of microcredit activities (e.g. Giné and Karlan, 
2008; Banerjee et al., 2009). 
Despite the diversity in microcredit schemes, many share two characteristics: they 
target poor women and often rely on some type of group-based lending4. Women’s 
empowerment in relation to microcredit has been studied extensively within the 
context of this type of microcredit scheme5
 
. Most of these studies have been carried 
out in the context of microcredit group schemes in South Asia. Women’s 
empowerment can be broadly defined as an “expansion in the range of potential 
choices available to women” (Kabeer, 2001: 81). It has been argued that access to 
microcredit can foster changes in individual attitudes of women (e.g. increased self-
reliance), power relations within the household (e.g. control over resources) and 
social status (Malhotra et al., 2002). 
Mayoux (2006) argues that the inter-linkages between microcredit and women’s 
empowerment are delineated differently by existing paradigms. The financial 
sustainability paradigm as well as the feminist empowerment paradigm emphasise 
women’s income-earning activities, whereas the poverty alleviation paradigm 
emphasises the effects on household expenditures and particularly the use of loans 
for consumption purposes. Consequently, one can identify a wide range of measures 
that try to capture the effect of microcredit on women’s empowerment in the 
literature (Kabeer, 2001). 
 
An important dimension of empowerment concerns women’s control over household 
spending (Pitt et al., 2003). The main assumption is that by providing credit to poor 
                                                        
3 USAID founded a special group called ‘Assessing the Impact of Microenterprise Services’ (AIMS) 
which among others focused on quasi-experimental impact analysis of microfinance. 
4 This term refers to a microcredit modality in which clients are organised in groups. Transaction costs 
for selection of clients and enforcement of repayment are transferred from the microfinance institution 
to the group. Regarding the latter, repayment is often based on principles of joint liability (i.e. if one of 
the group members cannot pay back a loan other members have to step in) or contingent renewal (i.e. 
no new loans will be issued to group members if one or more members are in arrears). 
5 See for example the special issue of ADA Dialogue (nr 37, 2007): Microfinance and gender: new 
contributions to an old issue. 
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women, their direct control over expenditures within the household increases, with 
subsequent implications for the status of women and the well-being of women and 
other household members. Women’s control over household spending is a 
frequently recurring aspect analyzed within the context of microcredit interventions, 
which allows us to study whether microcredit targeted at women affects women’s 
control over household spending decisions and the circumstances in which this 
occurs. 
 
1.2  THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MICROCREDIT 
The microfinance literature harbors a substantial number of synthesis studies which 
discuss a set of microcredit interventions intended to generate claims on impact with 
a certain degree of external validity. However, most of these studies face limitations 
in terms of addressing the attribution problem of effects microcredit – that is, the 
extent to which changes can be attributed to microcredit as opposed to other 
influencing factors. There are also concerns as to the extent to which findings can be 
generalised beyond particular contexts. Moreover, methodological principles 
regarding comprehensive searches and principles of selection, coding, extraction 
and aggregation are often lacking in these studies. Examples of studies with cross-
intervention perspectives on impact are Hulme and Mosley (1996), Snodgrass and 
Sebstad (2002), Goldberg (2005), Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) and 
EBI (2007).  
 
Recently, three systematic reviews on the effects of microfinance have been 
published. Stewart et al. (2010) in their study on microcredit and micro-savings 
effects in sub-Saharan Africa concluded that microcredit has mixed effects. With 
respect to empowerment they conclude that there is some evidence of empowering 
effects of microcredit but it is inconsistent across studies. Duvendack et al. (2011) 
provide a detailed assessment of the methodological quality of the global evidence 
on microcredit. In their analysis they observe that there are only very few 
randomised controlled trials that are of relevance to the review’s objectives, which is 
to assess the impact of microfinance on the well-being of poor people. They also 
highlight a number of methodological biases and problems in the existing RCTs in 
the field of microfinance as well as studies relying on other designs (e.g. pipeline-
studies). The two RCTs included in their study (Banerjee et al., 2009; Karlan and 
Zinman, 2007) were found to show several methodological flaws which potentially 
compromise their findings. With respect to empowerment they conclude that there 
is no robust evidence of positive impacts of microcredit on women’s status.  Finally, 
Stewart et al. (2012) employ a broader scope to microfinance, explicitly looking at 
global evidence on microcredit, micro-savings and micro-leasing. The review 
confirms the findings about microcredit of the first review conducted by some of the 
same authors (Stewart et al., 2010) and highlights the difficulties in drawing 
generalizable conclusions about the effects of microcredit. It does not draw any 
conclusions on microcredit and empowerment. 
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From Stewart et al. (2010) and Duvendack et al. (2011) we can conclude that the 
effects of microcredit on women’s empowerment are at best mixed. In part this can 
be explained by the heterogeneity in microcredit interventions, contexts and target 
groups. With respect to women’s empowerment Kabeer (2001) argues that the 
divergence in results between different impact studies is mainly due to differences in 
methodology as well as conceptualization and measurement of the concept of 
empowerment. Regarding the latter, the literature on microcredit and empowerment 
has covered such diverse aspects as participation in household decision-making (e.g. 
Mizan, 1993; Kabeer, 2001), control over assets (e.g. Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1996), 
women’s relative physical mobility, political and legal awareness and participation in 
public protests and political campaigns (Hashemi et al., 1996; Zaman, 1998) and 
knowledge of accounting practices (Ackerly, 1995) (see section 1.4.). The diversity in 
conceptualization of the construct of empowerment makes it more difficult to 
generate generalizable findings through a systematic review. In line with the 
diversity in outcome variables which are commonly associated with women’s 
empowerment, the literature also refers to multiple potential causal pathways.  
 
A commonly studied causal relationship is the potential link between microcredit as 
a resource and the opportunity space for women receiving loans to act more 
independently from men. Credit can potentially strengthen the bargaining position 
of a woman vis-à-vis a man within the household and hence provide the basis for 
gradual changes in the power balance within the household, the social status of the 
woman within the household and the community and ultimately gender relations. 
Thus, bargaining power or decision-making power, often studied in the context of 
decisions on household expenditures, is a key intermediate variable which lies at the 
basis of many manifestations of empowerment. This is one of the main reasons why 
we have chosen to focus on women’s control over household expenditures in this 
review. Despite the central and recurrent role across studies of this aspect of 
women’s empowerment in relation to microcredit activities, there has been no in-
depth systematic review of empowerment outcomes. The existing reviews which do 
aim to synthesise impacts of microcredit neither employ statistical meta-analysis to 
synthesise quantitative findings on effects, nor undertake context-mechanism-
outcome synthesis to understand mediating factors. 
 
Methodological quality of microcredit impact studies has often been contested (e.g. 
Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005; Karlan and Goldberg, 2006; Odell, 
2010). The few RCTs conducted in the context of microcredit interventions that 
cover aspects of women’s empowerment (e.g. Banerjee et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2007) 
in fact examine different outcomes. Banerjee et al. (2009) look at the effect of 
microcredit on women’s control over household spending, whereas Kim et al. (2007) 
cover a much larger set of empowerment indicators ranging from changes in self-
confidence, to changes in gender norms and partner relationships. 
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There is also a substantial number of quasi-experimental and regression-based 
studies studying the relationships between microcredit and women’s empowerment, 
including women’s control over household spending. Quasi-experiments and, even 
more so, regression-based analyses have been criticised regarding their limitations 
in addressing selection bias issues. Selection bias is likely to arise in microcredit 
programmes targeting the poor, as it may be expected that women who choose to 
participate in the programme are on average more empowered than those who do 
not (Goldberg, 2005). An example of a methodological critique comes from a paper 
by Roodman and Morduch (2009) who replicate what was long considered to be the 
most rigorous study on microcredit impact in the field: Pitt and Khandker’s (1998)6 
study on microcredit in Bangladesh. While Roodman and Morduch’s  (2009) paper 
does not arrive at substantially different findings, they do point out several 
methodological flaws endemic to quasi- and non-experimental impact studies on 
microcredit. A major methodological challenge is endogeneity. In the case of 
microcredit this often refers to a situation in which both access to credit and a 
particular outcome variable (e.g. change in income) are not necessarily causally 
related but both depend on a third variable, e.g. educational level. This is a key 
element of the attribution problem, often not adequately addressed in microcredit 
studies (see Roodman and Morduch, 2009)7
 
. 
In light of the above, the present review starts out from two basic premises. First, 
advances in methodology (and computing technology) have led to an increase in 
evaluations of the impact of microfinance. It is important to distinguish studies with 
a high degree of internal validity of findings, in terms of being able to attribute 
findings to microcredit controlling for other factors. In generalizing about ‘what 
works’ across studies, internal validity is a prerequisite for external validity. Second, 
women’s empowerment is a multidimensional concept; comparison across 
interventions and contexts requires a clear delimitation and focus on aspects of 
empowerment which are recurrent and more universal than others. Nevertheless, 
any comparison is inherently constrained by the fact that empowerment processes 
are embedded in gender relations which are very context-specific and diverse across 
regions and countries. 
 
Keeping in mind these qualifications, in this review we extract quantitative effect 
size information from included studies on variables that relate to women’s control 
over household spending. On the basis of these data, we undertake statistical meta-
analysis. In addition, in line with the theory-based approach to impact evaluation 
(Pawson, 2006; 2010; Astbury and Leeuw, 2010) it should be noted that reviewing 
and synthesizing quantitative results from studies with a high level of internal 
validity is only one side of the coin. The other side is to understand what makes 
them work, or what prevents them from working. This means that the question 
about what mechanisms are believed to make the programme work has to be 
                                                        
6 Including a few other related publications such as Khandker (2003). 
7 A newer version of this paper (2011) is available at www.cgdev.org. 
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addressed. Consequently, this review is inspired by the synthesis approach discussed 
in Van der Knaap et al. (2008) which combines a focus on synthesizing high internal 
validity studies with theory-based evaluation principles of ‘opening the black box’8
 
 to 
examine the mechanisms underlying processes of change. 
1.3  OBJECTIVES OF THE REVIEW 
The main objective of this study is to provide a systematic review of the evidence on 
the effects of microcredit on women’s control over household spending in developing 
countries. More specifically, we aim to answer two related research questions:  
1) what does the impact evaluative evidence say about the causal relationship 
between microcredit and a specific dimension of women’s empowerment: 
women’s control over household spending?; and  
2) what are the mechanisms which mediate the relationship between microcredit 
and women’s empowerment?  
 
We prioritise depth of analysis over breadth, thus, unlike the existing systematic 
reviews on microfinance (Stewart et al., 2010; Duvendack et al. 2011; Stewart et al., 
2012), the review focuses on empowerment outcomes. The review undertakes 
analysis of the relationship between microcredit and empowerment in greater depth 
than existing reviews, by conducting both statistical meta-analysis and context-
mechanism-outcome synthesis. We focus on specific aspects of women’s 
empowerment which allows us to combine these two methods of synthesis. 
 
1.4  THEORETICAL MODEL AND DELIMITATION 
In the last three decades, a large number of studies have looked at the effects of 
microcredit on women’s empowerment. Different studies often generate widely 
different findings. Some of these diverging findings are summarised below (see 
Table 1). 
 
Positive 
Table 1. Positive and negative empowerment outcomes as a result of microcredit 
interventions 
Negative 
• ↑ access to financial resources (= 
credit) 
• ↑ control over financial resources 
(=credit) 
• ↑ control over other resources 
(beyond the credit) 
• women do not control the financial resources (access ≠ 
control) but the repayment obligation remains  
• ↓ consumption women and children   
• no increased access and control over other resources  
(tangible and intangible) 
• increase of double/triple working day  
                                                        
8 The ‘black box’ is a metaphor used in this context to indicate that the causal relationships between an 
intervention and its effects are all too often hidden and not made explicit. 
18 
 
• changes in household allocation of 
resources 
• ↑ access/control to savings’ 
opportunities  
• ↑ access to emergency fund  
• ↑ participation in household 
decisions  (↑ individual agency) 
• ↑ female (self)-employment 
• ↑ job mobility  
• changes in local gender relations  
 
E.g. Amin et al. (1998); Hashemi and 
Schuler (1994); Kabeer (2001); 
Kaboshi and Townsend (2005); 
Zaman (2000); Holvoet (2006) 
• increase of domestic violence  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E.g. Brett (2006); Goetz and Sen Gupta (1996); Mayoux 
(1999);  Lessinger (1990); Rahman (1998); Yaqub (1995); 
Holvoet (2005; 2006) 
 
Several factors have been identified which can explain these differences (see for 
example Kabeer, 2001). First of all, studies were conducted in different settings, for 
example different regions, countries, rural and urban settings. Empowerment is 
highly context-specific and existing gender relations, norms and beliefs differ widely 
across regions and countries. Gender relations are shaped by a complex interplay of 
religious, cultural and socio-economic factors. Consequently, what in one case could 
be called ‘empowering’ in other cases is not, which has implications for the external 
validity of findings of individual studies as well as synthesis across studies. For 
example, it is more likely that microcredit of any type will have an effect on women’s 
participation over household spending in a context where the existing gender norms 
are not extremely male-biased. In a situation where general gender norms are 
extremely pro-male, it is less likely that microcredit will be enough to increase 
women’s agency inside the household. 
 
Second, there are differences in the methodologies used to study microfinance 
impacts, ranging from experimental, quasi-experimental to non-experimental. These 
studies are likely to produce different impact estimates due to the internal validity of 
findings – that is, the extent to which it has been established beyond doubt that 
there is a causal relationship between intervention and outcome – and the different 
types of estimation procedure used (Duvendack et al., 2012).  
 
Third, studies cover different time spans and lengths of follow-up. Some studies may 
be based on one data collection moment or a data set of one particular moment in 
time only, while other studies may include multiple data collection points with 
months or years in between these points. In case of empowerment, a longer time 
span is warranted for changes to be observed. Changes in some aspects of 
empowerment may take a long time to materialise; if one implements an impact 
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study after three years, it is unlikely that some of the intended changes (e.g. changes 
in local gender relations) have already taken place.  
 
Two final aspects relate to the construct validity of findings – that is, the extent to 
which particular variable(s) used in a study adequately represent a specific 
phenomenon. There are differences in the way in which the construct of 
‘empowerment’ is operationalised in the different studies. Different findings to a 
large extent reflect the fact that empowerment was measured differently across 
studies, which again is in part related to the context-specificity of gender relations 
and empowerment. There are also differences in the microfinance programmes 
under study, which in part relates to schools of thought on microfinance and 
empowerment. Most microfinance programmes, particularly those targeted at 
women, use ‘group intermediation’. While these programmes look very similar at 
first sight, there are important differences from a gender perspective in the way 
group intermediation is used which might explain differential impacts on women’s 
empowerment (see Annex 1). 
 
The impact of microcredit on women’s control over household spending can be 
meaningfully studied within the framework of the intra-household allocation 
literature (see for example Holvoet, 2004, 2005; Pitt and Khandker, 1998; see also 
Annex 2). In this context, microcredit is an external factor, a resource made 
available to one or more household member, which might influence the individuals 
inside the household and thus their control over or participation in household 
spending decisions. A useful way to unpack the construct of empowerment is based 
on Kabeer (1999, 2001) who distinguishes among three different interrelated 
dimensions of empowerment: resources, agency and achievements (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1.  Basic causal chain - dimensions of empowerment  
 
 
 
 
From the perspective of an individual woman and intra-household relations, the 
three concepts in Figure 1 can be explained as follows. The first aspect concerns 
access and control over resources (inputs) which potentially changes the balance of 
intra-household decision-making power of the woman vis-à-vis the man.  
 
The second dimension of empowerment relates to agency (process). Women’s 
control over household spending could be classified under this heading and will be 
further discussed below; ‘control’ is in itself a vague construct and could be 
resources outcomesagency
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operationalised through ‘participation in decision-making’. Control over small 
household expenditures is mostly a very time-consuming task where not much real 
decision-making power is involved as small household expenditures are very similar 
day-to-day; having control over small household expenditures is in most cases also 
in line with the existing gender norms and gendered division of responsibilities over 
household spending. Nevertheless, an increase in decision-making power of the 
woman in the household on these issues can be considered as increased ‘individual 
agency’ and is part of the broader process of women’s empowerment. A broad range 
of different areas of decision-making has been analyzed in the literature on 
household decision-making (e.g. Acharya and Bennett, 1982; Allen and Strauss, 
1984; Douglas and Wind, 1978; Hashemi and Schuler, 1994; White, 1984), including 
both small and large expenditures, time and task allocation, family and kinship 
matters, among others. Consequently, we have chosen to broaden our scope to all 
intra-household decision-making related to expenditures. 
 
The third dimension is linked to outcomes, which broadly can be classified in two 
categories. First are outcomes in terms of changes in the socio-cultural construct of 
‘gender’ itself (achievements). Proxies here will by definition be highly context-
specific, as gender is a socio-cultural construct; for example in those cases where 
there are strict gender norms regarding female mobility, which essentially refers to 
the possibility for women to participate in activities beyond the household. 
Increased female mobility could therefore be a good proxy for empowerment. 
Second, there may be economic outcomes, in terms of increased spending on 
education, health, nutrition, with corresponding developmental effects on household 
well-being. Regarding the latter, it is important to distinguish between a simple 
gender division in spending – e.g. the practice that a woman tends to spend 
relatively more on consumption and less on productive activities than the man – and 
an empowerment effect, in terms of women having a greater say in household 
spending, which caused the change in expenditures.  
 
This difference has been adequately worded by Pitt et al. (2006: 818; italics added). 
“In summary, the finding that the effect of women’s program participation on 
outcomes such as child health differs from the effect of men’s program participation 
cannot be taken to necessarily imply that women have gained power in the 
household. This result can, in principle, reflect standard income and substitution 
effects. However, our analysis of the relationship of subjectively measured 
empowerment to microcredit adds another piece of evidence suggesting that 
program-induced changes in women’s empowerment may be a powerful mechanism 
underlying the differential welfare impacts by gender of participant.” 
 
It is obvious that those studies which operationalise empowerment in terms of 
‘access to resources’ will more easily find positive outcomes (almost a tautology as 
microfinance is opening up the access to financial resources), as compared to studies 
which look at the increase of individual agency and actual changes in the socio-
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cultural construct of ‘gender’. As a result, one cannot simply accept conclusions such 
as women have been empowered by microcredit as this may mean very different 
things across studies and is much more easily achieved if empowerment is equated 
to access. Consequently, this constitutes another important reason why this review 
focuses on a particular dimension of empowerment. 
 
As explained above, in order to enhance the comparability of studies on 
empowerment and the generalizability of findings we focus on a common recurrent 
dimension of women’s empowerment, women’s control over household 
expenditures, which is an important proxy of agency.  The basic causal chain in 
Figure 1 provides a useful basis for further developing our theoretical framework. 
Given the context-specificity of gender relations, the differences across contexts with 
regard to the underlying determinants of gender relations and empowerment, and 
the implications for the differences in significance of aspects of women’s control over 
household expenditures as key aspects of processes of women’s empowerment, we 
have not produced a detailed theory of change on women’s empowerment which is 
generalizable to all contexts across the globe. Consequently, we start out from the 
simple model presented in Figure 1 and connect this model to several explanatory 
mechanisms. 
 
Mechanisms are the “cogs and wheels that have brought the relationship [between 
policies and outcomes] into existence” (Elster, 1989: 3; 2007: 36). Hedstrom (2005: 
181) defines a mechanism as “a constellation of entities and activities that are linked 
to one another in such a way that they regularly bring about a particular type of 
outcome.” Mechanisms operate at a deeper level than input-throughput-output-
outcome process variables: “We must go below the ‘domain of empirical’ surface 
level descriptions of constant conjunctions and statistical correlations to identify the 
underlying mechanisms that account for regularities in the joint-occurrence of 
events” (Astbury and Leeuw, 2010: 368). Based on Coleman (1990), Hedstrom 
(2005) and Elster (2007) we distinguished between three types of mechanisms: 
situational, action-formation mechanisms and transformational (Box 1). 
 
 BOX 1 Typology of three types of mechanisms 
 
Situational mechanisms operate at the macro-to-micro level. This type of mechanism 
shows how specific social situations or events shape the beliefs, desires, and opportunities 
of individual actors. An example is the opportunity structure by which a community, 
village or city is characterised; the more there are opportunities e.g. for crime, for 
employment, the larger the chance that crimes will be committed and jobs will be found. 
Another example has to do with the demographic composition of families or societies. The 
Easterlin- effect links the size of birth cohorts to among other things job opportunities but 
also levels of crime.  
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Action-formation mechanisms operate at the micro-to-micro level. This type of 
mechanism looks at how individual choices and actions are influenced by specific 
combinations of (individual) desires, beliefs, and opportunities. Cognitive dissonance, the 
fundamental attribution error and other cognitive processes and biases are examples, but 
also crowding out, relative deprivation or the working of the incentives are examples.  
 
Transformational mechanisms operate at the micro-to-macro level and show how a 
number of individuals, through their actions and interactions, generate macro-level 
outcomes.  An example is ‘‘cascading,’’ by which people influence one another so much that 
people ignore their private knowledge and rely instead on the publicly stated judgments of 
others. Threshold effects, also known as ‘tipping points’ or ‘critical mass models of collective 
action’ are other examples. In economics, an example could be a movement from a bull 
market to a bear market; in sociology, it could be the spread of political dissent culminating 
in rebellion (Granovetter, 1983). 
 
Sources: See for example Coleman (1986); Hedstrom (2005); Astbury and Leeuw, (2010). 
 
The link between the three types of mechanisms and the simple causal chain 
between microcredit and empowerment is presented in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Mechanisms underlying the microcredit – empowerment causal chain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For microcredit, the meaning of the different types of mechanisms can be 
summarised through the following example questions: 
• Situational mechanism: To what extent and in what ways does the existing 
opportunity structure of a region/area affect the chances for women to receive 
microcredit? How do changes in the opportunity structure through microcredit 
affect the behavior of women vis-à-vis men in the household, and under which 
conditions? 
resources outcomesagency
Situational 
mechanism
Situational 
mechanism
Action-
formation 
mechanism
individual, 
household
group, 
community, 
.....
clients.Transforma
tional mechanism 
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• Action-formation mechanism: which social, cultural, and behavioral 
mechanisms underlie processes of empowerment (e.g. an increase in women’s 
decision-making power within the household) of women receiving microcredit? 
• Transformational mechanism: which mechanisms explain how changes in the 
behaviour of individuals contribute to changes at a ‘macro’ level (e.g. at 
community or regional level)?  
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2 Approach 
 
2.1  CRITERIA FOR CONSIDERING STUDIES FOR THE 
REVIEW 
2.1.1 Types of studies 
The primary focus of the review is on studies with an acceptable level of internal 
validity of findings with respect to the causal link between microcredit and women’s 
control over household expenditures. The minimum criterion for inclusion was that 
studies should show evidence of addressing the attribution problem in a systematic 
manner, either through randomised design or quasi-experimental approaches, for 
example statistical matching or regression analysis. This means that the causal 
analysis between microcredit and relevant proxies of women’s control over 
household expenditures controlled for other confounding factors either through 
experimental or quasi-experimental design, or statistical controls.  
 
Studies based on the following designs were eligible for inclusion: 
1) Randomised designs 
2) Quasi-experimental designs 
- Pipeline approach 
- Propensity score matching 
- Cohort design 
- Ex post only measurements (with matching) 
- Regression discontinuity 
3) Regression-based approaches 
- Cross-section data 
- Panel data (cross-section plus multiple observation points in time; including 
fixed effects and difference-in-differences analysis) 
- Instrumental variables analysis 
 
All included studies employed treatment and comparison groups. Studies with 
analyses referring to our variables of interest based on comparisons between clients 
and non-clients, or other group-based comparisons, without further explanation or 
treatment of how differences between groups were addressed, were excluded. Non-
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experimental studies without counterfactual analysis were excluded (e.g. pre-post or 
single ex post measurement of microcredit beneficiaries only).  
 
Given the breadth of studies designs included in the literature and our analysis, it 
was important to assess selection bias and confounding, as has been highlighted by 
several authors. For example, Husain et al. (2010:6) assert that “[g]iven that 
enrolment in SHGs [self-help groups] is voluntary, self-selection emerges as an 
important issue. Self-selection occurs when members of a group have a 
predisposition to choose certain outcomes. Since women have the choice to join a 
SHG or not, the movement is more likely to attract women who are already 
economically active, or are more empowered than others. In this case, for instance, 
‘empowered’ women will join DWCUA [Development of Women and Children in 
Urban Areas9
 
] members, while those who are not ‘empowered’ are less likely to join 
such groups”. We therefore conducted detailed design-based risk of bias assessment 
and sensitivity analysis (see section 3.3.1). It should be noted that several of the 
studies included in the review rigorously address the issue of selection bias, although 
this is not necessarily the case. For example, whereas a randomised design may 
effectively rule out selection bias issues, a simple regression analysis based on 
observational data is unlikely to do so. 
We took into account studies that were published later than 198010
2.1.2 Types of participants 
. Searches 
included studies published up to July 31, 2011. In terms of type of publication, we 
included studies in peer reviewed and non-peer reviewed journals, articles in books, 
grey literature (e.g. policy reports, study documents) and PhD theses. 
We included studies that analyzed the effects of microcredit schemes targeting poor 
women in low and middle income countries, as defined by the World Bank. 
2.1.3 Types of interventions and comparisons 
Microcredit interventions targeting women differ in several characteristics. First, 
there is a difference between group-based schemes and schemes providing 
individual loans. Some microcredit institutions use both modalities. Group-based 
credit schemes usually refer to a system in which credit is provided to women 
organised in solidarity groups. Within these groups women receive individual loans. 
Repayment is enforced through mechanisms of group pressure based on principles 
such as joint liability and contingent renewal. Individual loans are directly provided 
to the female client. 
 
Second, in many cases credit is linked to other services (‘credit-plus’) such as 
training or financial services such as savings. Comparisons in primary studies 
                                                        
9 DWCUA aims at helping groups of urban poor women in taking up self-employment ventures. 
10 Most microfinance institutions were founded in the 1980s or later. A few were founded in the 1970s. 
The roots of the Grameen Bank, a pioneer institution in the field of microfinance, can be traced back to 
1976, but it became an independent microfinance institution in 1983.  
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usually concern women with credit versus women without credit. Comparisons were 
also eligible which included comparisons between different types of microcredit 
beneficiaries distinguishing them by specific characteristics, such as young versus 
older women, or recent versus mature clients. Finally, comparisons were eligible 
which compared female clients to male clients. 
2.1.4 Types of outcome measures 
We included studies estimating the impact of micro-credit interventions on women’s 
control over household spending, including women’s decision-making power, 
women’s bargaining power, or women’s control over expenditures with respect to 
small purchases or large purchases. These include expenditures relating to any type 
of consumption good, productive investment or acquiring of assets, for example 
clothing, education, health, food, house repairs, small livestock, large livestock and 
land. 
 
Proxies of women’s empowerment beyond the control over household expenditures 
were excluded. For instance, there is not always a gender division in the control over 
household expenditures. In such contexts microcredit may affect women’s 
empowerment in alternative ways. Moreover, some studies measure empowerment 
by looking only at changes in household expenditures. While such changes may be 
outcomes of empowerment processes – for example, changes in decision-making 
power (see section 1.4) – they may also simply be a reflection of a gender division in 
income use. For example, women may have a tendency to spend more on 
consumption rather than productive activities, whereas men may show the reverse 
tendency. In case a study only focused on changes in expenditures, but made no 
references to any changes in decision-making, then it was excluded from our 
selection. 
 
2.2  LITERATURE SCREENING PROCESS 
In order to identify studies with the relevant focus in terms of outcome variables, we 
applied an appraisal sequence which ultimately led to a selection of a batch of 
studies to be used for further data extraction and synthesis. This sequence 
principally relied on two dimensions, assessment of relevance (this section) and 
assessment of the strength of internal validity and construct validity11
 
 of studies 
(next section). 
Titles and abstracts identified in the search process described above which appeared 
to meet the inclusion criteria were entered (where possible) in ProCite and 
subsequently in an Excel sheet. If not possible studies were directly entered into 
Excel. Subsequently, all studies were independently coded by two reviewers (AR and 
JV) on the basis of the following classification: 
                                                        
13 None of the studies in this systematic review reported ex-ante power calculations. Ex-post power 
calculations (included in Masset et al., 2011) are controversial (Ellis, 2010; Hoenig and Heisey, 2001). 
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• Priority 1: study is on the impact of microcredit on women’s empowerment; 
involves original empirical analysis. 
• Priority 2: study is on the impact of microcredit, covering multiple outcome 
measures which include aspects of women’s empowerment; involves original 
empirical analysis. 
• Priority 3: study is on the impact of microcredit and women’s empowerment but 
does not rely on original empirical analysis. 
• Priority 4: all other studies. 
 
Where necessary full-text copies were obtained to facilitate coding. Full-text copies 
were obtained for all priority 1 and 2 studies. 
 
After the first pre-selection of studies the following selection sequence was applied 
(AR and JV, independently): 
- All priority 1 and 2 papers were screened and purely qualitative studies12
- Subsequently, all remaining studies were screened for the nature of outcome 
measures. Studies that did not include causal analysis on microcredit and the 
effect on one or more dimensions of women’s control over household 
expenditures were dropped. We refer to this step as being an assessment of the 
construct validity of findings (whether or not a particular study covers specific 
aspects or multiple aspects of women’s control over household expenditures). In 
fact, this exercise constitutes only a first step in what could be referred to as the 
construct validity assessment of eligible studies. A second step is presented in 
section 2.3, where we outline coding and data extraction with respect to the 
theoretical framework of individual studies. Finally, the remaining studies were 
screened for methodological design. This generated a batch of studies which 
provided the basis for our data extraction and synthesis work. 
 were 
discarded. 
Figure 3 
summarises the sequence of steps leading to the inclusion or exclusion of 
studies identified in the search (see next section). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
13 None of the studies in this systematic review reported ex-ante power calculations. Ex-post power 
calculations (included in Masset et al., 2011) are controversial (Ellis, 2010; Hoenig and Heisey, 2001). 
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Figure 3. Sequence of inclusion and exclusion of studies 
 
2.3  SEARCH STRATEGY 
We searched databases of published literature, conducted internet searches for 
published and unpublished research, and manually searched books and journals (AR 
and JV). Searches were concluded on 31 December 2011. Previous searches on 
microcredit impact studies by team members generated close to 300 studies (see 
Vaessen et al., 2009) and approximately 60 studies from this database which related 
to women’s empowerment were assessed for inclusion in the review. Searches were 
STEP 1: Screening (of title and 
abstract or in case the latter was 
unavailable the full text) of 
studies identified through the 
search strategy (see section 2.2.). 
Classification of all studies into 
four priorities (see section 2.1.5). 
STEP 2: Select studies of priority 
1&2. 
STEP 3: Select studies with 
quantitative analysis covering at 
least one random representative 
sample of microcredit 
STEP 4: Select studies with 
outcome variables that relate to 
women’s control over household 
spending. 
STEP 5: Select studies that show 
evidence of addressing the 
attribution problem. 
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performed mainly in English and where possible in Spanish and French. See Annex 
3 for the full search strategy.  
 
Database search of published literature: 
 
The following databases were included in the search process: 
- EBSCO Business Source Premier 
- Econlit (EBSCO) 
- Econpapers 
- IBSS (EBSCO) 
- JSTOR 
- PsycINFO (EBSCO) 
- SocINDEX (EBSCO) 
- Source OECD 
- ISI Web of Knowledge 
 
Web-based: 
- JOLIS: jolis.worldbankimflib.org/ 
- BLDS: http://blds.ids.ac.uk/ 
- LILACS: http://bases.bireme.br/cgi-bin/wxislind.exe/iah/online/ 
- Googlescholar: scholar.google.com  
 
Relevant portals and institutions (internet): 
 
Portals: 
- CGAP: www.cgap.org 
- Microbanking Bulletin: www.themix.org 
- Microfinance Gateway: www.microfinancegateway.org 
- Microfinance Network: www.mfnetwork.org 
- SEEP: http://www.seepnetwork.org 
 
Multilateral and bilateral and non-governmental donor organizations: African 
Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, DFID, EBI, Inter-American 
Development Bank, USAID, World Bank. 
 
Research institutes, foundations and networks: Center for Global Development, 
Grameen Foundation, BRAC Research and Evaluation Division, IDS, IDEAS, IFPRI, 
J-PAL, 3ie. 
 
Manual searches: 
 
We conducted separate online keyword searches for selected journals, some of which 
are not covered by the electronic databases mentioned above, covering all volumes, 
30 
 
starting from 1980 or from the first volume onwards if the journal was founded later, 
until July 31, 2011. The following journals were searched: 
- African Development Review 
- Development in Practice 
- Journal of Development Entrepreneurship 
- Journal of Development Effectiveness  
- Journal of Development Studies 
- Journal of International Development 
- ESR Review (previously Journal of Microfinance) 
- Microcredit review 
- Savings and development 
- Enterprise Development and Microfinance (previously Small Enterprise 
Development) 
- World Bank Research Observer 
- World Bank Economic Review 
- World Development 
 
In addition, we screened the tables of contents of books on microfinance for relevant 
chapters. Book collections from Maastricht University, University of Antwerp as well 
as other university libraries in The Netherlands and Belgium were consulted. 
 
We used back-referencing from recent studies (including (systematic) reviews) as 
well as (where possible) citation-tracking to identify additional relevant studies. 
 
Finally, authors of studies which we were unable to retrieve were contacted. In 
addition, we contacted experts on microcredit (and women’s empowerment) for 
additional references, which we might have missed. 
 
Keywords 
 
Search strategies in databases and journals were adapted for each source. Where 
possible we used the existing keyword indices of particular databases. In general, the 
following keywords were used: 
 
a) microcredit 
a) microfinance 
a) microlending 
a) *credit 
a) *finance 
a) *lending 
a) *loans 
b) women 
b) gender 
c) control 
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c) decision-mak* 
c) empower*  
c) bargain* 
c) expense* 
c) expenditure*  
c) spend* 
 
Keyword combinations relating individual words from a + b and a + c and a + b + c 
were used, depending on the keyword search limitations of the database. 
 
2.4  CODING AND DATA EXTRACTION 
We systematically extracted the following information from included studies. We 
recorded data on the following: 
 
• Descriptive information (AR, JV, GG): 
- Publication data (title, author, year, type of publication) 
- Geographical location 
- Type of intervention 
- Credit independent variable (specification) 
- Solidarity group mechanism (yes/no) 
- Characteristics of clients 
• Information concerning inclusion and exclusion criteria (AR, JV, MD, RPJ, 
HW): 
- Study characteristics (see above) 
- Methodological design 
- Effect size variables relating to women’s decision-making and control over 
household expenditures 
- Theoretical mechanisms underlying changes in outcomes 
• Quality assessment (see section 2.5) (GG, MD, RPJ, HW, JV) 
 
The coding forms are presented in Annex 4. Three authors coded the effect sizes for 
included RCTs (HW, JH, MD); each study was coded independently by two authors 
who reached agreement. Effect sizes for the quasi-experiments were estimated 
jointly but not independently and agreed by two authors (MD & RPJ).  
 
2.5  QUALITY ASSESSMENT OF STUDIES 
In the quality assessment of selected studies, we distinguished between assessment 
of methodological quality (MD, RPJ and HW) and the quality of the theoretical 
framework of selected studies (GG and FL). 
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We built a database of the included studies containing information on study design, 
method of analysis, country, type of intervention, effect size calculation formulae, 
measures of statistical significance, and other relevant quantitative information. 
This database was used in the methodological quality (risk of bias) assessment and 
subsequent meta-analysis. 
 
We determined whether studies were independent, ensuring only one study from 
each collection of papers on a single dataset was included in the analysis.  
 
We assessed risk of bias based on study design and methods of analysis, and 
implementation of the methodology. We used the scheme developed by Duvendack 
et al. (2011) to categorise each of the studies according to their reported research 
design and analytical method, and coded criteria relating to implementation of the 
research, including the approach to addressing selection bias and confounding, 
spillover effects and contamination, outcome reporting bias, analysis reporting bias, 
and other risks of bias13
 
. Annex 5 presents the signaling questions used in the risk of 
bias assessment.  
In addition to methodological quality, we also assessed the quality of the theoretical 
framework on microcredit and women’s control over household spending, looking at 
the following aspects:  
- Availability of theoretical framework on women’s empowerment and more 
specifically women’s control over household spending; 
- Coherence between theoretical framework and empirical data collection; 
- Discussion and data collection on control over and use of credit. 
 
The main reason for this assessment was to develop an understanding of the quality 
of theoretical reasoning underlying the quantitative data analysis. For the three 
aspects covered in the assessment, we developed specific semantic scales, which are 
presented along with the results in Table 5. 
 
2.6  QUANTITATIVE SYNTHESIS 
In order to combine different analyses we first put treatment estimates on a 
common scale. Given the diversity of estimation methods found in the selected 
studies, we used 12 different effect size formulae (see Annex 7), in each case 
measuring improvements in empowerment variables as an increase in the 
intervention group over the comparison. Further discussion is provided in section 
3.4. 
 
Our meta-analysis (conducted by MD, RPJ and HW) consists of the following steps: 
Steps in meta-analysis 
                                                        
13 None of the studies in this systematic review reported ex-ante power calculations. Ex-post power 
calculations (included in Masset et al., 2011) are controversial (Ellis, 2010; Hoenig and Heisey, 2001). 
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- Extraction of parameters to be used in effect size calculation 
- Selection of effect size formula to be used for each study/construct combination 
- Effect size calculation 
- Collation of effect sizes and merging with study characteristics 
- Description of diversity of studies 
- Initial calculation of ‘synthetic’ effect size to compute each study’s overall effect 
size (Borenstein et al., 2009; Chapter 24) 
- Meta-analysis across studies by subgroups and/or meta-regression 
 
The long list of possible effect size calculations was narrowed down depending on 
the data reported in the studies that were included in the systematic review. Several 
of these were included in the selected studies, reporting results in great number, and 
variety, often in non-standard forms. The biggest problems relate to studies which 
report estimates using logit, multinomial logit, probit, ordered probit, linear 
probability, and tobit estimates for which Lipsey and Wilson (2001) do not provide 
readymade effect size calculation methods; the study reporting tobit results 
(Lastarria-Cornhiel and Shimamura, 2008) was dropped from the meta-analysis due 
to difficulties in calculating the effect size. There are almost equivalent problems due 
to the diversity of outcome indicators (of empowerment) and their metrics, and 
incomplete and erroneous reporting of statistical results14
2.6.1 Effect size calculations 
.  
In this section we describe our procedures for computing effect sizes. We first 
describe the effect size (ES) calculation for continuous outcome variables, and then 
for categorical outcome variables. Finally, we describe the methods for pooling 
dependent effect size estimates. 
2.6.1.1 Continuous outcome variables 
Effects on continuous outcome variables were estimated from mean and regression 
estimates. For regression estimates we used SMD effect sizes rather than share of 
outcome ‘explained’ effect sizes15
 
, because we find the translation of r type ES to d 
type ES unreliable at the time of writing (for a possible reason for this, see McGrath 
and Meyer, 2006). 
                                                        
14 We wrote our own STATA code to calculate the effect sizes, compute appropriate variance for studies 
reporting multiple dependent effect sizes, describe the studies and their diversity as well as generate 
forest plots (using Stata user written routines). 
15 use http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/data/hsb2, clear 
xi: regress write female read math i.prog 
* now compute eta-sq etc. 
regeffectsize 
* reghedges.do (available from authors computes Hedges g along with eta etc). 
* now partial r2 
xi: pcorr2 write female read math i.prog 
* compare semiP^2 with eta^2 
We have adapted regeffectsize to also compute Hedges g for each RHS variable. This demonstrates the 
problem translating between r and d type effect sizes, and is available on request. 
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Means-based estimates of bivariate effect size such as Cohen’s d, Hedges’ g, Glass’s d 
and ∆ are the difference in means normalised by the variation in the data and hence 
are variations on the z-score. They vary in the way the variation is estimated, and the 
differences between these measures are generally small except for small sample 
sizes. These measures can be calculated from a range of the statistics commonly 
reported in research results. We found five ways to compute Cohen’s d from the 
combinations of data provided in means-based studies. When data for more than 
one method are available the different methods yield identical results. These 
methods are described in Annex 7 as SMD1-5.  
 
Estimation of partial effect sizes from regression results is less well developed and 
more problematic than for mean based results (Becker and Wu, 2007; Fritz, Morris 
and Richler, 2011). Several effect size estimates are available including r oriented 
estimates and d oriented estimates. Consensus on methods for extracting effect sizes 
from multiple regression estimates has seemingly not been reached16. The methods 
we have used are described as SMD 7, 8 and 9 in Annex 717
2.6.1.2 Categorical outcome variables  
.  
Several studies employed categorical variables as outcome indicators, analysing 
them as either contingency tables or using logistic regression. Estimates of effect size 
from the former was widely reported; for the latter, logistic regression, we took the 
exponent of the logit beta coefficient as an estimate of the odds ratio, and 
transformed the coefficient into SMD estimates using the method of Chinn (2000) 
in meta-analysis. We did not produce estimates of effect sizes for multinomial logit, 
probit, ordered probit as we have found no guidance in the literature.  
2.6.2 Unit of analysis 
We assessed unit of analysis for the randomised controlled trials included in the 
review. All randomised controlled trials included in the review used appropriate unit 
of analysis to estimate study precision. One study randomly allocated participants at 
the individual level (Karlan and Zinman, 2007). The three remaining RCTs used 
cluster-allocation (Banerjee et al., 2009; Crepon et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2007). All 
used regression-adjustment with cluster robust standard errors to estimate effects.  
2.6.3 Dependent Effect sizes 
This section discusses approaches to resolving within study dependent effect sizes 
(for discussion of dependency across studies, see above and section 3.2). Most of the 
studies reported multiple dependent estimations, meaning that they are not 
independent estimates. There appear to be five alternative approaches to dealing 
with the issue of multiple outcome estimates – to include all estimates, to drop some 
for which there can be a clear justification, to drop ‘outliers’ based on an arbitrary 
rule (e.g. observations which are more than +/- 2 standard deviations of the 
                                                        
16 The limitations of pooling partial effect sizes are discussed in the review limitations (section 4.2).  
17 SMD 7, 8 and 9 compute d using both standardised beta as in Wilson’s calculator and g using the 
formulae given in Keef and Roberts, 2004; these estimates are highly correlated. 
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weighted mean), pool the estimates in some way, or to model the diversity (Higgins 
and Green, 2011). As far as possible one can take the average of different effect size 
calculations, following Lipsey and Wilson (2001); however, this requires adjustment 
to the variance. 
 
We made two pooling calculations, estimating the average point estimate based on 
inverse variance weights, and adjusting the variance for dependency among 
outcomes (Borenstein et al., 2009: 230). Since most studies published more than 
one result that could be used to compute an effect size, and none specified a 
preferred result, we had multiple dependent estimates. To avoid bias due to this 
dependence (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001: 105, 125), we averaged effect sizes over study 
and dimension of empowerment using inverse variance weights (within study * 
dimension * treatment indicator). 
 
The method of adjusting variance for dependency among effect size estimates 
described in Borenstein et al. (2009:230) requires knowledge of the correlation 
among the outcome estimates. Since none of the studies reported intra-outcome 
correlations (r), we reviewed the studies and allocated a value of r depending on the 
anticipated degree of correlation. A study in which the different outcomes are based 
on the same treatment and control cases was assigned a high correlation (r=0.8); 
one in which the treatment and control groups differ were given low values of r 
(0.2). Other studies were given an intermediate value (0.5).  
 
2.7  QUALITATIVE SYNTHESIS 
Combining systematic reviews and meta-analysis of quantitative effects with 
qualitative synthesis has become more popular in the literature. Van der Knaap et al. 
(2008) discuss a systematic review process which combines a focus on synthesizing 
high internal validity studies with theory-based evaluation principles of opening the 
black box by looking at the mechanisms underlying processes of change. In line with 
studies by Coleman (1986, 1990), Hedstrom and Swedberg (1998) and Astbury and 
Leeuw (2010) we looked at three types of mechanisms (see section 1.4.): situational 
mechanisms; action-formation mechanisms; and transformational mechanisms. 
 
Given the focus of the review on aspects of agency and women’s control over 
household expenditures as a set of proxies for women’s empowerment, our search 
was aimed at action-formation mechanisms. Due to the particular inclusion and 
exclusion criteria applied in this study, the review aimed to generate a 
comprehensive and unbiased overview of the available evidence on this type of 
mechanism in the context of microcredit and women’s control over household 
expenditures. 
 
Two members of the research team (GG and FL) independently searched for the 
mechanisms explaining the causal relationship between microcredit and aspects of 
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women’s control over household spending. We followed the following sequence for 
extracting and synthesizing mechanisms.  
1. First we inventoried which of the studies in the final batch (see section 3.1.) 
include a theoretical framework on microcredit and women's control over 
household spending. In order to find out the number of studies in which a 
theoretical framework on microcredit and women's control over household 
spending is used, we used a broad definition of what a theoretical framework is. 
The definition not only includes a set of (deductively-structured) propositions 
on the relationship between microcredit and empowerment, but also the 
presentation of one or a few hypotheses about this relationship as well as a 
discussion on ‘theoretical aspects’ of microcredit and empowerment. Usually, 
such a discussion is part of a review of the (largely) empirical literature. 
2. Subsequently, we searched in the studies for information on mechanisms. 
Sometimes authors explicitly refer to ‘mechanisms’, more often they do not 
although. By reading between the lines, one is able to detect statements alluding 
to mechanisms. Using insights from argumentational analysis18
3. Finally, we summarised authors’ statements alluding to mechanisms into a 
narrative overview per type of mechanism. 
 (Toulmin, 1958; 
Leeuw, 2003) helped us to find these statements. The search activity focused on 
the empirical part of the papers. Statements include both confirmation of 
hypotheses or assumptions and refutations.  
 
It should be added that the demarcation lines between the different types of 
mechanisms are not always clear-cut. In case of doubt between the two reviewers, 
findings were discussed and a decision was made on classification (e.g. as either a 
situational or action-formation mechanism). In case this did not generate a clear 
decision, a third reviewer (JV) arbitrated.  
                                                        
18 Argumentational analysis can be used for analyzing chains of arguments and it helps to reconstruct 
and “fill in” argumentations. A central concept is the warrant, which is the “because” part of an 
argument: it says that B follows from A because of a (generally) accepted principle. The “because” part 
of such an argument is often not made explicit. Consequently, these warrants must be inferred by the 
person performing the analysis (Leeuw, 2003). 
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3 Results 
 
3.1  SEARCH RESULTS 
Figure 4 shows the results of the search. Of 6,000 hits in web-based search engines, 
targeted searches in journal and books, backward and forward tracking of references 
and author contact, we identified an initial number of 310 papers that were selected 
for full text examination. Of these, 190 studies were found to be of priority 1 and 2, 
meaning that they focused on the relationship between microcredit and women’s 
empowerment and included original empirical analysis. Of these, 113 studies 
included quantitative analysis on microcredit and empowerment. Purely qualitative 
studies (77) were excluded. Of the 113 quantitative studies, 56 were considered to be 
of relevance to our scope, meaning that they focused on the relationship between 
microcredit and women’s empowerment as a dependent variable, as expressed 
through one or more aspects of women’s control over household spending. After 
subsequently applying the final methodological quality inclusion criterion19
Figure 3
, we 
selected 29 reports describing 25 unique studies to be included in the review (see 
also  explaining the steps in the inclusion process). 
 
                                                        
19 Meaning that there is evidence that the study has attempted to address the attribution problem. 
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Figure 4. Search results 
   
310   full text documents    
examined  
190  studies found to be of  
priority 1 & 2   
113   studies containing  
quantitative  analysis  
on empower ment  
56  studies on women’s  
control over  
household spending  
29  reports of sufficient  
quality for further  
analysis  
   
  
1,950 original articles after 
removal of duplicate records 
 
 
STEP 5 
6,000 ‘hits’ from search 
engines, websites, hand 
searches, author contact 
 
 
STEP 4 
STEP 3 
STEP 2 
STEP 1 
Reasons for exclusion: 
- Selection bias not addressed 
(21 studies) 
- Insufficient information on 
causal method (3 studies) 
- No counterfactual analysis of 
empowerment (3 studies) 
 
 
Note 1: For a description of steps see Figure 3. 
Note 2: Duplicates were identified with the programme EndNote as well as manually through 
title screening. Annex 3 Table A3.1 provides the reasons for each study’s exclusion at step 4. 
Note 3: The 29 reports identified in Step 5 corresponded to 25 unique studies (see Section 
3.3.1). 
 
3.2  DESCRIPTION OF INCLUDED STUDIES 
Table 2 gives a descriptive overview of the 29 reports (representing 25 independent 
studies; see Section 3.3.1), which presents, in a summarised format, the findings of 
the studies with respect to causal relationships between microcredit and aspects of 
women’s control over householder resources (which differ per study). Annex 6 
elaborates on the design features and provides further information on the specific 
variables of women’s control over household expenditures and the possible causal 
relations with microcredit. 
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Study designs varied across the studies, with three estimating results from 
experimental designs (randomised assignment to intervention) and the remaining 
employing a range of different quasi-experimental and multivariate regression 
approaches.  
 
A range of outcome measures were used in the studies to measure control over 
household spending decisions (Annex 6). A summary of the outcome variables 
recorded in each study is provided in Table A5.2. Studies generally collected self-
reported outcomes from survey questionnaires over a range of expenditure items, 
which were grouped into a composite index. Some studies used simple trichotomous 
responses (1=wife makes decision alone, 0.5=decision made jointly, 0=husband 
alone) for each expenditure category (e.g. Amin et al., 1998; Husain et al., 2010) 
while others assessed women’s relative contribution to decision-making control 
using a Likert scale (e.g. Sharif 2002, 2004). The method of measuring the outcome 
variable varied, some studies using a continuous outcome (measured as the 
weighted average across categories) (e.g. Crepon et al., 2011) while others employed 
a threshold to determine a dichotomous outcome measuring whether a woman was 
‘empowered’ or not (e.g. Schuler and Hashemi, 1994; Hashemi et al., 1996).   
 
A naïve reading of Table 2 would suggest that, in a majority (15) of the 25 included 
(independent) studies), there is a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between microcredit and one or more aspects of women’s control over household 
expenditures. At the same time, the table suggests 10 studies did not find any 
statistically significant relationship between microcredit and women’s control over 
household spending. Moreover, in most studies that did find some effect, many of 
the studied relationships between microcredit and aspects of women’s control over 
household resources turned out to be statistically insignificant, depending on the 
nature of the credit independent variable, the type of outcome measure and the 
specific sample of (female) clients covered by particular analyses.  
 
While one might conclude that many studies do find some type of positive effect, this 
assessment does not take into account the inclusion of findings regarding the same 
data reported in multiple papers (dependent studies), characteristics of 
methodological design and implementation (risk of bias), and the magnitude of 
effects and study sample size (effect size and statistical precision). A critical 
appraisal of the evidence base, including assessment of study independence and risk 
of bias, together with a statistical meta-analysis, weighted by the inverse of study 
variance, are needed before we can confidently conclude whether this indication 
truly reflects an overall positive effect of microcredit on women’s control over 
household spending. 
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Table 2. Summary results from 29 reports representing the 25 unique included 
studies 
Study Short description of findings Included in meta-
analysis 
Amin et al. (1995) Positive relation between microcredit and women’s 
decision-making power regarding purchase of household 
items and health decisions  
Yes 
Amin et al. (1998) Positive relation between microcredit and women’s 
autonomy and decision-making power on a range of 
spending decisions (e.g. saving, education, health) 
Yes 
Asim (2008) No statistically significant relation Yes 
Banerjee et al. (2009) No statistically significant relation Yes 
Crepon et al. (2011) No statistically significant relation Yes 
Garikipati (2008) No statistically significant relation Yes 
Hashemi et al. (1996) Positive relation between microcredit and women’s ability 
to make spending decisions regarding small and large 
purchases and major investments (e.g. renovate house) 
Yes 
Holvoet (2005) Positive relation between microcredit and women’s 
participation in decision-making on use of loan 
No 
Holvoet (2006) Positive relation between microcredit and women’s 
control over assets 
Yes 
Hoque and Itohara 
(2009) 
Positive relation between microcredit and women’s 
participation in family decisions 
Yes 
Husain et al. (2010) No statistically significant relation Yes 
Jamal (2008) Positive relation between microcredit and women’s 
control over assets 
No 
Karlan and Zinman 
(2007) 
No statistically significant relation Yes 
Kim et al. (2007) Positive relation between microcredit women’s autonomy 
in decision-making (e.g. small and large purchases, 
health) 
Yes 
Lakwo (2007) Positive relation between microcredit women’s decision-
making power regarding small purchases 
Yes 
Lastarria-Cornhiel 
and Shimamura 
(2008) 
No statistically significant relation No 
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Study Short description of findings Included in meta-
analysis 
Mizan (1993) Positive relation between microcredit women’s decision-
making power regarding a range of decisions (e.g. food, 
education, productive investments, assets) 
No 
Mohindra et al. 
(2008) 
Positive relation between microcredit and women’s 
decision-making power regarding household 
expenditures and education 
Yes 
Ngo (2008) No statistically significant relation Yes 
Pitt et al. (2003) Positive relation between microcredit and women’s 
capacity to make a range of purchasing decisions 
independently (e.g. food, household items) and women’s 
decision-making regarding major transactions (e.g. land, 
house, credit) 
No 
Pitt et al. (2006) Positive relation between microcredit and women’s 
capacity to make a range of purchasing decisions 
independently (e.g. food, household items) and women’s 
decision-making regarding major transactions (e.g. land, 
house, credit) 
Yes 
Rahman et al. (2009) No statistically significant relation Yes 
Schuler and 
Hashemi (1994) 
Positive relation between microcredit and women’s ability 
to make small and large purchases and major 
(investment) decisions on her own 
No 
Setboonsarng and 
Parpiev (2008) 
No statistically significant relation Yes 
Sharif (2002) The relationships identified in the study concern 
comparisons between younger and older women; older 
women were found to benefit more from microcredit than 
younger women; it is concluded that empowerment 
comes with age (including, possibly, a longer history with 
credit) 
Yes 
Sharif (2004) Positive relation between microcredit and women’s 
participation in decision-making in small and large 
purchases, education and health decisions 
No 
Wakoko (2003) Positive relation between microcredit and women’s 
decision-making on income use (selling produce, using 
income, saving) 
Yes 
Zaman (1998) Positive relation between microcredit and women’s 
control over assets (e.g. livestock, jewelry, savings) 
No 
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Study Short description of findings Included in meta-
analysis 
Zaman (1999) Positive relation between microcredit and women’s 
control over assets (e.g. livestock, jewelry, savings) 
No 
Note 1: Descriptions refer to statistically significant relationships. 
Note 2: Studies were included in meta-analysis where independent effect sizes and standard 
errors were calculable. Four pairs of the above reports were identified as providing 
dependent findings (Holvoet, 2005 and 2006; Pitt et al., 2003 and 2006; Sharif, 2002 and 
2004; Zaman, 1998 and 1999) – see section 3.3.1. 
Note 3: The independent variable may slightly differ between studies (e.g. receiving credit, 
membership of a credit solidarity group; see Annex 6). Due to lack of information in studies 
it was difficult to determine the exact intervention(s) targeted to female clients. Microcredit 
is a consistent and predominant element of the independent variable (see Annex 8).  
Note 4: Further information on the dependent variables can be found in Annexes 6 and 8. 
 
3.3  CRITICAL APPRAISAL 
3.3.1 Study independence 
A number of the reports listed in Table 2 shared more or less important parts of 
their content, with respect to the inventions studied and participant data. This led to 
questions as to whether or not they should be considered as independent findings, 
and therefore included in the same meta-analysis. The studies suggesting possible 
overlap were the following: 
• Amin et al. (1995) and Amin et al. (1998) used different data sets measured at 
different times for different groups in Bangladesh (the first uses nationally 
representative data from 1992 the second using data collected from particular 
areas in 1995) and (partly) different measures of dependent variables. The 
studies covered different target populations.  As a result they were considered as 
independent findings and both were included in the meta-analysis.  
• Holvoet (2005) and Holvoet (2006) share the same underlying dataset. More 
specifically, Holvoet (2006) is based on a sub sample of the larger sample that 
was used in Holvoet (2005). We were only able to extract effect sizes for Holvoet 
(2006) which was included in the meta-analysis. 
• Pitt et al. (2003) and Pitt et al. (2006) are, respectively, the working paper and 
journal publication of the same study for Bangladesh. The papers used the same 
dataset, the same measures of dependent variables and analysis, but differ 
somewhat in their discussions of the literature and the implications of their 
findings, mainly the welfare impacts for families in the context of women’s 
empowerment. We were only able to extract effect sizes for Pitt et al. (2006) 
which were included in the meta-analysis.  
• Sharif (2002) and Sharif (2004) used the same data set to deal with two 
different, albeit related questions: one on the impact of participation in 
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microcredit programmes on the decision-making status of poor Bangladeshi 
women, and the other on the role that microcredit programmes can play in 
enabling women to develop human capital as well as sustainable livelihoods, 
with a special emphasis on young women. We were only able to extract effect 
sizes for Sharif (2002) which was included in the meta-analysis. 
• Zaman (1998) and Zaman (1999) are versions of the same analysis, using the 
same dataset, measures of dependent variables and analysis to reach the same 
estimates of impact of women’s control over household assets. The study did not 
report sufficient information to estimate confidence intervals and was therefore 
excluded from meta-analysis. 
 
In sum, in case of Pitt (2003, 2006), Sharif (2002, 2004), Holvoet (2005, 2006), 
and Zaman (1998, 1999) there are indeed overlaps between samples used in studies 
by the same author. Consequently, we did not consider them as independent 
findings. Only one study from each pair was included in the quantitative synthesis 
analysis.20
 
 In case of Amin (1995, 1998), these are two independent findings. Thus, 
there are a total of 25 independent findings eligible for inclusion in the quantitative 
review of effects, of which we were able to extract effect sizes from 20 studies which 
were included in the statistical meta-analysis. 
3.3.2 Risk of bias 
Table 3 presents a summary overview of the study design and methods of analysis 
used in the 25 independent studies. Table 4 provides an overall assessment of risk of 
bias for each study incorporating the design- and analysis-based assessment 
reported in Table 3, together with categories based on threats to validity arising from 
implementation of the design and methods of analysis. 
 
Table 3. Distribution of studies according to research design and statistical 
methods of analysis 
                                                        
20 While the quantitative analysis effectively covered 25 studies (to avoid any double-counting), the 
qualitative synthesis included all 29 studies as it did not involve any counting or quantitative 
aggregation of any kind. 
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  Statistical Methods of Analysis 
 
 
 IV,PSM,2SLS/LIML,
DID, RD Multivariate Tabulation 
Research Design     
RCT   4  
Pipeline  1 1 0 
Panel or b/a and w/wo  0 1 0 
Either b/a or w/wo  6 10 2 
Natural Experiment  0 0 0 
 
Legend Low threat to 
validity 
11 High threat to 
validity 
12 
 Medium threat 
to validity 
2   
Note: IV instrumental variables, PSM propensity score matching, 2SLS two-stage least squares, 
LIML limited information maximum likelihood, DID difference in differences, RD regression 
discontinuity. Source: Duvendack et al. (2011). 
 
The analysis scheme reflected in Table 3, based on Duvendack et al. (2011), assessed 
studies on two dimensions – research design and method of statistical analysis – 
from low treat to validity to high threat to validity. Studies using randomised 
assignment and credible quasi-experimental methods such as regression 
discontinuity, difference in differences, statistical matching and instrumental 
variables are assessed as using methods which create low threat to validity. Pipeline 
studies using multivariate or bivariate methods, and panel studies using simple 
multivariate methods only, are classified as having medium threat to validity. All 
other studies, including cross-sectional with/without studies which use multivariate 
regression and tabular methods, are classified as having high threat to validity. As 
indicated in Table 3 just under half of the included studies (12 out of 25 independent 
findings) used methods of analysis which are considered of high threat to validity 
based on study design and method of analysis. 
 
The assessment of risk of bias (Table 4) assessed implementation of the study 
methodology according to risks of bias due to confounding, spill-overs and 
contamination, and reporting biases. We used a transparent decision-rule to reach 
an overall assessment of risk of bias (see Table 4 notes). From the table it can be 
concluded that none of the studies included in this systematic review were assessed 
as having low risk of bias, while the majority (16) have high risk of bias; the 
remaining 9 were assessed as having medium risk of bias.   
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Table 4. Risk of bias assessment 
Study Design and analysis based 
assessment: study design, 
method of analysis (Table 3) 
Risk of selection bias and confounding Risk of 
spill-overs 
and conta-
mination 
Risk of 
outcome 
reporting bias 
Risk of analysis reporting bias Other risk 
of bias 
Overall 
assess-
ment 
RCTs Quasi-experiments 
PSM / 
CVM 
IV OLS Logit/ 
Probit 
Bi-
variate 
Panel Other RCTs PSM IV OLS Other 
Amin et al., 1995 High threat to validity: cross-
section observational data, 
multivariate regression analysis 
   Uc     Yes No    No  Uc High risk 
    Uc     No     No Uc High risk 
Amin et al., 1998 High threat to validity: cross-
section observational data, 
bivariate analysis 
     Uc   Yes No     No Uc High risk 
Asim, 2008 Low threat to validity: cross-
section observational data, IV 
regression / PSM analysis 
 Yes       Yes No  No    Uc High risk 
  Yes       No   No   Uc High risk 
Banerjee et al., 
2009 
Low threat to validity: RCT 
experimental data, ITT multivariate 
regression analysis 
Uc        Yes No No     Uc Moder-ate 
risk 
Crepon et al., 2011 Low threat to validity: RCT 
experimental data, ITT multivariate 
regression analysis 
Uc        Yes No No     Uc Moder-ate 
risk 
Garikipati, 2008 Low threat to validity: cross-
section observational data, IV 
regression analysis 
  Uc      Yes No   No   Uc Moder-ate 
risk 
Hashemi et al., 
1996 
High threat to validity: cross-
section observational data, 
multivariate regression analysis 
    Uc    Yes No     No Uc High risk 
Holvoet, 2006 High threat to validity: cross-
section observational data, 
     Uc   Yes Uc     Uc Uc High risk 
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Study Design and analysis based 
assessment: study design, 
method of analysis (Table 3) 
Risk of selection bias and confounding Risk of 
spill-overs 
and conta-
mination 
Risk of 
outcome 
reporting bias 
Risk of analysis reporting bias Other risk 
of bias 
Overall 
assess-
ment 
RCTs Quasi-experiments 
PSM / 
CVM 
IV OLS Logit/ 
Probit 
Bi-
variate 
Panel Other RCTs PSM IV OLS Other 
bivariate tables 
Hoque and Itohara, 
2009 
High threat to validity: cross-
section observational data, 
multivariate regression analysis 
    Uc    Yes Uc     No Uc High risk 
Husain, Mukherjee 
and Dutta, 2010 
Medium threat to validity: pipeline 
study, cross-section observational 
data, multivariate regression 
analysis 
   Yes     Yes Uc    Uc  Uc High risk 
Jamal, 2008 Low threat to validity: pipeline 
study, individual panel data, DID 
multivariate regression analysis 
       Uc Yes No     Uc Uc Moder-ate 
risk 
Karlan and Zinman, 
2007 
Low threat to validity: RCT, ITT 
multivariate regression analysis 
Uc        Yes No No     Uc Moder-ate 
risk 
Kim, et al., 2007 Low threat to validity: pipeline RCT Uc        Yes No     Uc Uc Moder-ate 
risk 
Lakwo, 2007 High threat to validity: cross-
section observational data, 
multivariate regression analysis 
   Yes     Yes Uc    Uc  Uc High risk 
Lastarria-Cornhiel 
and Shimamura, 
2008 
Low threat to validity: cross-
section observational data, PSM / 
Tobit regression analysis 
 Yes       Yes No  No    Uc High risk 
   Uc     Yes No    No  Uc Moder-ate 
risk 
    Uc    Yes No     No Uc Moder-ate 
risk 
Mizan, 1993 High threat to validity: cross-    Uc     Yes No    No  Uc High risk 
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Study Design and analysis based 
assessment: study design, 
method of analysis (Table 3) 
Risk of selection bias and confounding Risk of 
spill-overs 
and conta-
mination 
Risk of 
outcome 
reporting bias 
Risk of analysis reporting bias Other risk 
of bias 
Overall 
assess-
ment 
RCTs Quasi-experiments 
PSM / 
CVM 
IV OLS Logit/ 
Probit 
Bi-
variate 
Panel Other RCTs PSM IV OLS Other 
section observational data, 
multivariate regression analysis 
Mohindra et al., 
2008 
High threat to validity: cross-
section observational data, 
multivariate regression analysis 
    Uc    Yes No     No Uc High risk 
Ngo, 2008 Low threat to validity: cross-
section observational data, 
covariate matching, multivariate 
regression analysis  
 Uc      Uc Yes Uc     Uc Uc Moder-ate 
risk 
Pitt et al., 2006 Low threat to validity: cross-
section observational data, 2SLS 
(IV) regression analysis 
  Uc      Yes No   No   Uc Moder-ate 
risk 
Rahman et al., 2009 High threat to validity: cross-
section observational data, 
multivariate regression analysis 
    Uc    Yes No     No Uc High risk 
Schuler and 
Hashemi, 1994 
Medium threat to validity: unclear 
cross-section and two-period 
observational data, multivariate 
regression analysis  
   
 
 Uc    Yes Uc     No Uc Moder-ate 
risk 
Setboonsarng and 
Parpiev, 2008 
Low threat to validity: cross-
section observational data, PSM 
analysis 
 Yes       Yes No  No    Uc High risk 
Sharif, 2002  High threat to validity: cross-
section observational data, 
    Uc    Yes Uc     Uc Uc High risk 
48 
 
Study Design and analysis based 
assessment: study design, 
method of analysis (Table 3) 
Risk of selection bias and confounding Risk of 
spill-overs 
and conta-
mination 
Risk of 
outcome 
reporting bias 
Risk of analysis reporting bias Other risk 
of bias 
Overall 
assess-
ment 
RCTs Quasi-experiments 
PSM / 
CVM 
IV OLS Logit/ 
Probit 
Bi-
variate 
Panel Other RCTs PSM IV OLS Other 
multivariate and bivariate analysis 
Wakoko, 2003 High threat to validity: cross-
section observational data, 
multivariate and bivariate analysis 
    Uc    Yes Uc     Uc Uc High risk 
Zaman, 1998, 1999 High threat to validity: cross-
section observational data, 
multivariate and bivariate analysis 
   Uc     Yes Uc    Uc  Uc High risk 
    Uc     Uc     Uc Uc High risk 
 
Notes: ‘Unclear’ is abbreviated Uc. CVM stands for covariate matching.  
Selection bias and confounding: we scored ‘no’ when study design and analysis were reported and executed adequately, ‘yes’ if study design and 
analysis were not reported and executed adequately, and ‘unclear’ when the evidence was mixed and we could not reach a firm conclusion.  
Spill-overs: studies scored ‘no’ when, based on our judgment, no spill-overs were expected from the treatment to the control group and the groups 
were isolated from other interventions, ‘yes’ when spill-overs were likely, and ‘unclear’ when we could not reach any firm conclusion and had 
lingering doubts.  
Outcome and analysis reporting: a score of ‘no’ was achieved when the outcomes/analyses discussed in the methods section were also reported in 
the results/analysis section, scored ‘yes’ if otherwise and  ‘unclear’ when the paper had no information.  
Other risks of bias: ‘no’ suggests no other sources of bias, ‘yes’ suggests other potential sources of bias, and ‘unclear’ when no firm conclusions could 
be reached.  
Overall assessment: the last column reaches an overall conclusion about risk of bias taking into account the design/analysis (as shown by the design-
based assessment) and the execution of the analysis (as in the remaining columns). We implemented the following decision rule: if the design-based 
assessment was ‘high threat to validity’, all remaining categories needed to be ‘no’ in order to get a risk of bias assessment better than ‘high risk of 
bias’ (i.e. even if we were in the main unclear, we still did not think we were likely to consider any of these designs trustworthy enough to score better 
than ‘high risk’). If the design-based assessment was ‘low threat to validity’ or ‘medium threat to validity’, the majority of remaining categories 
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needed to be ‘no’ in order to get a ‘low risk of bias’ assessment; if ‘yes’ against selection bias and confounding then the overall score was ‘high risk of 
bias’. If otherwise mixed, or the majority of remaining categories are ‘unclear’, then the overall score was ‘moderate risk of bias’. 
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3.3.3 Quality of theoretical framework 
In this section we look at the quality of information contained in the final batch of 
studies and subsequently identify underlying mechanisms of causal relationships 
between microcredit and women’s control over household spending. The studies 
were analyzed following the procedure described in section 2.4. First, we looked at 
the presence of a theoretical framework on microcredit and women's control over 
household spending. As shown in Table 5 we found that 10 studies lacked a 
theoretical framework on microcredit and empowerment, 4 used a theoretical 
framework or theory that discussed causal relationships between microcredit and 
empowerment (without explicitly addressing women’s control over household 
spending), and 15 presented a theoretical discussion that also dealt with causal 
relationships between microcredit and (particular aspects of) women's control over 
household spending. However, as indicated in section 3.3.1, there were four pairs of 
studies which provided dependent findings on effects. When we looked at 
independent findings only, we found that 9 studies lacked a theoretical framework, 3 
used a theoretical framework examining empowerment and 13 also presented a 
theoretical discussion examining women’s control over expenditure. 
 
Second, we looked at the link between the theoretical framework and empirical data 
collection and analysis. Eighteen reports (summarising 14 independent studies) 
presented no explicit or clearly recognizable relation between the theoretical 
framework or discussion and empirical data collection, while 11 did (see Table 5). 
 
Third, we looked at the issue of whether studies discuss the use and control over 
microcredit. The aspect control over the use of loans constitutes an intermediate 
causal step towards control over household spending (although increased women’s 
control over household spending may occur in households where women do not 
directly control the use of loans). Given its potential importance in the causal chain 
we included it in our assessment. Studies including variables relating to women’s 
control over household spending do not necessarily need to include this aspect in 
order to be selected for this review. However, studies that do include ‘control over 
and use of loans’ are more elaborate and precise from a theoretical perspective in 
their assessment of the relationship between credit and women’s control over 
household spending or women’s empowerment in general. 
 
As Table 5 shows, 14 reports (summarising 13 independent studies) dealt with the 
issue of women’s control over loan use and presented and analyzed empirical data 
on the topic. Two studies only mentioned the issue while another 13 reports (10 
independent studies) did not mention it at all. 
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Table 5. Assessment of the theoretical basis regarding microcredit and women’s 
control over household spending in selected studies 
Question (scaling) Num. of 
reports 
(studies) 
References 
Is there a theoretical framework on the relationship between microcredit and women's control 
over household spending? 
0 = study in which  no theoretical 
framework/theory  is available on 
microcredit and empowerment 
10 (9) Crépon et al. 2011, Garikipati 2008,  
Hashemi et al. 1996, Holvoet 2005, Jamal 
2008, Karlan and Zinman, 2007, Lastarria 
and Shimamura 2008, Mohindra et al. 2008, 
Rahman et al. 2009, Setboonsarng and 
Parpiev 2008 
1 = study in which a theoretical 
framework is available that addresses 
causal relationships between microcredit 
and empowerment 
4 (3) Amin et al. 1995, Banerjee et al. 2009, 
Husain et al. 2010, Zaman 1998 
2 = study in which a theoretical 
discussion takes place on the causal 
relationships between microcredit and 
(aspects of) women's control over 
household spending 
 
15 (13) Amin et al. 1998, Asim 2008, Holvoet 2006, 
Hoque and Itohara 2009, Kim et al. 2007, 
Lakwo 2007, Mizan 1993, Ngo 2008, Pitt et 
al. 2003, Pitt et al. 2006, Schuler and 
Hashemi 1994, Sharif 2002, Sharif 2004, 
Wakoko 2003, Zaman 1999 
 Total: 29 (25)  
Does the paper present a recognizable relation between the theoretical framework/ discussion 
and empirical data collection and analysis? 
0 = empirical data collection and analysis 
on microcredit and women's control over 
household spending is not  linked to the 
theoretical framework/discussion  on 
causal relationships between microcredit 
and (aspects of) women's control over 
household spending (even if such a 
framework is discussed in the study) 
18 (14) Amin et al. 1995, Banerjee et al. 2009, 
Crépon et al. 2011, Garikipati 2008, Hashemi 
et al. 1996, Holvoet 2005, Holvoet 2006, 
Husain et al. 2010, Jamal 2008, Karlan and 
Zinman 2007, Lastarria and Shimamura 
2008, Mohindra et al. 2008, Pitt et al. 2003, 
Pitt et al. 2006, Rahman et al. 2009, Sharif 
2004, Setboonsarng and Parpiev 2008, 
Zaman 1998 
1 = empirical data collection and analysis 
on microcredit and women's control over 
household spending reflects theoretical 
framework/discussion on microcredit and 
(aspects of) women's control over 
household spending 
11 (11) Amin et al. 1998, Asim 2008, Hoque and 
Itohara 2009, Kim et al. 2007, Lakwo 2007, 
Mizan 1993, Ngo 2008, Schuler and Hashemi 
1994, Sharif 2002, Wakoko 2003, Zaman 
1999 
Total: 29 (25)  
Does the paper discuss and empirically measure the control over the use of loans? 
0 = there is no discussion on women's 13 (10) Amin et al. 1998, Banerjee et al. 2009, 
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Question (scaling) Num. of 
reports 
(studies) 
References 
control over and use of loan in the study Crépon et al., 2011, Holvoet 2006, Kim et al. 
2007, Mizan 1993, Mohindra et al. 2008, Ngo 
2008, Schuler and Hashemi 1994, Sharif 
2002, Sharif 2004, Setboonsarng and 
Parpiev 2008, Zaman 1999 
1 = there is discussion on women's 
control over and use of loan in the study 
2 (2) Rahman et al. 2009, Zaman 1998 
2 = there is discussion and empirical 
data collection and analysis on women's 
control over and use of loan in the study 
14 (13) Amin et al. 1995, Asim 2008, Garikipati 2008, 
Hashemi et al. 1996, Holvoet 2005, Hoque 
and Itohara 2009, Husain et al. 2010, Jamal 
2008, Karlan and Zinman 2007, Lakwo 2007, 
Lastarria and Shimamura 2008, Pitt et al. 
2003, Pitt et al. 2006, Wakoko 2003 
 Total: 29 (25)  
Note 1: The 29 reports summarise the findings from 25 unique studies (see Section 3.3.1). As 
Table 5 shows, there are sometimes differences in quality (from a theory perspective) 
between studies that are not independent. In case of differences between two dependent 
studies, the highest score from each pair of dependent studies was included in the count of 
independent findings. The number of independent findings is indicated in parentheses. 
 
The differences in nature and relevance of the theoretical framework in part point at 
a quality issue and in part an issue of focus of the underlying primary study. Not all 
included studies focused primarily on women’s empowerment, let alone the 
particular proxies covered by the present review. Nevertheless, the fact that more or 
less half of the studies did not include a proper theoretical discussion on the causal 
relations studied in the quantitative analysis (with respect to women’s control over 
household spending) reveals an important weakness in the quality of impact studies 
on this subject. This weakness is particularly problematic given that many also used 
questionable causal identification strategies. 
 
3.4  QUANTITATIVE SYNTHESIS OF EFFECT SIZES 
This section presents an account of the effect sizes, subsequent meta-analysis and 
sensitivity analysis, and analysis of publication bias of the empowerment-related 
variables reported in the 25 independent studies. A comprehensive analysis of 
extraction of effect sizes and subsequent meta-analysis of all empowerment-related 
variables reported in the studies is presented in Annex 8. In this section we restrict 
outcomes to those considered to represent “women’s control over household 
spending”.  
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Synthesis through meta-analysis is only possible for studies that can be meaningfully 
compared. In other words, they need to be comparable on a conceptual level which 
means that similar constructs and relationships are used and they need to follow 
similar statistical approaches (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). The findings from the 25 
independent studies included in the meta-analysis were selected on the basis of 
including particular proxies of women’s control over household expenditures. 
However, these still vary by treatment indicator, analytical method and bias 
assessment. Moreover, even though the review focuses on one specific dimension of 
empowerment, there was heterogeneity in outcome variables across studies. The 
studies reviewed here are diverse, suggesting the so-called ‘apples and oranges’ 
problem is likely to arise where studies which are distinctly different in these 
respects are pooled without concern for sensitivity analysis (Lipsey and Wilson, 
2001: 2; Sharpe, 1997). Studies that are methodologically flawed or of low quality 
should not be included in the same meta-analysis as other studies, since this could 
adversely affect the overall results (Slavin, 1986). 
 
In our case the ‘apples and oranges’ problem might be an issue and Annex 8 
describes the potential sources of heterogeneity across studies and what this implies 
for meta-analysis. In addition, while the risk of bias assessment covered threats to 
validity both of the point effect size and unit of analysis errors in clustered studies, 
pooled effect size estimates can be biased by non-normality and heteroscedasticity of 
individual effect sizes (Wilcox, 2008), which are generally not reported in our 
studies. Studies with low or negative effects may also be under-reported. Hence 
meta-analysis would be upward biased, necessitating analysis of publication bias. 
 
We also found heterogeneity of treatment. Treatment indicators can be dichotomous 
(membership, participation21
 
) or continuous (length of membership, number or 
amount of loans taken, and so on). We pooled studies with membership and 
participation treatment indicators, in part because these terms are often used 
interchangeably; however, it is important to bear in mind that microfinance 
institution (MFI) members may or may not receive microfinance, and may or may 
not receive other dimensions of treatment such as group discussions, technical 
assistance, or social support from peers or the MFI. Hence the estimates from these 
studies are ‘intention to treat’. We did not include studies with treatment indicators 
which could not be represented by a dichotomous membership variable, because 
they were few, and could not be put on a comparable basis. The majority of 
treatment indicators could be treated as dichotomous (92%). 
The meta-analysis aimed to address heterogeneity concerns through sensitivity 
analysis and publication bias assessment. Due to gaps in available data for effect size 
calculation we were able to generate effect size estimates for 20 studies (see Table 2). 
Several studies had more than one treatment variable; 23 effect size estimates could 
                                                        
21 A member of a group may or may not participate in, for example, microcredit. 
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be recovered where the treatment indicator was a binary variable representing 
membership or participation in a microfinance organization. Finally, synthetic effect 
sizes were calculated for three studies reporting multiple outcome constructs for 
both decision making and control (Amin et al., 1998; Husain et al., 2010; Garikipati, 
2008) (Annex 8). The synthesis of these 20 effect sizes is presented in the following 
section.  
3.4.1 Meta-analysis of experimental studies 
It was possible to extract SMD effect sizes for the four RCTs, two of which were 
conducted in South Africa (Kim et al., 2007; Karlan and Zinman, 2007) and two 
more in India (Banerjee et al., 2009) and Morocco (Crepon et al., 2011). All of the 
studies were assessed as having comparatively high validity (moderate risk of bias), 
and all reported effects on empowerment outcomes which were not statistically 
significantly different from zero. The analysis of Kim et al. (2007) uses 8 pair-
matched clusters (4 treatment, 4 control). This is rather a small sample size for a 
cluster randomized experiment – in comparison, the studies of Banerjee et al. 
(2009) and Crepon et al. (2011) enrolled 104 and 162 villages, respectively – which is 
likely to explain the lack of statistically significant findings of the study, and 
therefore the small weighting of the study in the meta-analysis. The study also 
appears to be unbalanced on baseline outcome characteristics (no significance tests 
are reported, nor socio-economic characteristics of participants and controls), which 
may explain the comparatively larger effect size estimated.  
 
The results (Figure 5 and Table 6) suggest there is no evidence for impacts of 
microcredit on empowerment-related variables either in individual studies or when 
we estimated a pooled effect size using inverse-variance weighted random effects 
meta-analysis (SMD=-0.007, 95% confidence interval: -0.041, 0.027). The studies 
are largely homogeneous in terms of outcome measure: Banerjee et al. measured 
women’s decision-making with respect to household purchases directly using an 
index of spending items; Karlan and Zinman used an index comprising largely 
spending items but also including a question on fertility; Kim et al. similarly used an 
autonomy index regarding decision over household purchases but also including 
decisions on child health care and visiting family and friends; Crepon et al. used a 
close proxy of decision-making over household spending (share of household 
activities managed by women). There were also some differences in measures of 
treatment variables across the three studies, where Crepon et al., Karlan and Zinman 
and Kim et al. used a dichotomous variable indicating receipt of credit while 
Banerjee et al. measured whether the women lived in the intervention area. 
However, we found no statistical evidence for heterogeneity between studies 
(Q=2.72, Tau=squared=0.000, I-sq=0%). Given the limited number of studies 
available for analysis, no further sensitivity analyses were conducted. 
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Figure 5. Forest plot of effect of women’s control over household spending: RCTs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Meta-analysis of microcredit and women’s control over household 
spending: RCTs 
Panel A 
 
SMD 95% Confidence Interval % Weight 
Crepon et al. (2011) -0.021 -0.062 0.020 70.33 
Banerjee et al. (2009) -0.003 -0.095 0.088 14.06 
Karlan and Zinman (2007) 0.049 -0.039 0.137 15.34 
Kim et al. (2007) 0.273 -0.385 0.931 0.27 
D+L pooled ES -0.007 -0.041 0.027 100.00 
Panel B 
Heterogeneity chi-squared 2.72 (d.f. = 3) p = 0.437 
I-squared (variation in ES attributable to heterogeneity) 0.0% 
Estimate of between-study variance Tau-squared  0.0000 
Test of ES=0 z=0.40 p = 0.690 
 
3.4.2 Meta-analysis of quasi-experimental studies 
All the studies included in meta-analysis of quasi-experimental and regression (QE) 
studies estimated effects with and without treatment, where the treatment cases 
were due to independent interventions.  
 
First, we conducted a meta-analysis for ES estimates using both means and 
regression based “d” type effect sizes of continuous outcome variables with a 
Overall  (I-squared = 0.0%, p = 0.437) 
Study 
Banerjee et al. (2009) (India) 
ID 
Crepon et al. (2011) (Morocco) 
Karlan and Zinman (2009) (South Africa) 
Kim et al. (2007) (South Africa) 
-0.01 (-0.04, 0.03) 
-0.00 (-0.10, 0.09) 
ES (95% CI) 
-0.02 (-0.06, 0.02) 
0.05 (-0.04, 0.14) 
0.27 (-0.38, 0.93) 
100.00 
% 
14.06 
Weight 
70.33 
15.34 
0.27 
    0 -.931 .931 
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dichotomous treatment variable denoting membership of an MFI22
Figure 6
. Of the 22 
study/construct estimates extracted only 17 were for a membership treatment 
indicator.  and Table 7 show the forest plot and random effects meta-
analysis results for all resource control outcomes. The pooled effect size is positive 
and statistically significant (SMD=0.129, 95%CI=0.035, 0.222 z=2.68, p< .007; 17 
studies included), although small in size (SMD< 0.2; Cohen, 1988). Inspection of the 
forest plot suggested a high degree of heterogeneity which was confirmed by formal 
statistical tests (chi-square = 169 (df 16), p<.000, Tau-square=0.02, I-square=91%).  
 
Figure 6. Forest plot of effect of women’s control over household spending: QE 
studies 
 
 
 
Table 7. Meta-analysis of microcredit and women’s control over household 
spending: QE studies 
Panel A     
Study  SMD 95% Confidence interval % Weight 
Lakwo (2007) -0.174 -0.57 0.223 3.35 
Mohindra et al. (200 -0.139 -0.431 0.153 4.69 
Rahman et al. (2009) -0.110 -0.335 0.115 5.81 
Garikipati (2008) -0.086 -0.198 0.026 7.87 
                                                        
22 The analysis was done in Stata 12 using the user written “metan”, “metabias” and “metafunel” 
commands for random effects analysis. 
Overall  (I-squared = 91.1%, p = 0.000)
Sharif (2002) (Bangladesh)
Hoque and Itohara (2009) (Bangladesh)
Holvoet (2006) (India)
Amin et al. (1998) (Bangladesh)
Husain et al. (2010) (India)
Wakoko (2003) (Uganda)
Amin et al. (1995) (Bangladesh)
Rahman et al. (2009) (Bangladesh)
Setboonsarng and Parpiev (2008) (Pakistan)
Hashemi et al. (2006) (Bangladesh)
Ngo (2008) (Kyrgyzstan)
Asim (2008) (Pakistan)
Lakwo (2007) (Uganda)
Garikipati (2008) (India)
ID
Mohindra et al. (2008) (India)
Pitt et al. (2006) (Bangladesh)
Study
0.12 (0.03, 0.21)
0.13 (-0.12, 0.38)
0.60 (-2.87, 4.06)
1.47 (1.17, 1.78)
0.27 (0.21, 0.33)
0.01 (-0.25, 0.26)
0.05 (-0.24, 0.35)
0.24 (0.18, 0.30)
-0.11 (-0.33, 0.11)
-0.01 (-0.07, 0.05)
0.06 (0.01, 0.12)
0.08 (-0.01, 0.16)
0.19 (0.03, 0.35)
-0.17 (-0.57, 0.22)
-0.09 (-0.20, 0.03)
ES (95% CI)
-0.14 (-0.43, 0.15)
0.05 (-0.01, 0.10)
100.00
5.45
0.07
4.47
8.59
5.29
4.71
8.59
5.81
8.57
8.62
8.23
7.03
3.35
7.87
Weight
4.69
8.67
%
  0-4.06 4.06
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Setboonsarng and Parpiev (2008) -0.013 -0.074 0.048 8.57 
Husain et al. (2010) 0.009 -0.246 0.263 5.29 
Pitt et al. (2006) 0.045 -0.005 0.095 8.67 
Wakoko (2003) 0.055 -0.236 0.346 4.71 
Hashemi et al. (2006) 0.064 0.008 0.120 8.62 
Ngo (2008) 0.077 -0.011 0.165 8.23 
Sharif (2002) 0.130 -0.115 0.375 5.45 
Asim (2008) 0.187 0.028 0.346 7.03 
Amin et al. (1995) 0.239 0.18 0.298 8.59 
Amin et al. (1998) 0.269 0.210 0.327 8.59 
Hoque and Itohara (2009) 0.596 -2.870 4.062 0.07 
Holvoet (2006) 1.472 1.165 1.779 4.47 
D+L pooled ES 0.125 0.034 0.215 100.00 
Panel B     
Heterogeneity chi-squared  168.72 (d.f. = 15) p = 0.000 
I-squared (variation in ES attributable to heterogeneity) 91.1%  
Estimate of between-study variance Tau-squared  0.0247  
Test of ES=0  z=2.61 p = 0.009 
 
However, both the positive effect size and to some extent the heterogeneity appear to 
be driven by two particular studies (Hoque and Itohara, 2009, and Holvoet, 2006), 
which also showed relatively large positive effect sizes. Hoque and Itohara reported 
logit odds ratio coefficients which we transformed into logs, and adjusted to 
standardised mean difference following Chinn (2000). Holvoet seems to be an 
outlier. We regarded these two studies as outliers and excluded them from the meta-
analysis on the basis of an exceptionally large variance (Hoque and Itohara, 2009) 
and an exceptionally large mean difference (Holvoet, 2006)  (see Figure 7 and Table 
8). Results indicate that the small positive effect size was not significant by 
conventional standards (SMD=0.069, 95%CI=-0.003, 0.141), while heterogeneity 
remained large (Chi-sq=92.64, Tau-sq=0.01, I-sq=85%). 
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Figure 7. Forest plot of microcredit and women’s control over household spending: 
QE studies excluding outliers. 
 
 
Table 8. Meta-analysis of microcredit and women’s control over household 
spending: QE studies excluding outliers 
Panel A 
Study SMD 95% Confidence Interval % Weight 
Lakwo (2007) -0.174 -0.57 0.223 2.55 
Mohindra et al. (200 -0.139 -0.431 0.153 3.92 
Rahman et al. (2009) -0.11 -0.335 0.115 5.27 
Garikipati (2008) -0.086 -0.198 0.026 8.52 
Setboonsarng and Parpiev (2008) -0.013 -0.074 0.048 9.93 
Husain et al. (2010) 0.009 -0.246 0.263 4.61 
Pitt et al. (2006) 0.045 -0.005 0.095 10.16 
Wakoko (2003) 0.055 -0.236 0.346 3.93 
Hashemi et al. (2006 0.064 0.008 0.12 10.04 
Ngo (2008) 0.077 -0.011 0.165 9.23 
Sharif (2002) 0.13 -0.115 0.375 4.81 
Asim (2008) 0.187 0.028 0.346 7.06 
Overall  (I-squared = 85.9%, p = 0.000)
Setboonsarng and Parpiev (2008) (Pakistan)
ID
Rahman et al. (2009) (Bangladesh)
Asim (2008) (Pakistan)
Sharif (2002) (Bangladesh)
Hashemi et al. (2006) (Bangladesh)
Study
Husain et al. (2010) (India)
Pitt et al. (2006) (Bangladesh)
Wakoko (2003) (Uganda)
Lakwo (2007) (Uganda)
Mohindra et al. (2008) (India)
Amin et al. (1998) (Bangladesh)
Amin et al. (1995) (Bangladesh)
Garikipati (2008) (India)
Ngo (2008) (Kyrgyzstan)
0.07 (-0.01, 0.14)
-0.01 (-0.07, 0.05)
ES (95% CI)
-0.11 (-0.33, 0.11)
0.19 (0.03, 0.35)
0.13 (-0.12, 0.38)
0.06 (0.01, 0.12)
0.01 (-0.25, 0.26)
0.05 (-0.01, 0.10)
0.05 (-0.24, 0.35)
-0.17 (-0.57, 0.22)
-0.14 (-0.43, 0.15)
0.27 (0.21, 0.33)
0.24 (0.18, 0.30)
-0.09 (-0.20, 0.03)
0.08 (-0.01, 0.16)
100.00
9.93
Weight
5.27
7.06
4.81
10.04
%
4.61
10.16
3.93
2.55
3.92
9.98
9.98
8.52
9.23
  0-.57 .57
59 
 
Amin et al. (1995) 0.239 0.18 0.298 9.98 
Amin et al. (1998) 0.269 0.21 0.327 9.98 
D+L pooled ES 0.066 -0.006 0.139 100.00 
Panel B     
Heterogeneity chi-squared  92.38 (d.f. = 13) p = 0.000 
I-squared (variation in ES attributable to heterogeneity)  85.9%  
Estimate of between-study variance Tau-squared 0.0128  
Test of ES=0  z=1.79 p = 0.073 
 
Finally, given the large number of microcredit impact studies in Bangladesh, and the 
length and scale of engagement of microcredit organisations in that country, we 
examined whether there were systematic differences in results by location (Figure 8, 
Table 9). At first glance, the results suggest Bangladesh studies tended to show 
significant effects across studies, in contrast to elsewhere. However, few of the 
Bangladesh studies included in the meta-analysis used low threat to validity 
methods (and none used randomised assignment) and many were assessed as being 
of high risk of bias. It is necessary to control for these additional sources of 
heterogeneity before any conclusions for policy can be made, and indeed when we 
did control for risk of bias in meta-regression analysis we did not find any significant 
effects for Bangladesh studies (Table 12).  
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Figure 8. Forest plot assessing differences in effect by location: QE studies 
excluding outliers 
 
 
Table 9. Meta-analysis assessing differences in effect by location (excluding 
outliers) 
Panel A 
Study SMD 95% Confidence Interval % Weight 
Bangladesh studies     
Rahman et al. (2009) -0.11 -0.335 0.115 5.27 
Pitt et al. (2006) 0.045 -0.005 0.095 10.16 
Hashemi et al. (2006) 0.064 0.008 0.12 10.04 
Sharif (2002) 0.13 -0.115 0.375 4.81 
Amin et al. (1995) 0.239 0.18 0.298 9.98 
Amin et al. (1998) 0.269 0.21 0.327 9.98 
D+L pooled ES 0.124 0.021 0.226 50.24 
Other studies     
Lakwo (2007) -0.174 -0.57 0.223 2.55 
Mohindra et al. (2008) -0.139 -0.431 0.153 3.92 
.
.
Overall  (I-squared = 85.9%, p = 0.000)
Hashemi et al. (2006) (Bangladesh)
Setboonsarng and Parpiev (2008) (Pakistan)
Amin et al. (1995) (Bangladesh)
Pitt et al. (2006) (Bangladesh)
Garikipati (2008) (India)
ID
Ngo (2008) (Kyrgyzstan)
Wakoko (2003) (Uganda)
Sharif (2002) (Bangladesh)
Rahman et al. (2009) (Bangladesh)
Lakwo (2007) (Uganda)
Subtotal  (I-squared = 90.8%, p = 0.000)
Mohindra et al. (2008) (India)
Study conducted elsewhere
Subtotal  (I-squared = 42.9%, p = 0.092)
Asim (2008) (Pakistan)
Husain et al. (2010) (India)
Amin et al. (1998) (Bangladesh)
Study conducted in Bangladesh
Study
0.07 (-0.01, 0.14)
0.06 (0.01, 0.12)
-0.01 (-0.07, 0.05)
0.24 (0.18, 0.30)
0.05 (-0.01, 0.10)
-0.09 (-0.20, 0.03)
ES (95% CI)
0.08 (-0.01, 0.16)
0.05 (-0.24, 0.35)
0.13 (-0.12, 0.38)
-0.11 (-0.33, 0.11)
-0.17 (-0.57, 0.22)
0.12 (0.02, 0.23)
-0.14 (-0.43, 0.15)
0.01 (-0.06, 0.08)
0.19 (0.03, 0.35)
0.01 (-0.25, 0.26)
0.27 (0.21, 0.33)
100.00
10.04
9.93
9.98
10.16
8.52
Weight
9.23
3.93
4.81
5.27
2.55
50.24
3.92
49.76
7.06
4.61
9.98
%
  0-.57 .57
61 
 
Garikipati (2008) -0.086 -0.198 0.026 8.52 
Setboonsarng and Parpiev 
(2008) -0.013 -0.074 0.048 9.93 
Husain et al. (2010) 0.009 -0.246 0.263 4.61 
Wakoko (2003) 0.055 -0.236 0.346 3.93 
Ngo (2008) 0.077 -0.011 0.165 9.23 
Asim (2008) 0.187 0.028 0.346 7.06 
D+L pooled ES 0.013 -0.057 0.082 49.76 
Panel B: Test(s) of heterogeneity: 
 Heterogeneity 
statistic 
d.f. P-value I-squared Tau-squared 
Bangladesh 54.43 5 0.000 90.8% 0.0128 
Other location 12.27 7 0.092 42.9% 0.0035 
      Significance test(s) of ES=0 
Bangladesh: z= 2.37, p = 0.018 
Other location: z= 0.36, p = 0.721 
 
3.4.3 Sensitivity analysis: risk of bias and study design  
We explored the possibility that studies with weaker causal identification strategies 
tended to produce larger (upwards biased) effect sizes, using sensitivity analysis by 
risk of bias and study design assessment. We allocated a risk of bias category to each 
study based on study design, method of analysis, and quality assessment (Table 4).  
None of the studies from which we could extract effect sizes could be rated as having 
a low risk of bias, with the remainder being categorised as either moderate or high 
risk of bias. Figure 9 and Table 10 present the sensitivity analysis by study design 
assessment, indicating, as shown previously, that more internally valid designs 
consistently showed smaller effects, with the evidence from RCTs showing no 
statistically significant effects.  
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Figure 9. Forest plot of effects of microcredit on women’s control over household 
spending by study design assessment  
 
 
Table 10. Meta-analysis of effect of microcredit on women’s control over household 
spending by study design assessment 
Panel A: Meta-analysis by study design assessment 
Study  ES 95% Confidence Interval % Weight 
QE studies: High threat to validity 
Lakwo (2007) -0.174 -0.57 0.223 4.79 
Mohindra et al. (2008) -0.139 -0.431 0.153 7.29 
Rahman et al. (2009) -0.11 -0.335 0.115 9.70 
Husain et al. (2010) 0.009 -0.246 0.263 8.53 
Wakoko (2003) 0.055 -0.236 0.346 7.30 
Hashemi et al. (2006) 0.064 0.008 0.12 17.91 
Sharif (2002) 0.13 -0.115 0.375 8.88 
Amin et al. (1995) 0.239 0.18 0.298 17.81 
Amin et al. (1998) 0.269 0.21 0.327 17.81 
.
.
.
QE studies: high threat to validity
Lakwo (2007) (Uganda)
Mohindra et al. (2008) (India)
Rahman et al. (2009) (Bangladesh)
Husain et al. (2010) (India)
Wakoko (2003) (Uganda)
Hashemi et al. (2006) (Bangladesh)
Sharif (2002) (Bangladesh)
Amin et al. (1995) (Bangladesh)
Amin et al. (1998) (Bangladesh)
Subtotal  (I-squared = 82.2%, p = 0.000)
QE studies: medium/low threat to validity
Garikipati (2008) (India)
Setboonsarng and Parpiev (2008) (Pakistan)
Pitt et al. (2006) (Bangladesh)
Ngo (2008) (Kyrgyzstan)
Asim (2008) (Pakistan)
Subtotal  (I-squared = 64.2%, p = 0.025)
RCTs
Crepon et al. (2011) (Morocco)
Banerjee et al. (2009) (India)
Karlan and Zinman (2009) (South Africa)
Kim et al. (2007) (South Africa)
Subtotal  (I-squared = 0.0%, p = 0.437)
ID
Study
-0.17 (-0.57, 0.22)
-0.14 (-0.43, 0.15)
-0.11 (-0.33, 0.11)
0.01 (-0.25, 0.26)
0.05 (-0.24, 0.35)
0.06 (0.01, 0.12)
0.13 (-0.12, 0.38)
0.24 (0.18, 0.30)
0.27 (0.21, 0.33)
0.09 (-0.01, 0.19)
-0.09 (-0.20, 0.03)
-0.01 (-0.07, 0.05)
0.05 (-0.01, 0.10)
0.08 (-0.01, 0.16)
0.19 (0.03, 0.35)
0.03 (-0.03, 0.09)
-0.02 (-0.06, 0.02)
-0.00 (-0.10, 0.09)
0.05 (-0.04, 0.14)
0.27 (-0.38, 0.93)
-0.01 (-0.04, 0.03)
ES (95% CI)
4.79
7.27
9.70
8.53
7.30
17.91
8.88
17.81
17.81
100.00
16.10
25.54
27.70
20.16
10.50
100.00
70.33
14.06
15.34
0.27
100.00
Weight
%
  0-.931 .931
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D+L pooled ES 0.089 -0.011 0.189 
 QE studies: Medium/low threat to validity 
Garikipati (2008) -0.086 -0.198 0.026 15.77 
Setboonsarng and 
Parpiev (2008) -0.013 -0.074 0.048 25.52 
Pitt et al. (2006) 0.045 -0.005 0.095 27.81 
Ngo (2008) 0.077 -0.011 0.165 19.91 
Asim (2008) 0.187 0.028 0.346 10.17 
D+L pooled ES 0.032 -0.028 0.093 
 RCTs 
Crepon et al. (2011) -0.021 -0.062 0.02 8.15 
Banerjee et al. (2009) -0.003 -0.095 0.088 7.09 
Karlan and Zinman 
(2007) 0.049 -0.039 0.137 7.18 
Kim et al. (2007) 0.273 -0.385 0.931 0.82 
Sub-total     
D+L pooled ES -0.007 -0.041 0.027 
 Panel B: Test(s) of heterogeneity: 
 Heterogeneity 
statistic 
degrees of 
freedom 
P I-squared** Tau-squared 
QE studies: high 45.05 8 0.000 82.2% 0.0138 
QE studies: medium/low  11.18 4 0.025 64.2% 0.0029 
RCTs 2.72 3 0.437 0.0% 0.0000 
Significance test(s) of ES=0 
High  z=1.74  p=0.082 
Medium z=0.96  p=0.336 
Low z=0.40 p=0.690 
Overall  z=1.81  p=0.070 
 
Figure 10 shows the forest plot and Table 11 the corresponding meta-analysis for 
quasi-experimental studies by risk of bias status.  The results confirmed firstly that 
studies in which we suspected higher risk of bias appeared to systematically inflate 
effect sizes to the point in which, overall, the findings were marginally statistically 
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significant. Secondly, the results suggested that much of the heterogeneity in effect 
sizes arose from the inclusion of high risk of bias studies in the analysis.  
 
Figure 10. Forest plot of effects of microcredit on women’s control over household 
spending by risk of bias for quasi-experiments and regression studies 
 
 
Table 11. Meta-analysis of effect of microcredit on women’s control over household 
spending by risk of bias (quasi-experiments and regression studies) 
Panel A: Quasi-experimental designs by risk of bias 
Study  ES [95% Conf. Interval] % Weight 
High risk of bias     
Lakwo (2007) -0.174 -0.57 0.223 2.55 
Mohindra et al. (2008) -0.139 -0.431 0.153 3.92 
Rahman et al. (2009) -0.11 -0.335 0.115 5.27 
Setboonsarng and 
Parpiev (2008) -0.013 -0.074 0.048 9.93 
Husain et al. (2010) 0.009 -0.246 0.263 4.61 
Wakoko (2003) 0.055 -0.236 0.346 3.93 
Hashemi et al. (2006) 0.064 0.008 0.12 10.04 
Sharif (2002) 0.13 -0.115 0.375 4.81 
.
.
Overall  (I-squared = 85.9%, p = 0.000)
Medium risk of bias
Husain et al. (2010) (India)
Study
Wakoko (2003) (Uganda)
Lakwo (2007) (Uganda)
Mohindra et al. (2008) (India)
Garikipati (2008) (India)
Sharif (2002) (Bangladesh)
Setboonsarng and Parpiev (2008) (Pakistan)
Subtotal  (I-squared = 86.2%, p = 0.000)
Pitt et al. (2006) (Bangladesh)
Asim (2008) (Pakistan)
Rahman et al. (2009) (Bangladesh)
Hashemi et al. (2006) (Bangladesh)
Amin et al. (1995) (Bangladesh)
ID
Amin et al. (1998) (Bangladesh)
Subtotal  (I-squared = 63.7%, p = 0.064)
High risk of bias
Ngo (2008) (Kyrgyzstan)
0.07 (-0.01, 0.14)
0.01 (-0.25, 0.26)
0.05 (-0.24, 0.35)
-0.17 (-0.57, 0.22)
-0.14 (-0.43, 0.15)
-0.09 (-0.20, 0.03)
0.13 (-0.12, 0.38)
-0.01 (-0.07, 0.05)
0.08 (-0.01, 0.17)
0.05 (-0.01, 0.10)
0.19 (0.03, 0.35)
-0.11 (-0.33, 0.11)
0.06 (0.01, 0.12)
0.24 (0.18, 0.30)
ES (95% CI)
0.27 (0.21, 0.33)
0.02 (-0.06, 0.10)
0.08 (-0.01, 0.16)
100.00
4.61
%
3.93
2.55
3.92
8.52
4.81
9.93
72.09
10.16
7.06
5.27
10.04
9.98
Weight
9.98
27.91
9.23
  0-.57 .57
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Asim (2008) 0.187 0.028 0.346 7.06 
Amin et al. (1995) 0.239 0.180 0.298 9.98 
Amin et al. (1998) 0.269 0.210 0.327 9.98 
Sub-total     
D+L pooled ES 0.082 -0.010 0.175 72.09 
Medium risk of bias     
Garikipati (2008) -0.086 -0.198 0.026 8.52 
Pitt et al. (2006) 0.045 -0.005 0.095 10.16 
Ngo (2008) 0.077 -0.011 0.165 9.23 
Sub-total     
D+L pooled ES 0.022 -0.056 0.100 27.91 
Overall     
D+L pooled ES 0.066 -0.006 0.139 100.00 
Panel B Test(s) of heterogeneity: 
 Heterogeneity 
statistic 
degrees of 
freedom 
P-value I-squared Tau-squared 
High risk 72.21 10 0.000 86.20% 0.0159 
Medium risk 5.51 2 0.064 63.7% 0.0030 
Overall 92.38 13 0.000 85.90% 0.0128 
Significance test(s) of ES=0 
High  z=1.74  p=0.082 
Medium z=0.69  p=0.487 
Overall  z=1.88  p=0.061 
 
3.4.4 Analysis of publication bias  
Examination of a contour-enhanced funnel plot (Figure 11) (Peters et al., 2008) did 
not suggest that there was asymmetry in the plots, although the effect sizes 
estimated by Hoque and Itohara are large and of low precision. The analysis 
therefore did not suggest there was evidence for publication bias due to 
underreporting of findings according to statistical significance, since the majority of 
studies are represented in the area of non-significance.  
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Figure 11. Contour-enhanced funnel plot of microcredit and women’s control over 
household spending (excluding outliers) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: plot contains 18 effect sizes, excluding outliers (Hoque and Itohara, 2009; Holvoet, 
2006)
 
. 
Indeed, meta-regression analysis incorporating Egger’s test (Egger et al., 1997), 
which regresses effect size on its standard error, suggested that statistical evidence 
for publication bias was not present (Table 12, specification 1). The meta-regression 
also suggested that any asymmetry was likely due to high risk of bias studies 
overestimating study effects, as indicated by the positive significant coefficient on 
the ‘high risk of bias’ dummy variable (Table 12, specification 2). Specification 3 
includes a dummy variable for location in Bangladesh, which suggested that once 
risk of bias is controlled for, microcredit in Bangladesh is not more likely to lead to 
significant effects on women’s control over household spending than in other 
locations. 
 
Table 12. Meta-regression analysis of small study effects and study location 
Panel A          
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
Coeff t-stat P>t Coeff t-stat P>t Coeff t-stat P>t 
Standard error  -0.522 -0.85 0.408 -0.829 -1.38 0.188 -0.533 -0.85 0.412 
1=high risk of bias    0.101 1.85 0.084 0.062 1.04 0.314 
1=Bangladesh study       0.082 1.37 0.193 
0 
.1 
.2 
.3 
.4 
Standard error 
-1 -.5 0 .5 1 
Standardised mean difference 
Studies 
p < 1% 
1% < p < 5% 
5% < p < 10% 
p > 10% 
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Constant 0.087 1.88 0.078 0.050 1.09 0.294 0.022 0.45 0.660 
Panel B          
Number of obs 18   18   18   
Tau-squared 0.010   0.007   0.007   
I-squared 86.7%   81.2%   76.1%   
Adjusted R-squared 1.25%   26.9%   35.5%   
Model F    2.15   2.24   
Prob > F    0.151   0.129   
Note: analysis conducted using inverse-variance weights. 
 
3.4.5 Concluding remarks on the meta-analysis 
Four studies based on randomised design (Banerjee et al., 2009; Crepon et al., 2011; 
Karlan and Zinman, 2007; Kim et al., 2007) found no statistically significant effect 
of microcredit on women’s control over household spending, individually or when 
pooled using meta-analysis. Of the remaining studies, the results of the meta-
analysis suggest that the effect sizes were generally insignificantly different from 
zero, and when marginally significant were small. However, an analysis separating 
studies by design and by risk of bias status showed that results were relatively 
consistent between the two sets of studies, which could be taken as an indication of a 
certain degree of robustness of the meta-analytical results, albeit with experimental 
studies showing smaller effects which were not statistically significantly different 
from zero. In addition, we did not find robust evidence that studies conducted in 
Bangladesh where microcredit was pioneered demonstrated bigger effects over other 
locations. 
 
The experimental studies appeared to be fairly homogenous in terms of between 
study effects, and we did not suspect there to be important sources of heterogeneity 
which meta-analysis would need to take into account. In contrast, a high level of 
heterogeneity within and between studies and the general reliance on observational 
studies and statistical analyses which were not reported in sufficient detail to enable 
confident judgment as to their robustness, limited the confidence that we could 
place in the findings of the quasi-experimental studies. Quite a number of the 
studies came from works which were not peer-reviewed, and our general assessment 
of vulnerability to bias of the majority of studies was high.  
 
While we did not find statistical evidence for publication bias due to small study 
effects, it is likely that there was a positive bias in the published effect sizes due to 
internal validity, as the meta-regression suggested. The statistically insignificant 
results for higher validity studies together with the likely prevalence of researcher 
68 
 
bias (also known as researcher allegiance) and any tendency to publish positive and 
statistically significant results, suggested that the true average effect size across 
studies would be insignificantly different from zero. 
 
Taking into account the evidence presented in this section, we can conclude that 
there is no evidence for a significant effect of microcredit on women’s control over 
household spending.  
 
3.5  QUALITATIVE SYNTHESIS OF INCLUDED STUDIES 
How can we explain the non-existence of effects and heterogeneity in effects found 
across studies? The most important mechanisms for understanding the effect of 
microcredit on women’s control over household expenditures are situational and 
action-formation mechanisms. 
3.5.1 Situational mechanisms 
Situational mechanism: availability and provision of money (i.e. the loan)   
The availability and provision of money (as a loan) to women, linking microcredit 
and women’s empowerment, is a situational mechanism. Several of the included 
studies made the point that an effect of microcredit on empowerment (also) 
depended on the amount of credit. Amin et al. (1998: 229) reported that “being 
empowered by their new sources of financial income and related credit-group 
supports, female recipients of NGO credits may have asserted their autonomy and 
authority vis-à-vis their husbands' restrictions and dominance in relevant household 
affairs”. Hashemi et al. (1996: 643; 645) found in their data that “women who earn 
independent incomes and contribute to their families’ support are likely to be 
empowered regardless of whether this is a result of their involvement in a credit 
program”.  Schuler and Hashemi (1994: 71) confirmed the idea that credit 
programmes “affect women’s level of empowerment by strengthening their 
economic roles”.  
 
Some researchers like Wakoko (2003:180) suggested that it may not be only the fact 
that money is available but the amount of resources. “[For] ... women [who] had very 
small amounts of loans/total personal income … [this] did not affect their decision-
making role in a positive way. Larger loans, more equal to those of men might make 
a lot of difference in their power. It is possible that women may have received 
recognition and respect for their role in the home even though we don’t observe a 
change in their decisions”. Zaman (1998:17) and Zaman (1999: 21) looked into the 
access to resources. The results “support the view that greater access to resources in 
terms of micro-credit enhances female control (i.e. ability to sell these assets without 
asking consent) over her assets, controlling for a range of other factors”. Sharif 
(2004: 479) also found that credit programmes indeed can increase women’s 
capability but he noticed that “factors other than programme participation (such as 
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age) can have as strong or stronger impacts on decision-making status”. However, 
virtually all studies in our sample explicitly or implicitly acknowledged the 
importance of the woman’s (independent) financial contribution to the household 
income and livelihood and the associated steps toward empowerment23
 
.  
Situational mechanism: the financial situation of the household 
Several studies made the point, that, in poor families, any income contribution to the 
family by a wife is of significant value for subsistence and may enhance her position 
in the family, give her leverage and increase her power in decision-making (Mizan, 
1993; Hashemi et al. 1996; Lastarria-Cornhiel and Shimamura, 2008). The less 
wealth or income there is, the more welcome or needed is the female financial 
contribution, and the higher the potential for bargaining power for women. Amin et 
al. (1995:112) referred to a negative effect of household income and ownership of 
land on empowerment because of what can be labelled as social pressure (see also 
action-formation mechanisms), while Lastarria-Cornhiel and Shimamura (2008:49) 
showed that the “size of landholding has a negative and significant (at 0.05 level) 
coefficient for joint decision making and an almost equal but positive coefficient for 
male-head-only decisions. This seems to indicate that bigger landholdings increase 
male head’s decision-making authority (on food consumption) at the expense of 
joint-decisions”.  
 
Rahman et al. (2009:300) found that “assets are positively related to women’s 
empowerment”, while Schuler and Hashemi (1994:70) also found that wealth had a 
significant positive effect on a women’s status or level of empowerment in the 
villages where the Grameen Bank programme operated in their study. In the case of 
the latter studies, the positive associations may point to the fact that the likelihood 
that credit adds to an increase in empowerment of women with more assets or 
income may be lower than in cases where women have less income or assets. 
 
Situational mechanism:  the (demographic) composition of the (larger) household 
and the position of the women  
As is the case on a societal level with the Easterlin effect24
                                                        
23 Pitt et al. (2003, 2006) for example argued that credit programme participation leads to women 
taking a greater role in household decision-making, having greater access to financial and economic 
resources, having greater social networks, having greater bargaining power vis-à-vis their husbands, 
and having greater freedom of mobility. And Zaman (1998) stated that strengthening women’s 
economic roles gives them more autonomy and more control over important decisions affecting 
themselves and their families, as well as contributing to their self-confidence and their ability to plan 
for the future. Hoque and Itohara (2009) described the following pathway to empowerment. When a 
woman uses the money (taken as loan from micro-credit NGO) by herself in any productive purpose 
then she can earn money and contribute to some extent to household income.  Due to this contribution 
she can establish her control over the family decision-making process and other family affairs and thus 
ultimately improve her position in the family. 
, the position of women in 
the household, the age distribution and the composition of the (larger) household 
are important situational mechanisms, affecting the potential impact of microcredit 
further down the chain. The number of (school aged) children is an example: having 
24 The Easterlin effect refers to a macro mechanism describing cyclical changes in demographic and 
social behaviour as the result of fluctuations in birth rates and cohort sizes.  
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school age children increases a woman’s dependence on her husband, because of her 
needs for financial and emotional support. Another example is that women that live 
with their husband and her parents in the same household experience more 
decision-making power than other women (Mizan 1993). According to the study, the 
presence of the woman’s kin or others may affect decision-making power either as 
bystanders or by encouraging coalition formation. In the context of Bangladesh, 
when a wife’s parents live nearer, the woman’s control over her share of her family’s 
property becomes better protected. This reflects coalition formation with her kin 
group and may increase her power25 26
 
. Sharif (2004: 476-477) analyzed family 
composition and showed that the greater the number of adult sons a woman has, the 
smaller the likelihood of having decision-making power, other things being equal. 
Also several other demographic composition variables were investigated like the 
presence of a second wife.  
Situational mechanism: the division of labour, the balance of decision-making 
power in households and compliance with (traditional) norms  
Several studies (Asim, 2008, Mohindra et al., 2008 and Sharif, 2004) argued that an 
absence of impact or a limited impact of microcredit on empowerment might be the 
result of the existing “balance of power” within the household. Asim (2008:44) 
reported that when the role of women in household decision-making is not changed 
first, obtaining a loan is unlikely to achieve that. This author did not find impact of 
microcredit programmes because women had already “been given the bargaining 
power in these decisions commensurate with the prescribed gender norms of the 
society […]. However when it comes to decisions relating to major household 
decisions like purchase of assets, house repairs and sale/purchase of house, women 
do not have much say. […]  The unconditional mean values for those decisions have 
a value of about 2 on a scale of 5 suggesting that female preferences are rarely or 
never considered for these household decisions” (Asim, 2008:48). He also suggests 
“that on average women in the treatment group are no more independent or 
autonomous than the control units, even when it comes to decisions relating to small 
household purchases. This further reinforces our earlier findings that women have 
reached a certain threshold level of independence within the structural norms of the 
society and microcredit has no marginal impact on all such indicators” (Asim, 
2008:49). These findings point to a ceiling (or threshold) phenomenon. Mohindra et 
al. (2008) argued that initial levels of decision-making agency have to be taken into 
account; as it is relatively easy for women to move toward “joint” decision-making, it 
is much more difficult going beyond that, except for those who are at this level to 
begin with.  
                                                        
25 This can also be linked with the different household models and threat points (see Annex 2). 
26 Another demographic characteristic that influences the chances of microcredit having an impact is 
the age of women. Mizan (1993) found that older women in the family are more empowered; it was 
explained by the alleged increased strength and self-confidence achieved by older women. He added 
that this should be understood in the context of rural Bangladesh where traditional norms predominate 
and the elderly are unquestionably revered. Also, in Bangladesh, age may reflect other critical life cycle 
factors such as motherhood and becoming a mother-in-law which may work as a cultural resource in 
decision-making power. 
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Ngo (2008: 86) mentioned a similar threshold phenomenon. “If programme 
beneficiaries come from households where women enjoy high levels spousal 
cooperation or are already ‘empowered’, the impact on the intra-household 
allocation of resources […] is likely to be small”. Ngo (2008) also observed that in 
case loans were small in size and mostly used to finance activities that were 
traditionally controlled by men, there was little effect on empowerment. The 
primacy of married life and limited options for women outside marriage were 
drivers. If economic opportunities lie outside the traditional realm of the female 
spouse and exit options for women are severely limited, then she will be better-off 
ignoring them in order to preserve her social ties within the community. Thus, the 
empowering potential of microfinance is necessarily circumscribed by prevailing 
gender norms, unless alternatives are offered to women that strengthen their outside 
options in a credible manner (Ngo, 2008:90-91). The same author (2008: 92) 
“showed that the intra-household sharing rule [i.e. of credit/loans] may become 
more biased against the disempowered spouse if the initial distribution of resources 
within the household is highly unequal”. This could strengthen inequalities between 
men and women. In Asim’s (2008) study on membership in credit organizations, it 
was also found that when women have reached a certain threshold level of 
independence and autonomy within the structural norms of the society, microcredit 
has no marginal impact on these aspects, even when it comes to decisions relating to 
small household purchases. They have been given the bargaining power in these 
decisions commensurate with the prescribed gender norms of the society27
 
. 
Situational mechanisms: the opportunity structure related to other activities  
Amin et al. (1998:232) found that “when asked to discuss the benefits that people 
are deriving from NGOs, most of the loanees pointed out their various positive 
elements. According to them, NGOs not only provide loans, but also provide various 
other welfare services”. This finding highlights that the presence of microfinance 
organizations in many contexts presents opportunities for women that go beyond 
the availability and use of loans28
 
. 
In our initial theoretical model ‘resources’ constitutes one of the three central 
elements. The availability and use made of resources is to some extent dependent 
upon situational mechanisms, like the ones we found in this review. Availability of 
money is one of these, but when money is available, other situational mechanisms 
like the financial situation of the household prior to obtaining microcredit and its 
demographic composition, together with the existing division of labour and gender 
                                                        
27 Regarding the capacity of networks to exclude members, see Aviram (2003: 63) who put it as follows: 
“the network wields a significant sanction over its members, in the form of exclusion (or suspension) 
from the network….. A network is in excellent position to coordinate members’ sanctions, and through 
exclusion denies from the offending party the network benefits conferred by the other members”. 
28 We did not study this aspect in detail. In fact, in most studies it was impossible to determine whether 
credit was the only intervention at work (in tandem with credit). Membership of a solidarity group, the 
social interaction among peers as well as the social pressures, can have a significant effect on 
empowerment processes. See also below in the discussion on action formation mechanisms. 
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relations in the household, can shed more light on the relationship between the 
available ‘resources’ in terms of microcredit, the use made of it and the level of 
empowerment. Threshold effects can also play a role29
 
.  
3.5.2 Action-formation mechanisms 
Action-formation mechanism: awareness-raising of women (through media 
exposure) 
Access to media is believed to make women aware about their rights and scopes and 
women having access to media will be more empowered compared to the women 
who do not have such access.  Zaman (1999: 23) for example found that “there is a 
positive effect of (BRAC’s) credit on [two of the] knowledge/awareness indicators 
even after controlling for female education variables. Whilst an obvious limitation of 
the data is not knowing whether any of the ‘knowledge’ is actually put into practice, 
greater legal and political awareness is argued to be an important first step towards 
raising female consciousness of her rights within the household and in the 
community at large”. In other words, the confluence of having access to credit and to 
media is more likely to affect decision-making power within the household. 
 
Action-formation mechanism: education of husbands encouraging women’s 
empowerment  
Rahman et al. (2009) found a positive relationship between the education of the 
husband and empowerment of the wife. According to the study this may be 
interpreted as an indication that a younger and educated male (could be husband or 
father) encourages a female to be empowered. Amin (1995:108) also found a 
relationship with the husband’s (and wife’s) education, assuming that “these proxies 
are the causes rather than the effects of women’s empowerment”. See also Rahman 
et al. (2009:300): “the most interesting finding is the age and education of the male 
partner. It appears that young and educated males encourage females to be more 
empowered”. An unresolved issue is the direction of causality as suggested by Amin 
(1995). Whereas credit may have a positive effect on decision-making when in fact 
the husband is more open to such a change (e.g. as reflected in a higher level of 
education), it may also be the case that educated men marry more empowered 
women in the first place. 
 
Action-formation mechanism: entrepreneurial drive (‘spirit’) 
“Among households who did not own a business when the programme began, those 
households with low predicted propensity to start a business do not increase 
durables spending, but do increase nondurable (e.g. food) consumption, consistent 
                                                        
29 In one of the studies (Amin et al., 1998:229) attention was drawn to the role of Islamic religion as a 
restricting factor for empowerment. Although the authors found that “[the] heavy concentration of 
NGO activities in the central and north-central regions may have raised women's empowerment, ... it is 
also well known that the relatively higher’ female autonomy in the northern region may result from less 
Islamic influence”. As we did not find similar cases of constraining or restricting situations discussed, 
we have not gone into detail.  
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with using microcredit to pay down more expensive debt or borrow against future 
income. Those households with high predicted propensity to start a business, on the 
other hand, reduce nondurable spending, and in particular appear to cut back on 
temptation goods, such as alcohol, tobacco, lottery tickets and snacks eaten outside 
the home, presumably in order to finance an even bigger initial investment than 
could be paid for with just the loan” (Banerjee et al., 2009: 20).  This 
“entrepreneurial spirit mechanism” consists of combining opportunity recognition, 
risk tolerance, and self-confidence; the more women are characterised by such a 
spirit, the larger the chances are that they start new businesses30
 
. 
Action-formation mechanism: women’s pride, self-esteem and ‘self-efficacy’ 
According to many studies gainful employment will impart pride and self-esteem in 
female borrowers. Lakwo (2007) explored how microfinance affected women’s 
reflection of themselves.  It was found that women were generally proud of who they 
are, given the assets they acquired. They had proudly taken up hitherto socially 
accepted roles of men, such as making direct cash contributions to their household’s 
well-being and paying for poll tax for their husbands and for the bride price both for 
themselves and their natal brothers. Equally, they were proud of creating jobs for 
their husbands and gaining in functional money management skills like calculating 
profits and keeping separate business from household money. Hoque and Itohara 
(2009) found, in line with this, that when a woman uses the money (taken as a loan 
from a microfinance organization) by herself on behalf of a productive purpose, she 
not only can earn money and contribute to some extent to household income, but 
can also establish her control over the family decision-making process and other 
family affairs and thus ultimately improve her position in the family. The (social) 
psychological mechanism that is at stake is ‘self-efficacy’:  the larger the belief in 
one’s capabilities to organise and execute the courses of action required to manage 
prospective situations (or, in other words, the more a person believes in his or her 
ability to succeed in a particular situation), the more this person is able to realise the 
behaviour. In Zaman’s studies (1998, 1999), it was suggested that credit 
programmes affect women’s levels of empowerment by strengthening their 
economic roles, and in other ways as well. Strengthening their economic roles gives 
them more autonomy and more control over important decisions affecting 
themselves and their families, as well as contributing to their self-confidence and 
their ability to plan for the future.  
 
Action-formation mechanism: microcredit programmes can help women to 
participate in the outside world and interact with others, and by doing so create 
social capital which in turn may lead to new ideas and insights and a change in 
power relations 
A necessary condition to be able to work outside the household is to be allowed a 
greater mobility and freedom to move outside the immediate vicinity of the home 
                                                        
30 Entrepreneurs are individuals who are more likely than others to be "alert" to the identification and 
exploitation of profit opportunities (Kirzner (1973). 
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independently and to interact with strangers. This is an important condition for 
empowerment in cultures that confine the woman to the home, like in Bangladesh, 
where the majority of the studies in our batch of included studies have been 
conducted. Participation in credit solidarity groups gives the women socially 
legitimate reasons to move outside the home and to associate with one another in 
public spaces (Schuler and Hashemi, 1994). This is of particular importance in 
cultures that restrict women’s movements outside the home. The group’s activities 
create new social contacts and they might create a new “shared” identity and 
identification with the group. These might be the first of participants’ associations 
apart from marriage or the household.  This new bond makes it easier for the women 
to resist the tight strictures of the traditional family and to adhere to the regulations 
of the program. They become a new source of social support and a kind of 
countervailing power against pressures from the family.  
 
Amin et al. (1995:108) and Amin et al. (1998: 233) linked the exposure to the outside 
world to an increase in women’s self-confidence and self-reliance, enhancing their 
empowerment. Schuler and Hashemi (1994: 73) added that when a microcredit 
programme gives the women socially legitimate reasons to move about and to 
associate with one another in public spaces, these meetings will increase their 
mobility and visibility, which will, subsequently, expose them to new ideas, which 
will then help them to become more confident and more skilful at interacting in the 
public sphere. Hashemi et al. (1996: 641) also reported that “the longer a woman is a 
member of either BRAC or Grameen Bank, the greater the likelihood that she will be 
empowered based on these indicators, and the more likely she is to make a 
substantial contribution to her family’s support”. Pitt et al. (2006: 817) suggested 
that “credit programs lead to women taking a greater role in household decision 
making, having greater access to financial and economic resources, having greater 
social networks, having greater bargaining power vis-à-vis their husbands, and 
having greater freedom of mobility”. The underlying mechanism was outlined by 
Burt (2004): people with cohesive social networks tend to think and act the same 
and in the long run. People who reach outside their social network not only are often 
the first to learn about new and useful information, but they are also able to see how 
different kinds of groups solve similar problems. The new social contacts, allegiances 
and information are also a new source of support in intra-household bargaining 
power. 
 
Action-formation mechanism: skill-building and developing new competences as a 
result of outside employment and participation in (credit) groups and networks 
Participation in work and credit organizations not only can increase social capital 
but can also increase human capital: knowledge and skills. Women can use these 
resources in marital decision-making. Mizan (1993) argued that participation in 
bank activities “imparts expert bases of power”, through which the borrower can 
bring skills, expertise and competence in decision-making into the family.  
Specifically, through their occupational activities, the female borrowers might gain 
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functional money management skills like calculating profits and keeping separate 
business from household money (Lakwo, 2007)31
 
. Lakwo (2007:143) also described 
how women, as they receive loans, enter into the world of “added obligations with 
both their group members and the bank, which requires them to adopt or adapt their 
livelihood strategies in order to ably meet their loan obligations. By so doing, they 
experience changes in their gender relations due to the changing claim-making 
rights in regards to access to, ownership over, and participation in decision-making 
on livelihood assets and strategies.  
Within these different domains, the various facets of power operate. For instance, 
driven by the ‘power to’ engage in business, women use their ‘power with’ other 
actors to identify and invest in the existing markets while taking into consideration 
stocking and profit gains. By so doing, they gain ‘power over’ their investments. This 
gain in turns changes their ‘power within’ as they become able to do what they were 
not able to do before”32. The new world they have entered and the very fact of 
learning how to accomplish dealing with financial situations is believed to stimulate 
women to participate effectively in power activities and games of a broader nature33
 
. 
Amin et al. (1995:108) also stressed the importance of being a member of a credit 
organization. Holvoet (2005:96) referred to the role that enhanced awareness 
(training) can have. “Whereas direct credit delivery to women by itself is not 
sufficient to produce a substantial impact on decision-making patterns, the opposite 
is true when credit is channelled through women’s groups and combined with 
technical and social awareness training. Comparing effects of IRDP Female and 
TNWDP Myrada Young credit schemes shows major shifts in decision-making 
patterns from norm-following and men deciding alone towards more bargaining and 
women deciding alone…..Our data further suggest that more frequent meetings, 
more intensive training and more investment in building groups create more 
additional effects than longer group membership [on women’s decision-making 
power]. The duration of being a group member also is reported to be an important 
factor. […..] These effects are even more striking when women have been members 
of a group for a longer period and in particular when more attention is given to 
genuine social intermediation” (Holvoet, 2005:97). 
Action-formation mechanism: peer pressure, knowing to be monitored and 
blaming, naming and shaming  
Holvoet (2005) argued that peer pressure and the availability of a group fund, which 
the women see as a lender of last resort for consumptive and emergency purposes, 
increased the probability that the loans were effectively used for the intended 
productive purpose. The women also felt that their position in the household had 
                                                        
31 See also Holvoet (2005, 2006). On the relationship between extra-household and intra-household 
bargaining, see also Agarwal (1997) and Wakoko (2003). 
32 One could speculate if behind this finding a different mechanism is active, i.e. the creation of 
obligations outside the family and bonds, which can lead to outside employment which in turns can 
lead to more bargaining power.  
33 This is strongly related to the skills mechanism and the enhanced self-esteem mechanism.  
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improved as they had secured access to long-term financial resources through their 
personal savings account and the group fund. Hoque and Itohara (2009) made a 
point that is related. They highlighted the phenomenon of women knowing that they 
are ‘monitored’ (by the microcredit organization).  To some extent there also is a 
naming, blaming and shaming mechanism at work. As pointed out by Hashemi et 
al. (1996:650): “Grameen counsels women to help them hold on to their loan money 
when their husbands try to take it away from them. Grameen communicates to the 
men, through the women, that if their wives fail to make loan repayments their 
names will be mentioned in public, and they may face embarrassment and 
harassment by visiting Bank staff and members. At the same time, the men see that 
families who pay their loans on time immediately receive subsequent loans, that if 
they follow the rules they are ensured continuing access to larger and larger amounts 
of credit”. Pawson (2010) has analysed how this ‘pillory mechanism’ works in 
general. This mechanism can have different outcomes for decision-making power of 
the woman within the household. 
 
Action-formation mechanism: rituals 
Schuler and Hashemi (1994:73) analyzed Grameen Bank (GB’s) approach to 
microcredit  in which chanting, saluting and other rituals appears to be more 
effective than BRAC’s in strengthening women’s autonomy (indicated by difference 
in effect on contraceptive use) and in performing the rituals the woman develops a 
strong identification with the group. This bond makes it easier for her to resist the 
tight strictures of the traditional family and to adhere to the regulations of the 
program. Hashemi et al. (1996:648) also found that “through the rituals of 
participation, and the contact with other members of their credit group, the women 
develop[ed] an identity outside of their families”.  Rituals (Winthrop, 1991) can be 
seen as “formalized, socially prescribed symbolic behaviour” and are believed to be 
relevant in changing behaviour and/or in reinforcing (newly learned) behaviour.  
According to Turner (1969 quoting Wilson 1954: 241) “rituals reveal values at their 
deepest level…men express in ritual what moves them most, and since the form of 
expressions is conventionalized and obligatory, it is the values of the group that are 
revealed”. It is assumed that rituals related to microcredit are an important 
mechanism that can contribute to the empowerment of women.  
 
A second crucial process referred to in our initial theoretical model is ‘agency’. 
‘Agency’, both individual and collective, appears to be a shortcut for jointly operating 
mechanisms, drawing on cognitive, behavioural and social processes, ranging from 
on the one hand learning from new insights through social action, being more 
competent and capable in household negotiations and increased self-efficacy to on 
the other hand stimulating the entrepreneurial spirit and taking part in microcredit 
‘rituals’. In that sense one can say that by linking the overall concept of ‘agency’ to 
these and other ‘action-formation mechanisms’, the ‘agency black box’ has become 
more transparent.  
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3.5.3 Transformational mechanisms 
Transformational mechanism:  increased social capital, increased levels of 
‘personal agency’ and selective incentives lead to the “collectivization” of individual 
problems, “collective agency” and subsequently to collective actions34
Holvoet (2005) distinguished microcredit programmes that use groups as financial 
intermediaries only (little more than a substitute for conventional collateral) from 
those that consider groups to be genuine social intermediaries. The latter stress their 
‘transformatory’ potential and use access to credit as a selective incentive to mobilise 
women and to stimulate collective action. In some cases, these types of women’s 
groups gradually evolved into actors of local institutional change. While, female 
members became increasingly involved in extra-household bargaining with 
community members, they in fact strengthened their individual fall-back position 
within the household. Holvoet (2006) claimed that the activities of these women’s 
groups can lead to awareness raising, to more public action, and social change. It is 
essential in this respect that a social intermediary function should be built upon the 
mechanism of financial intermediation. By creating a forum for the sharing of 
everyday life experiences, women may come to realise that most of their experiences 
are ‘collective’ rather than ‘individual’, and they may gradually become aware of a 
link between their own condition of ‘relative deprivation’ and broader socio-
economic structures. This will essentially lead to the ‘collectivization’ of individual 
problems and to the unveiling of such underlying structural causes as ‘gender’. This 
author explicitly referred to the working of the selective incentive mechanism 
(Olson, 1965), which may thus
 
35
 
 trigger collective action as a kind of by-product. 
Credit, for instance, clearly has the potential to act as a ‘selective incentive’ for 
women to become involved in women’s groups (Holvoet, 2006).  
Transformational mechanism:  the ‘diffusion’ / ‘spill over’ or demonstration 
mechanism36
Three of our included studies discussed a ‘diffusion’ or ‘spill over’ effect of 
microcredit on empowerment. According to Schuler and Hashemi (1994) residence 
in a village with a microcredit programme had a significant effect on women that did 
not participate in the program. This positive effect of the programme seems 
attributable to its effectiveness in strengthening women’s economic roles through 
credit and in other ways as well. Amin et al. (1998) found higher levels of 
empowerment in certain regions of Bangladesh and suggests that a diffusion effect 
might be in play. Rahman et al. (2009: 301) referred to a ‘demonstration effect’ to 
‘explain’ absence of (discernible) impact, suggesting “intensive microcredit 
intervention in the rural economy is leaving a demonstration effect on every person, 
 
                                                        
34 It is clear that the action-formation mechanism ‘social capital’ is related to this mechanism. 
35 It may, however, also train respondents in studies on microcredit and empowerment to become more 
complacent or become more aware of “correct” answers. 
36 The Demonstration Effect theory is not applicable here because it refers to a different mechanism 
(see Mitrut and Wolff, 2009). 
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thereby making even non-borrowers as empowered as borrowers”. To some extent 
this may even be the prelude to a tipping point mechanism.  
 
Transformational mechanism: the achievements of using microcredit loans in 
terms of women’s empowerment in household decision-making  
Achievements at individual and household levels are in the realm of action-
formation mechanisms. An additional dimension is how these achievements 
translate into collective effects. Here ‘transformational mechanisms’ are important 
(Opp, 2011). In our batch of selected studies only a few of these mechanisms were 
referred to37
 
: i.e. collective efficacy through selective incentives of a social nature and 
the diffusion and demonstration mechanism. 
3.5.4 Conclusion 
To conclude, we found an interesting array of behavioural mechanisms at work, 
most importantly five different situational mechanisms and eight different action-
formation mechanisms, in the context of causal relationships between microcredit 
and women’s control over household spending. Due to several factors – different 
contexts (e.g. gender relations), differences and lack of clarity regarding 
independent variables (e.g. credit versus participation in a solidarity group) and, 
despite our review’s focus and selection of studies, different outcome proxies – we 
were not able to construct more complete causal theories at the level of microcredit 
around the world.  
                                                        
37 This in part has to do with the focus of our review, i.e. on situational and action-formation 
mechanisms. 
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4 Conclusions 
4.1  SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Women’s empowerment in relation to microcredit has been studied extensively 
within the context of microcredit schemes. Most of these studies have been carried 
out in South Asia. An important dimension of empowerment concerns women’s 
control over household spending. This review focused on the impact of microcredit 
interventions on this aspect of women’s empowerment and the circumstances under 
which this occurs. It contributes to an existing number of systematic reviews of the 
effects of microcredit (Stewart et al., 2010; Duvendack et al., 2011; Stewart et al., 
2012).  
 
The main objective of this review was to assess the effects of microcredit on women’s 
control over household spending in developing countries. We adopted an approach 
in which we emphasised the construct validity of our analysis and the opening of the 
‘black box’ of microcredit in relation to women’s empowerment. At the same time we 
ensured that only studies of reasonable quality in terms of the internal validity of 
findings were included in the review, on the basis of rigorous assessment of internal 
validity. As a result, the review included not just randomised experiments but also 
quasi-experimental (e.g. propensity score matching) and regression-based studies 
(e.g. panel data regressions). We also looked at the question of how microcredit 
interventions might affect outcomes. We focused on the theoretical mechanisms that 
are believed to make microcredit programmes work. We brought in existing 
theoretical research about this issue, which provided a basis for searching for key 
mechanisms in the empirical studies that were selected in this review. 
 
Of the 6,000 hits (or 1,950 individual studies after duplicates were removed) in web-
based search engines, targeted searches in journal and books, backward and forward 
tracking of references, and so on, we identified an initial number of 310 papers that 
were selected for full text examination. Of these, 56 were considered to be of 
relevance to our scope, meaning that they focused on the relationship between 
microcredit and women’s empowerment (as dependent variable) as expressed 
through one or more aspects of women’s control over household spending. After 
subsequently applying methodological quality criteria, we selected 29 papers to be 
included in the review, covering 25 independent studies. 
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We subsequently performed an in-depth quality assessment of the included studies. 
Overall, both in terms of the methodological quality and quality of the theoretical 
framework, most of the included studies showed serious weaknesses, an aspect 
which inevitably compromised the level of depth and generalization we could 
achieve in the synthesis phase. 
 
After collecting descriptive information on all included studies and the quality 
assessment we proceeded with the synthesis phase. The results of the meta-analysis 
suggest that the effect of microcredit on women’s empowerment as measured by 
control over household spending was not statistically significantly different from 
zero. Those studies which did find an effect were assessed as being of high risk of 
bias and produced effect sizes which were in any case small. Consequently, we can 
conclude that overall there is no evidence for an effect of microcredit on women’s 
control over household spending.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, women’s control over household resources constitutes an 
important intermediary dimension in processes of women’s empowerment. Given 
the overall lack of effect of microcredit on women’s control over household resources 
it is very unlikely that microcredit has a meaningful and substantial impact on 
empowerment processes in a broader sense. While the latter type of impact may 
have occurred in particular contexts, overall the evidence suggests that this is not the 
case38
 
. As a result, there appears to be a gap between the often optimistic (societal) 
belief in the capacity of microcredit to ameliorate the position of women in decision-
making processes within the household on the one hand, and the empirical evidence 
base on the other hand. 
Our conclusions on the effects of microcredit on empowerment are also in line with 
those by Duvendack et al. (2011) and Stewart (et al. 2010) who reported to a limited 
extent on empowerment effects. The previous three systematic reviews included 
broader interventions (microcredit, micro-savings and micro-leasing) and outcome 
measures. However, the focus of the present review on empowerment enabled us to 
perform statistical meta-analysis (albeit subject to challenges as described in section 
4.239
 
), and a search for behavioral mechanisms underlying programme impacts. 
Figure 12 summarises the mechanisms identified in the synthesis phase. It should be 
noted that our review was optimised towards uncovering action-formation 
mechanisms (and to a somewhat lesser extent situational mechanisms), as this type 
of mechanism is most directly related to the causal linkages between microcredit 
and women’s control over household expenditures. Our search was comprehensive 
                                                        
38 See also Annex 1 for the underlying theoretical discussion on when to expect particular processes of 
empowerment. 
39 Despite a narrow focus on one outcome dimension (women’s control over household spending), 
there was still quite a lot of heterogeneity in the underlying proxies used in the different studies 
included in this review. 
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and unbiased, given our inclusion and exclusion criteria, with respect to this type of 
mechanism. The other two types of mechanisms helped situating the action-
formation mechanisms in a broader context. Our review was not set up to cover 
transformational mechanisms comprehensively. 
 
Figure 12. Key mechanisms with respect to microcredit, women’s control over 
household expenditures and wider processes of empowerment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What Figure 12 shows is that microcredit, in order to lead to women’s empowerment 
through women’s control over household spending, has to trigger behavior through a 
diversity of mechanisms. These are not only those that deal with situational factors 
like the demography and poverty levels of female clients and their households, but 
also sociological ones like social capital and peer pressure and psychological ones 
such as self-efficacy and self-esteem. Mechanisms of a more hybrid nature like the 
ritualization women go through when they obtain microcredit are also assumed to 
play a (positive) role. However, microcredit programmes not only focus on changing 
individual behavior but also on making a difference at a more macro level 
(communities, regions). These processes are guided by transformational 
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mechanisms that resemble the tipping point mechanism, diffusion of innovation and 
(Olson’s) ‘selective incentives’. 
 
From the identified mechanisms at work we can conclude that the way in which 
microcredit is delivered, in combination with the given gender relations context, 
seem to determine to a large extent whether or not microcredit can make a 
difference for women’s decision-making power and control over resources in the 
household. To address this issue in more detail, and to develop generalizable 
conclusions about how microcredit affects women’s decision-making power across 
different contexts, a different (complementary) review approach is needed. 
 
4.2  LIMITATIONS 
Some discussion is warranted of the extent to which our analysis has generated valid 
conclusions about the effect of microcredit on women’s control over household 
spending. Both the topic of review and the nature and quality of the evidence base 
have made this review particularly complicated. Limitations of the studies 
constrained both the quantitative and qualitative part of the synthesis and can be 
summarised under the following points: 
 
• Our general assessment of vulnerability to bias of included studies was high. 
Under these circumstances meta-analysis (or other methods of synthesis such 
as ‘vote counting’) without rigorous risk of bias assessment and sensitivity 
analysis would have risked inflating statistical significance by combining 
relatively poor quality studies each of which at best yielded only marginally 
significant results. At the same time these studies are vulnerable to unknown 
biases which are likely to inflate both effect sizes and confidence levels, as the 
meta-analysis of higher validity studies demonstrated.  
• The context-specificity of gender relations and correspondingly of 
empowerment processes made it difficult to generalise beyond the study 
context. 
• There was a bias in the literature in terms of regional coverage and therefore 
externality validity of findings for other regions; about two thirds of the 
included studies were conducted in Bangladesh and India. 
• There was substantial diversity across studies in terms of operationalizing the 
construct of women’s empowerment, even within the confines of our cross-
cutting focus on women’s control over household spending. 
• There is a lot of diversity in microfinance organizations and the exact 
intervention delivered to microfinance clients (including microcredit and 
linkages with other interventions)40
                                                        
40 We were unable to isolate the credit effect from other associated ‘interventions’ on the independent 
variable side. In fact, in most studies it was impossible to determine whether credit was the only 
. These factors are only very partially 
captured by impact studies. 
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• The potential ‘dark side’ of microcredit is under-researched. Impact studies 
and especially those containing quantitative analysis underreport (or mostly 
do not report) on the negative aspects of microcredit such as the psychological 
stress of carrying debt or the use of microcredit as a tool for men to strengthen 
their power over women (see for example Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1996). 
 
The review approach used in this review is in line with common practices in 
systematic review and meta-analysis, but essentially differs in two aspects. First, we 
included experimental, quasi-experimental and regression-based studies in the 
statistical meta-analysis, provided studies used methodological design criteria to 
address attribution issues.41
 
 As noted in Becker and Wu (2007), multivariate effect 
sizes from different which use different regression specifications are not strictly 
comparable. All studies included in the analysis used regression adjustment. 
However, the studies do not control for the same covariates which means that the 
effect sizes may differ where there is any correlation between treatment status and 
these covariates.   
Secondly, we were able to identify behavioral mechanisms from a relatively large 
batch of studies which at the same time show evidence of addressing the attribution 
problem. Following Van der Knaap et al. (2008) we applied a review approach that 
combines the idea of hierarchy of evidence (i.e. selecting studies with a credibility in 
terms of internal validity of findings) with a theory-based (‘realist’) review approach, 
focused on unpacking the causality between microcredit and empowerment. 
However, we did not attempt to articulate an overall theory of change. Instead we 
focused on capturing patterns of regularity, mechanisms, which explain part of the 
causality between microcredit in a broad sense and aspects of women’s control over 
household spending. In our exercise of identifying and articulating mechanisms we 
only focused on the information to be found in explicit statements by authors of 
primary studies on causal relations. An alternative more accurate approach would 
have been to reconstruct patterns of regularity by systematically collecting any 
information from studies that could provide insights into the nature of the 
intervention, the context, the target group, and so on, in order to infer the ‘how’ and 
‘why’ of proven (absence of) causal relationships. This task would not only have been 
more cumbersome, it would also likely have proven to be unproductive, especially 
given the lack of detail on these issues in the more rigorous impact studies (e.g. 
those based on randomised designs). As in other fields, there is an ‘evidence 
paradox’ where the most rigorous studies in terms of internal validity often provide 
the least information on the nature of causality.  
                                                                                                                                                             
intervention at work. However, several of the identified mechanisms highlight the importance of 
membership of a solidarity group in triggering change, as the social interaction among peers can have a 
significant effect on empowerment processes. 
41 In addition, one aspect of analysis typically incorporated in Campbell reviews was not followed: we 
used Cohen’s d rather than Hedges’ g (small sample corrected) SMD estimator, given the large sample 
sizes used in studies in the review (mean sample size=1,470; median=787; minimum=100; see Annex 
6). 
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However, the study was limited by the exclusion of qualitative studies in examining 
the causal mechanisms component of the synthesis. We excluded these studies 
because, while in general they provide more detail about the nature of causal 
processes, they lack the appropriate basis for generalizable causal inference. While it 
would have been useful to take into account purely qualitative studies, overcoming 
the hurdles of obtaining an unbiased and comprehensive selection of studies and to 
properly match these with the quantitative studies remained a challenge that was 
beyond the scope of the review. 
 
4.3  DEVIATIONS FROM PROTOCOL 
The following deviations from protocol were made: 
• The detailed assessment procedures for assessing study design and risk of bias 
were not provided in the protocol; the approach follows the tool developed by 
3ie in 2012. 
• Sensitivity analyses that were not noted in the protocol, include the removal of 
two outlier observations, and the analysis of heterogeneity by location.  
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Annex 1: The relationship between 
credit and women’s 
empowerment42
The rationale for the use of group intermediation is mostly based upon financial 
profitability and sustainability reasons (see e.g. Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Huppi and 
Feder, 1990). Group intermediation leads to a decline of transaction costs and 
information costs (particularly important in the context of widely scattered rural 
populations who lend small amounts) and to an increase of repayment rates (as a 
result of peer pressure). Group intermediation through the use of women’s groups 
even has the tendency to further increase repayment rates (and financial 
profitability and sustainability). This is particularly the case where group 
intermediation is used in a context (e.g. rural areas in developing areas) where 
gender norms (of female obedience and female compliance to repayment rules) are 
very strictly applied. In fact, from a perspective of financial profitability and 
sustainability the existing gender norms are very useful for microfinance 
programmes as they guarantee strict compliance to the repayment rules of the 
program. These microfinance programmes might adopt an ‘empowerment discourse’ 
but it is unlikely that they will add to their financial intermediation any other type of 
activity which increases individual and collective agency and which lead to changes 
in gender relations as this might simultaneously reduce financial profitability
 
43. 
While it is not impossible that these microfinance programmes generate 
‘empowerment’ effects beyond access to productive resources (in particular financial 
resources) and non-sensitive areas of individual agency (such as control over small 
household expenditures), it is not likely and one can certainly not assume that it will 
happen automatically. In gender/development terminology, the distinction among 
practical and strategic gender needs is also useful here. When these microfinance 
programmes add to their financial intermediation any activities in the area of gender 
and development, it is expected that these activities will be strictly confined to 
addressing practical gender needs44
                                                        
42 This section largely relies on Holvoet (2006). 
 (such as provision of water and fuel); these 
activities do not really question gender norms (such as the existing division of labor) 
43 There is for example an interesting study which has revealed that increasing levels of women’s 
empowerment led to a decrease of repayment rates (see Yaqub, 1995). 
44 See for example Moser (1993) for an explanation on the difference between practical gender needs 
and interests and strategic gender needs and interests. 
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but rather re-confirm them. While addressing practical gender needs could affect 
strategic gender issues, this is not necessarily the case.  
 
From a feminist (economics) perspective, one would refer to these microfinance 
programmes as  those that adopt an instrumentalist (versus transformatory, see 
below) use of women’s intermediation (i.e. women’s groups are used for other 
objectives than women’s well-being and/or empowerment, in this case financial 
sustainability and possibly poverty reduction). 
 
When one looks at these microfinance programmes through the angle of the 
different women/gender and development policy approaches, one could classify 
these as Women in Development (WID) anti-poverty/efficiency approaches45
 
. WID 
approaches consider poverty as the cause of inequality between men and women and 
poverty reduction through an increased participation of women in the production 
process as the solution for the inequality between men and women. In order for 
women to participate in the production process they need access to production 
factors, one of them being financial services. The underlying idea of the WID anti-
poverty/efficiency approach is that access to production factors will give women the 
opportunity to participate in the production process, which will lead to an increased 
efficiency and productivity, to a reduction of poverty and to more equality between 
men and women. WID approaches disregard the importance of underlying gender 
norms and mainly consider human behavior as completely free agency. In practice, 
access does not necessarily mean control; increased women’s participation in 
productive activities does not automatically generate a redistribution of labor inside 
the household and often results in an increased workload for women.  
In sharp contrast to the abovementioned microfinance programmes are those 
microfinance programmes which have among their central objectives women’s 
empowerment (and particularly beyond access and more towards strategic gender 
needs). These microfinance programmes combine financial intermediation with 
social intermediation (see Edgcomb and Barton, 1998) and use the women’s 
intermediaries for ‘transformatory’ purposes (compared to ‘instrumentalist’ use)46.  
These are the typical “credit+” programmes (investment in group building and 
maturing, training, organizational capacities, networking, etc.). Groups may evolve 
and become local institutional entrepreneurs which engage in collective agency47
                                                        
45 A distinction is usually made between welfare approaches (classified as pre-WID), equity, anti-
poverty and efficiency approaches (these three are classified as WID) and empowerment and gender-
efficiency approaches (classified as gender and development approaches: GAD) (see Moser, 1993). 
 
(Holvoet, 2005). As involvement in extra-household bargaining is one of the ways in 
which women increase their bargaining position inside the household (see Agarwal, 
1997), it also often leads to an increase of intra-household agency (and this also 
highlights the interdependence among the different empowerment levels). 
46 See Molyneux (1985) for a discussion on the difference between ‘instrumentalist’ and 
‘transformatory’ use of women’s groups. 
47 Also referred to as extra-household bargaining in local political and economic decision-making 
bodies. 
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From an institutional (feminist) economics approach, you may consider those 
women’s groups as instances of collective action which have the capacity to change 
‘institutions’ and norms (in this case gender norms is one of the mechanisms to 
bring about institutional change (see for example Lin and Nugent, 1995)). Credit has 
a specific function in this regard, it functions as the selective incentive through 
which women are mobilised to become a member of a women’s group. Processes 
which take place once women become member of a women’s group are described as 
‘collectivization of individual problems’48
 
, awareness of the changeability of norms, 
changes in the perception of cost-benefits of non-conform behavior (i.e. if one 
behaves non-conform the norms as an individual the costs may be very high; non-
conform behavior as a group lowers the cost; finally, the perception of effectiveness 
of change increases when one realises that there is a critical mass to change norms).  
In terms of women/gender and development policy approaches, one can classify 
these microfinance programmes as Gender and Development (GAD) programs, a 
sub-category of empowerment approaches.  
 
From an individual microfinance program’s perspective, it is more rational to adhere 
to the instrumentalist use of women’s intermediation. However, from a society’s 
point of view, the second type of programme is more optimal. Increased women’s 
agency within the household for example has shown to increase investments in the 
human capital of different household members (which increases productivity and 
economic growth in the subsequent next period). From a policy point of view, one 
may then think about compensating those microfinance programmes for their 
positive spill-over effects (compensation for the production of public goods). 
                                                        
48 The understanding that one’s deprivation is not individual but collective and related to ‘structures 
and institutions’ (see for example Kabeer, 1995). 
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Annex 2: Microcredit and intra-
household allocation 
There are mainly two schools of thought when it comes to intra-household resource 
allocation: 
1. The household is a unit and the household utility function the utility function 
of the household head (see for example Becker, 1981). Allocation is the result of 
maximization of utility of the household head and determined by factors outside the 
household (for example the case of price incentives: if female wages are higher than 
male wages, then women will work outside the household). The policy implication of 
this approach is that there is no need to target specific individuals inside the 
household. It is nowadays acknowledged that the household does not necessarily 
function as a unit. 
2. The household may be conceptualised as a place where there is both 
cooperation and conflict, individuals have different preferences and through 
bargaining the outcome (allocation of consumption and production) will be 
determined (for example, if the woman prefers to do work outside the household 
and she wins the bargain, she will engage in work outside the household, even in 
those cases where the male wage is higher). Under this approach, collective 
preference models are used to model and predict outcomes. A diversity of different 
models exist, depending on whether cooperative or non-cooperative bargaining 
models, or symmetric or non-symmetric bargaining models are used. What is 
essential is the idea that threat points determine the bargaining position inside the 
household and the final allocative outcomes. Threat points refer to the maximum 
utility that a person can obtain in case of non-cooperation with the partner. Threat 
points are determined by exogenous factors (factors which are not determined inside 
the household; for example participation in the labor market is not a factor which 
determines the threat point because it is something which is determined inside the 
household (endogenous)). Exogenous factors are for example inheritances, pensions 
and extra-household environmental parameters (for example laws and norms49
                                                        
49 Examples are the following. Land laws regarding male/female ownership have an effect on threat 
points; the strict inside/outside dichotomy or female purdah will heavily reduce a women’s threat 
point; laws which forbid women to ask for divorce reduces women’s threat point to almost zero as 
women have no real exit option in that case. 
). In 
most developing countries, it is particularly the extra-household environmental 
parameters and more particularly the strong male bias therein which strongly affect 
threat points. The policy implication of this type of household models is targeting, if 
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one wants to achieve specific outcomes beneficial to either men or women. If men 
for example have a higher preference for education and one wants to promote 
education then it is necessary to target men and try to increase their threat point so 
that their preferences prevail in the household bargaining process. 
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Annex 3: Search results and 
reasons for study exclusion 
The global search strategy is discussed in Section 2.2. Here we provide three 
examples of source-specific searches, and reasons for exclusion of quantitative 
studies at the final stage (priority 1 and 2 studies assessed at step 5 in Figure 3).  
 
SCIENCE DIRECT 
 
First login, for more search options, and to save searches, etc.  Use the advanced 
search menu. Search term in abstract, title, keywords. Include journals and all 
books. Search all sources and sciences. Limit the search period to 1980-2011.  Once 
all searches have been performed the duplicates can be filtered out by using the 
Combing with OR option. Then you can select the relevant articles and export these 
to EndNote. During export, make sure to select to export both the citation and the 
abstract. ScienceDirect does provide URLs in the downloaded reference. In addition, 
all PDFs can be downloaded at once.  
Method: 
 
The search can be done all at once using the Boolean command listed below: 
 
Boolean: (pub-date > 1979 and TITLE-ABSTR-KEY(Rural credit evidence)) OR 
(pub-date > 1979 and TITLE-ABSTR-KEY(Rural credit effect)) OR (pub-date > 1979 
and TITLE-ABSTR-KEY(Rural credit impact)) OR (pub-date > 1979 and TITLE-
ABSTR-KEY(Access to credit evidence)) OR (pub-date > 1979 and TITLE-ABSTR-
KEY(Access to credit impact)) OR (pub-date > 1979 and TITLE-ABSTR-KEY(Group 
lending evidence)) OR (pub-date > 1979 and TITLE-ABSTR-KEY(Group lending 
result*))OR (pub-date > 1979 and TITLE-ABSTR-KEY(Group lending effect)) OR 
(pub-date > 1979 and TITLE-ABSTR-KEY(Group lending impact))OR (pub-date > 
1979 and TITLE-ABSTR-KEY(Microfinanc* evidence))OR (pub-date > 1979 and 
TITLE-ABSTR-KEY(Microfinanc* outcome))OR (pub-date > 1979 and TITLE-
ABSTR-KEY(Microfinanc* result*))OR (pub-date > 1979 and TITLE-ABSTR-
KEY(Microfinanc* effect))OR (pub-date > 1979 and TITLE-ABSTR-
KEY(Microfinanc* impact))OR (pub-date > 1979 and TITLE-ABSTR-
KEY(Microcredit evidence))OR (pub-date > 1979 and TITLE-ABSTR-
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KEY(Microcredit result*))OR (pub-date > 1979 and TITLE-ABSTR-KEY(Microcredit 
impact))          
 
The boolean command retrieved 291 results which all have been exported to 
EndNote. Because of the Boolean command these results contained no duplicates.  
 
IDEAS 
 
Go to the search page: http://ideas.repec.org/search.html 
 
You can search for the term, but only separately in abstract/keyword/title. This will 
generate overlap in the results, so it is probably better to search for the ‘whole 
record’. Restrict the search to articles, papers, chapters and books. Limit the 
publication date. 
Method: 
 
Microfinance impact (110) 
Keywords (hits): 
Microfinance outcome (18) 
Microfinance evidence (62) 
Microcredit impact (22) 
Microcredit evidence (25) 
Microcredit effect (27) 
(Rural) finance impact (61) 
(Rural) finance effect (80) 
(Rural) credit effect (168) 
(Rural) credit evidence (121) 
(Rural) lending impact (22) 
(Rural) lending evidence (36) 
 
In total 752 results were obtained in the keyword search process. After title and 
abstract selection 14 new results were found and included in the EndNote database. 
 
GOOGLE ACADEMICO (We also performed this search in other 
languages) 
 
We repeated the search protocol in a more simplified manner (limited number of 
search options) for documents in Spanish. Only a few of the academic search engines 
allow for Spanish language document searches. Mostly, we focused on internet 
searches through the portals and using Googlescholar. All processes are recorded in 
a similar way as above. 
 
Method: 
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Use the advanced search menu for the search process. Select under preferences to 
only look at websites written in English. Limit the search to publication between 
1980 and 2011. Further select to return articles from all subject areas. Results can be 
exported to EndNote individually.  Google scholar is very broad, so the search terms 
will have to be more focused in order to obtain potentially relevant results. This 
means that the search only returns results where all keywords appear in the title. 
 
Microfinanzas   (364) 
Keywords (hits): 
Microfinanzas impacto (9) 
Microfinanzas resultados (1) 
Microfinanzas efecto  (0) 
Microfinanzas evidencia (1) 
Micro-credito   (6) 
Microcredito impacto  (0) 
Microcredito efecto  (0) 
Microcredito evidencia (0) 
Micro prestamo impacto (0) 
Micro prestamo evidencia (0) 
Micro prestamo  (0) 
Rural finanzas   (6) 
Rural finanzas impacto (0) 
Rural credito impacto  (2) 
Rural credito efecto   (0) 
Rural credito evidencia (0) 
Rural prestamo impacto (0) 
Rural prestamo evidencia (0) 
 
In total 389 results were obtained with the keyword combinations, but after 
checking for overlap and existing articles only 79 were included in Endnote. 
 
The justification for exclusion of priority 1 and 2 studies not meeting minimum 
methodological requirements is given below. 
 
Table A3.1 Quantitative studies that did not meet the minimum methodological 
quality threshold: priority 1 and 2 studies excluded at step 5 (see Figure 3) 
Authors Title Year Description method Reason 
exclusion 
Aruna and 
Jyothirmayi 
The role of microfinance in 
women empowerment: a 
study on the SHG bank 
linkage programme in 
Hyderabad (Andhra 
Pradesh) 
2011 Simple client - non-
client comparison 
Selection bias 
not addressed 
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Bali Swain Microfinance and Women’s  
Empowerment Evidence 
from the Self Help Group 
Bank Linkage Programme in 
India 
2006 Pipeline matching 
(weak) 
Insufficient 
information on 
selection bias 
Banu et al. Empowering Women in 
Rural Bangladesh: Impact of 
BRAC’s programme 
2001 Group-based 
comparison 
membership duration 
and empowerment 
Weak 
counterfactual, 
insufficient 
information on 
method 
Barnes et al. The impact of three 
microfinance programmes in 
Uganda 
2001 Simple client - non-
client comparison 
Selection bias 
not addressed 
Barua and 
Sulaiman 
Impact Evaluation and Client 
Satisfaction of Northwest 
Microfinance Expansion 
Project 
2007 Simple mature 
clients- intermediate 
clients-  newly clients 
comparison 
Simple 
description 
Creevey Tanzania food Processing 
in: Changing Women’s Lives 
and Work. An Analysis of 
the Impact of  Eight 
Microenterprises 
1996 Simple client - non-
client comparison 
Selection bias 
not adequately 
addressed 
Driouchi et al.  Women Empowerment 
through Microcredit in the 
Rural Areas of Khénifra  
2005 Simple before-after 
comparison 
Selection bias 
not addressed 
Garikipati Microcredit and women's 
empowerment: Have we 
been looking at the wrong 
indicators 
2010 Simple description No 
counterfactual 
analysis 
Hoque Micro-credit and 
empowerment of women: 
Evidence from Bangladesh 
2005 Simple association 
membership duration 
and empowerment 
Weak 
counterfactual 
Hoque and  
Itohara  
Participation and Decision 
Making Role of Rural 
Women in Economic 
Activities: A Comparative 
Study for Members and 
Non-Members of the Micro-
Credit Organizations in 
Bangladesh 
2008 OLS Weak 
specification of 
model on 
decision-making 
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Huda and 
Mahmud 
Women’s control over 
productive assets: role of 
credit-based Development 
Interventions 
1998 Simple client - non-
client comparison 
Selection bias 
not addressed 
Jameela, V. 
A. 
Microcredit, empowerment 
and diversion of loan use 
2009 Simple before after 
comparison in one 
SHG 
Weak 
counterfactual 
Kabeer and 
Noponen 
Social and Economic 
Impacts of PRADAN's Self 
Help Group Microfinance 
and Livelihoods Promotion 
Program: Analysis From 
Jharkhand, India 
2005 Simple client - non-
client comparison 
Selection bias 
not adequately 
addressed 
Kumar Impact of Microfinance 
through SHG-Bank Linkage 
in India: A Micro Study 
2007 Group-based 
comparison 
membership duration 
and empowerment 
Weak 
counterfactual, 
insufficient 
information on 
method.  
Lafontaine Impact Survey - 
MUCREFAB program 
2001 Simple client - non-
client comparison 
Selection bias 
not addressed 
Larocque  and 
Kalala 
The Impact of Savings and 
Credit Cooperatives in 
Burkina Faso 
2002 Simple before after 
comparison 
Weak 
counterfactual 
Mahmud Actually How Empowering is 
Microcredit? 
2003 Simple client - non-
client comparison 
Selection bias 
not addressed 
Mourji Impact Study of the Zakoura 
Microcredit Program 
2000 Simple client - non-
client comparison, 
judgmental matching 
Selection bias 
not adequately 
addressed 
Murthy et al.  Towards women's 
empowerment and poverty 
reduction, lessons from the 
participatory impact 
assessment of SAPAP India 
n.d. Simple client - non-
client comparison 
Selection bias 
not addressed 
Mustafa et. al.  Beacon of Hope. An Impact 
Assessment Study of 
BRAC’s Rural Development 
Programme 
1996 Simple description No 
counterfactual 
analysis 
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Noponen The Internal Learning 
System - a Tool for Tracking 
and Enhancing 
Empowerment Outcomes 
and Wider Social Impacts of 
Microfinance 
2003 Group-based 
comparison 
membership duration 
and empowerment 
Weak 
counterfactual 
Osmani Impact of Credit on Relative 
Well- Being of Women: 
Evidence From the 
Grameen Bank  
1998 2SLS regression Insufficient 
information in 
study 
Osmani The Grameen Bank 
Experiment: Empowerment 
of Women Through Credit. 
In: Women  and 
Empowerment b, Afshar H. 
1998 Simple client - non-
client comparison 
Selection bias 
not adequately 
addressed 
Sharma et al.  Impact Assessment of 
SACCOSs in Nepal’s Hill 
Districts. 
2005 Simple client - non-
client comparison 
Selection bias 
not addressed 
Steele et al. Savings/Credit Group 
Formation and Change in 
Contraception 
2001 Simple  programme -
non programme 
villages comparison  
Selection bias no 
adequately 
addressed 
Sinha et al. The maturity of Indian 
microfinance: Findings and 
policy implications from a 
national study 
2005 Simple client - non-
client comparison 
Selection bias 
not addressed 
UNPF and 
RAFAD 
Exploring linkages: 
Women's empowerment, 
microfinance and health 
education 
2010 Pipeline matching 
(weak) 
No 
counterfactual 
analysis (on 
empowerment 
variables) 
 
 
  
132 
 
Annex 4: Coding forms 
 
 
A9.1. Search and screening 
Variable Type of information 
Screening of full text documents and 
determination of priority for (possible 
further examination and analysis) 
Priority 1: study is on the impact of microcredit 
on women’s empowerment; involves original 
empirical analysis. 
Priority 2: study is on the impact of microcredit, 
covering multiple outcome measures which 
include aspects of women’s empowerment; 
involves original empirical analysis. 
Priority 3: study is on the impact of microcredit 
and women’s empowerment but does not rely on 
original empirical analysis. 
Priority 4: all other studies. 
Contains quantitative analysis on 
microcredit and women’s empowerment 
Yes/no 
Contains dependent variables relating to 
women’s control over household 
spending 
Yes/no 
Evidence of addressing the attribution 
problem (through design or statistical 
controls) 
Yes/no 
 
A9.2. Description of studies 
Variable Type of information 
Title Open 
Author Open 
Year Open 
Type of publication Journal article, Book Chapter, working paper, 
PhD dissertation, other 
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Type of intervention Open (e.g. microcredit alone or in combination 
with microsavings and/or other interventions 
etc.) 
Microcredit(-related) independent 
variable 
Open (e.g. client yes/no, member yes/no, 
duration membership, etc.) 
Location (area of study) Country/countries 
Description of data sample Open 
Characteristics of clients Open 
Solidarity group mechanism Yes/no 
Dependent variable description (plus 
description of components if relevant) 
Open 
Empowerment dimensions covered in 
study 
Decisions, control, other 
 
A9.3. Methodological design and risk of bias assessment50
Variable 
 
Type of information 
Research design Randomised controlled trial, panel or 
before/after and with/without, either 
before/after or with/without, natural experiment 
Statistical method Instrumental variables, propensity score 
matching, two-stage least squares, limited 
information maximum likelihood estimation, 
difference in differences, regression 
discontinuity, other multivariate method of 
analysis, tabulation 
Method of allocation of treatment Self-selection, randomised assignment, cluster-
randomised assignment 
Data collection moment Single data point measurement; two data point 
measurement 
Risk of selection bias and confounding 
bias 
Yes/no/unclear 
Risk of spill-overs and contamination Yes/no/unclear 
Risk of outcome reporting bias Yes/no/unclear 
Risk of analysis reporting bias Yes/no/unclear 
Other risk of bias Yes/no/unclear 
Theoretical framework on the 
relationship between microcredit and 
women’s control over household 
spending 
0 = study in which  no theoretical 
framework/theory  is available on microcredit 
and empowerment; 1 = study in which a 
theoretical framework is available that addresses 
causal relationships between microcredit and 
                                                        
50 See also Annex 5 for risk of bias signaling questions. 
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empowerment; 2 = study in which a theoretical 
discussion takes place on the causal relationships 
between microcredit and (aspects of) women's 
control over household spending 
Link between theoretical framework and 
empirical data collection and analysis 
0 = empirical data collection and analysis on 
microcredit and women's control over household 
spending is not  linked to the theoretical 
framework/discussion  on causal relationships 
between microcredit and (aspects of) women's 
control over household spending (even if such a 
framework is discussed in the study); 1 = 
empirical data collection and analysis on 
microcredit and women's control over household 
spending reflects theoretical 
framework/discussion on microcredit and 
(aspects of) women's control over household 
spending 
Empirical measurement and discussion 
of use of loan 
0 = there is no discussion on women's control 
over and use of loan in the study; 1 = there is 
discussion on women's control over and use of 
loan in the study; 2 = there is discussion and 
empirical data collection and analysis on 
women's control over and use of loan in the study 
 
A9.4. Synthesis (general) 
Variable Type of information 
Statistically significant relation between 
independent and dependent variables of 
interest 
Yes/no 
Description of relation Open 
Study included in meta-analysis Yes/no 
Effect size calculation formulae and data 
requirements 
Table A8.1 (see also Annex 7 and Annex 8 Table 
A8.5). 
Mechanisms Open (using key publications as a reference for 
mechanism detection: Elster (1997, 2007), 
Hedstrom (2005), Hedstrom and Swedberg 
(1998), Coleman (1986, 1990). 
 
A9.5. Coding for Effect Sizes 
Variable Type of information 
Year data collection Year of (first) data collection 
Country Country of data collection 
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Location type Rural/urban/both 
Product Credit/credit plus 
Group lending? Yes/no/both 
Design Code Before/after; panel; pipeline; pipeline (old 
vs. new members); with/without; 
before/after repeated; young vs. old (pseudo 
with/without); RCT (not clustered); RCT 
(clustered) 
Design Score See Table 3 
Analysis Code 2sls; tables; DID; ITT; IV; logit; t-test; 
multivariate; multivariate/OLS/logit; OLS 
and logit; probit; tables & probit; PSM  
Analysis Score See Table 3 
Overall Score See Table 3 
Outcome See Table A5.2. 
treat indicator Duration of membership of MFI; 
membership (0/1);  loanee from MFI (0/1); 
cumulative (deflated) amount borrowed 
from MFI; MFI member (non-borrower); old 
participant; new participant 
treat dimension Amount of credit; live in area with access to 
credit; borrower from MFI; member (non-
borrower) 
Effect size formula See Tables A6.1. and A6.2. 
N treat Number of treated 
N control Number of controls 
No obs regression/total N Number of observations in estimation data 
set 
all mean outcome Mean outcome for whole sample 
all sd outcome Standard deviation of outcome for whole 
sample 
treat mean outcome Mean outcome for treated 
treat sd outcome Standard deviation of outcome for treated 
ctl mean outcome Mean outcome for controls 
ctl sd outcome Standard deviation of outcome for controls 
mean treat var Mean of the treatment variable 
sd treat var Standard deviation of the treatment variable 
R2 Coefficient of determination 
adj R2 Adjusted coefficient of determination 
unstand beta Unstandardised beta coefficient of treatment 
variable 
stand beta Standardised beta coefficient of the 
treatment variable 
Chi2 Chi-square 
p-val of Chi2 p-value of chi-square 
Odds ratio Odds ratio of treated to controls 
Confidence level Confidence level (0.90; 0.95; 0.999, etc.) 
Loci Low confidence level (lower bound of 
confidence interval) 
Hici High confidence level (upper bound of 
confidence interval) 
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Logit Beta coefficient of treatment variable of logit 
estimation 
Probit Beta coefficient of treatment variable of 
probit estimation 
Tobit Beta coefficient of treatment variables of 
tobit estimation 
se_prob_tob_it Standard error of beta coefficients of 
logit/probit/tobit estimations 
Wald test Wald test statistic 
ATT Stratification PSM average treatment effect (stratification 
matching) 
ATT NN PSM average treatment effect (nearest 
neighbour matching) 
ATT Kernel PSM average treatment effect (kernel 
matching) 
ATT Radius PSM average treatment effect (radius 
matching) 
SE - full sample Standard error of outcome variable whole 
sample 
t-value t-value of treatment effect 
p-value of t-test p-value of t-test 
z_value z-value of z test 
f_value f-value of anova analysis 
No cov Number of covariates 
Comment Source (table/page) in study 
Effect_size_formula_3 See Tables A6.1. and A6.2. 
Construct Preliminary classification of outcome 
variables 
Dimension Reduced classification of outcome variables  
(control of resources; participation in 
decisions; other empowerment dimensions) 
Peer reviewed Whether source peer reviewed (0/1) 
Cluster design Has cluster design (yes/no) 
Cluster analysis Uses cluster adjustment in analysis (yes/no) 
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Annex 5: Risk of bias signaling 
questions51
 1. Mechanism of assignment: was the allocation or identification 
mechanism able to control for selection bias? 
 
 
a) For Randomised assignment (RCTs), 
Score “YES” if: 
• a random component in the sequence generation process is described (e.g. 
referring to a random number table)52
• and if the unit of allocation was at group level (geographical/ social/ 
institutional unit) and allocation was performed on all units at the start of the study; 
;  
• or if the unit of allocation was by beneficiary or group and there was some 
form of centralised allocation mechanism such as an on-site computer system; 
• and if the unit of allocation is based on a sufficiently large sample size to 
equate groups on average. 
 
Score “UNCLEAR” if: 
• the paper does not provide details on the randomization process, or uses a 
quasi-randomization process for which it is not clear has generated allocations 
equivalent to true randomization.  
 
Score “NO” if:  
• the sample size is not sufficient or any failure in the allocation mechanism 
could affect the randomization process53
                                                        
51 The signalling questions were developed by Jorge Hombrados and Hugh Waddington, drawing on 
existing tools, in particular EPOC (n.d.) ‘Suggested risk of bias criteria for EPOC reviews’; Coalition for 
Evidence-Based Policy (2010) ‘Checklist for reviewing a randomized controlled trial of a social 
programme or project, to assess whether it produced valid evidence’; and Higgins and Green (2011). 
.   
52 If a quasi-randomised assignment approach is used (e.g. alphabetical order), you must be sure that 
the process truly generates groupings equivalent to random assignment, to score “Yes” on this criteria. 
In order to assess the validity of the quasi-randomization process, the most important aspect is whether 
the assignment process might generate a correlation between participation status and other factors 
(e.g. gender, socio-economic status) determining outcomes; you may consider covariate balance in 
determining this (see question 2). 
53 If the research has serious concerns with the validity of the randomization process or the group 
equivalence completely fails, we recommend to assess the risk of bias of the study using the relevant 
questions for the appropriate methods of analysis (cross-sectional regressions, difference-in-difference, 
etc.) rather than the RCTs questions.  
138 
 
 
b) For discontinuity assignment (Regression Discontinuity Designs) 
Score “YES” if: 
• allocation is made based on a pre-determined discontinuity on a continuous 
variable (regression discontinuity design) and blinded to participants or;  
• if not blinded, individuals reasonably cannot affect the assignment variable 
in response to knowledge of the participation decision rule;  
• and the sample size immediately at both sides of the cut-off point is 
sufficiently large to equate groups on average.  
 
Score “UNCLEAR” if: 
•  the assignment variable is either non-blinded or it is unclear whether 
participants can affect it in response to knowledge of the allocation mechanism.  
 
Score “NO” if: 
• the sample size is not sufficient or;  
• there is evidence that participants altered the assignment variable prior to 
assignment54
 
. 
c) For assignment based non-randomised programme placement 
and self-selection (studies using a matching strategy or regression 
analysis, excluding IV), 
Score “YES” if: 
• participants and non-participants are either matched based on all relevant 
characteristics explaining participation and outcomes, or;  
• all relevant characteristics are accounted for55 56
 
. 
Score “UNCLEAR” if: 
• it is not clear whether all relevant characteristics (only relevant time varying 
characteristics in the case of panel data regressions) are controlled.  
 
Score “NO” if:  
• relevant characteristics are omitted from the analysis.  
 
                                                        
54 If the research has serious concerns with the validity of the assignment process or the group 
equivalence completely fails, we recommend assessing risk of bias of the study using the relevant 
questions for the appropriate methods of analysis (cross-sectional regressions, difference-in-difference, 
etc.) rather than the RDDs questions.  
55 Accounting for and matching on all relevant characteristics is usually only feasible when the 
programme allocation rule is known and there are no errors of targeting. It is unlikely that studies not 
based on randomization or regression discontinuity can score “YES” on this criterion. 
56 There are different ways in which covariates can be taken into account. Differences across groups in 
observable characteristics can be taken into account as covariates in the framework of a regression 
analysis or can be assessed by testing equality of means between groups. Differences in unobservable 
characteristics can be taken into account through the use of instrumental variables (see also question 
1.d) or proxy variables in the framework of a regression analysis, or using a fixed effects or difference-
in-differences model if the only characteristics which are unobserved are time-invariant. 
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d) For identification based on an instrumental variable (IV 
estimation), 
Score “YES” if: 
• an appropriate instrumental variable is used which is exogenously generated: 
e.g. due to a ‘natural’ experiment or random allocation.  
 
Score “UNCLEAR” if:  
• the exogeneity of the instrument is unclear (both externally as well as why 
the variable should not enter by itself in the outcome equation). 
 
Score “NO” otherwise. 
 
2. Group equivalence: was the method of analysis executed adequately to 
ensure comparability of groups throughout the study and prevent 
confounding? 
 
a) For randomised control trials (RCTs) and quasi-RCTs, 
Score “YES” if57
• baseline characteristics of the study and control/comparisons are reported 
and overall
: 
58
• or covariate differences are controlled using multivariate analysis; 
 similar based on t-test or ANOVA for equality of means across groups; 
• and the attrition rates (losses to follow up) are sufficiently low and similar in 
treatment and control, or the study assesses that loss to follow up units are random 
draws from the sample (e.g. by examining correlation with determinants of 
outcomes, in both treatment and comparison groups); 
• and problems with cross-overs and drop outs are dealt with using intention-
to-treat analysis or in the case of drop outs, by assessing whether the drop outs are 
random draws from the population; 
• and, for cluster-assignment, authors control for external cluster-level factors 
that might confound the impact of the programme (e.g. weather, infrastructure, 
community fixed effects, etc.) through multivariate analysis.  
 
Score “UNCLEAR” if:  
• insufficient details are provided on covariate differences or methods of 
adjustment;  
• or insufficient details are provided on cluster controls.  
 
Score “NO” otherwise. 
 
                                                        
57 Please note that when a), b) or f) score no or large differences in baseline characteristics, we suggest 
assessing risk of bias considering other study design (Diff-in-Diff, cross-sectional regression, 
instrumental variables) 
58 Even in the context of RCTs, when randomization is successful and carried out over sufficiently large 
assignment units, it is possible that small differences between groups remain for some covariates. In 
these cases, study authors should use appropriate multivariate methods to correcting for these 
differences.  
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b) For regression discontinuity designs (RDDs), 
Score “YES” if: 
• the interval for selection of treatment and control group is reasonably small;  
• or authors have weighted the matches on their distance to the cut-off point;  
• and the mean of the covariates of the individuals immediately at both sides of 
the cut-off point (selected sample of participants and non-participants) are overall 
not statistically different based on t-test or ANOVA for equality of means;  
• or significant differences have been controlled in multivariate analysis; 
• and, for cluster-assignment, authors control for external cluster-level factors 
that might confound the impact of the programme (e.g. weather, infrastructure, 
community fixed effects, etc.) through multivariate analysis.  
 
Score “UNCLEAR” if: 
• there are covariate differences across individuals at both sides of the 
discontinuity which have not been controlled for using multivariate analysis, or if 
insufficient details are provided on controls; 
• or if insufficient details are provided on cluster controls. 
 
Score “NO” otherwise. 
 
c) For non-randomised trials using difference-in-differences methods of 
analysis, 
Score “YES” if: 
• the authors use a difference-in-differences (or fixed effects) multivariate 
estimation method;  
• the authors control for a comprehensive set of time-varying characteristics59
• and the attrition rate is sufficiently low and similar in treatment and control, 
or the study assesses that drop-outs are random draws from the sample (e.g. by 
examining correlation with determinants of outcomes, in both treatment and 
comparison groups); 
; 
• and, for cluster-assignment, authors control for external cluster-level factors 
that might confound the impact of the programme (e.g. weather, infrastructure, 
community fixed effects, etc.) through multivariate analysis.   
 
Score “UNCLEAR” if:  
• insufficient details are provided;  
• or if insufficient details are provided on cluster controls.  
 
Score “NO” otherwise. 
 
                                                        
59 Knowing allocation rules for the programme – or even whether the non-participants were individuals 
that refused to participate in the programme, as opposed to individuals that were not given the 
opportunity to participate in the programme – can help in the assessment of whether the covariates 
accounted for in the regression capture all the relevant characteristics that explain differences between 
treatment and comparison. 
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d) For statistical matching studies including propensity scores (PSM) 
and covariate matching60
Score “YES” if: 
,  
• matching is either on baseline characteristics or time-invariant 
characteristics which cannot be affected by participation in the programme; and the 
variables used to match are relevant (e.g. demographic and socio-economic factors) 
to explain both participation and the outcome (so that there can be no evident 
differences across groups in variables that might explain outcomes);  
• in addition, for PSM Rosenbaum’s test suggests the results are not sensitive 
to the existence of hidden bias; 
• and, with the exception of Kernel matching, the means of the individual 
covariates are equated for treatment and comparison groups after matching; 
• and, for cluster-assignment, authors control for external cluster-level factors 
that might confound the impact of the programme (e.g. weather, infrastructure, 
community fixed effects, etc.) through multivariate or any appropriate analysis.  
 
Score “UNCLEAR” if: 
• relevant variables are not included in the matching equation, or if matching 
is based on characteristics collected at endline;  
• or if insufficient details are provided on cluster controls. 
 
Score “NO” otherwise. 
 
e) For regression-based studies using cross sectional data (excluding IV) 
Score “YES” if: 
• the study controls for relevant confounders that may be correlated with both 
participation and explain outcomes (e.g. demographic and socio-economic factors at 
individual and community level) using multivariate methods with appropriate 
proxies for unobservable covariates; 
• and a Hausman test61
• and none of the covariate controls can be affected by participation;  
 with an appropriate instrument suggests there is no 
evidence of endogeneity;  
• and either, only those observations in the region of common support for 
participants and non-participants in terms of covariates are used, or the 
                                                        
60 Matching strategies are sometimes complemented with difference-in-difference regression 
estimation methods. This combination approach is superior since it only uses in the estimation the 
common support region of the sample size, reducing the likelihood of existence of time-variant 
unobservables differences across groups affecting outcome of interest and removing biases arising from 
time-invariant unobservable characteristics.  
61 The Hausman test explores endogeneity in the framework of regression by comparing whether the 
OLS and the IV approaches yield significantly different estimations. However, it plays a different role in 
the different methods of analysis. While in the OLS regression framework the Hausman test mainly 
explores endogeneity and therefore is related with the validity of the method, in IV approaches it 
explores whether the author has chosen the best available strategy for addressing causal attribution 
(since in the absence of endogeneity OLS yields more precise estimators) and therefore is more related 
with analysis reporting bias.  
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distributions of covariates are balanced for the entire sample population across 
groups; 
• and, for cluster-assignment, authors control particularly for external cluster-
level factors that might confound the impact of the programme (e.g. weather, 
infrastructure, community fixed effects, etc.) through multivariate analysis.  
 
 
Score “UNCLEAR” if: 
• relevant confounders are controlled but appropriate proxy variables or 
statistical tests are not reported; 
• or if insufficient details are provided on cluster controls.  
 
Score “NO” otherwise. 
 
f) For instrumental variables approaches, 
Score “YES” if:  
• the instrumenting equation is significant at the level of F≥10 (or if an F test is 
not reported, the authors report and assess whether the R-squared (goodness of fit) 
of the participation equation is sufficient for appropriate identification);  
• the identifying instruments are individually significant (p≤0.01); for 
Heckman models, the identifiers are reported and significant (p≤0.05); 
• where at least two instruments are used, the authors report on an over-
identifying test (p≤0.05 is required to reject the nul l hypothesis); and none of the 
covariate controls can be affected by participation and the study convincingly 
assesses qualitatively why the instrument only affects the outcome via 
participation62
• and, for cluster-assignment, authors particularly control for external cluster-
level factors that might confound the impact of the programme (e.g. weather, 
infrastructure, community fixed effects, etc.) through multivariate analysis. 
; 
 
Score “UNCLEAR” if:  
• relevant confounders are controlled but appropriate statistical tests are not 
reported or exogeneity63
• or if insufficient details are provided on cluster controls (see category f) 
below).  
 of the instrument is not convincing;  
 
Score “NO” otherwise. 
 
                                                        
62 If the instrument is the random assignment of the treatment, the reviewer should also assess the 
quality and success of the randomization procedure in part a). 
63 An instrument is exogenous when it only affects the outcome of interest through affecting 
participation in the programme. Although when more than one instrument is available, statistical tests 
provide guidance on exogeneity (see background document), the assessment of exogeneity should be in 
any case done qualitatively. Indeed, complete exogeneity of the instrument is only feasible using 
randomised assignment in the context of an RCT with imperfect compliance, or an instrument 
identified in the context of a natural experiment.   
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3. Hawthorne and John Henry effects: was the process of being observed 
causing motivation bias? 
 
Score “YES” if either: 
a) For data collected in the context of a particular intervention trial 
(randomised or non-randomised assignment), the authors state explicitly that the 
process of monitoring the intervention and outcome measurement is blinded, or 
argue convincingly why it is not likely that being monitored in ways that could affect 
the performance of participants in treatment and comparison groups in different 
ways. 
b) The study is based on data collected in the context of a survey, and not 
associated with a particular intervention trial, or data are collected in the context of 
a retrospective (ex post) evaluation. 
 
Score “UNCLEAR” if: 
• it is not clear whether the authors use an appropriate method to prevent 
Hawthorne and John Henry Effects (e.g. blinding of outcomes and, or enumerators, 
other methods to ensure consistent monitoring across groups).  
 
Score “NO” otherwise. 
 
4. Spill-overs: was the study adequately protected against performance 
bias?  
 
Score “YES” if: 
• the intervention is unlikely to spill-over to comparisons (e.g. participants and 
non-participants are geographically and/or socially separated from one another and 
general equilibrium effects are unlikely)64
 
.  
Score “UNCLEAR” if: 
• spill-overs are not addressed clearly.  
 
Score “NO” if: 
• allocation was at individual or household level and there are likely spill-overs 
within households and communities which are not controlled for in the analysis;  
• or if allocation at cluster level and there are likely spill-overs to comparison 
clusters.  
 
5. Selective outcome reporting: was the study free from outcome 
reporting bias? 
 
                                                        
64 Contamination, that is differential receipt of other interventions affecting outcome of interest in the 
control or comparison group, is potentially an important threat to the correct interpretation of study 
results and should be addressed via PICO and study coding.  
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Score “YES” if: 
• there is no evidence that outcomes were selectively reported (e.g. all relevant 
outcomes in the methods section are reported in the results section).  
 
Score “NO” if: 
• some important outcomes are subsequently omitted from the results or the 
significance and magnitude of important outcomes was not assessed.  
 
Score “UNCLEAR” otherwise. 
 
6. Selective analysis reporting: was the study free from analysis 
reporting bias? 
 
Score “YES” if: 
• authors use ‘common’ methods65 of estimation and the study does not 
suggest the existence of biased exploratory research methods66
 
.  
Score “NO” if: 
• authors use uncommon or less rigorous estimation methods such as failure 
to conduct multivariate analysis for outcomes equations where it is has not been 
established that covariates are balanced.  
 
See also the following for particular estimation methodologies.  
 
For PSM and covariate matching, score “YES” if: 
• where over 10% of participants fail to be matched, sensitivity analysis is used 
to re-estimate results using different matching methods (Kernel Matching 
techniques); 
• for matching with replacement, no single observation in the control group is 
matched with a large number of observations in the treatment group. 
Where not reported, score “UNCLEAR”. Otherwise, score “NO”. 
 
For IV (including Heckman) models, score “YES” if: 
• the authors test and report the results of a Hausman test for exogeneity 
(p≤0.05 is required to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity); 
• the coefficient of the selectivity correction term (Rho) is significantly 
different from zero (P<0.05) (Heckman approach). 
Where not reported, score “UNCLEAR”. Otherwise, score “NO”. 
 
For studies using multivariate regression analysis, score “YES” if: 
                                                        
65 ‘Common methods’ refers to the use of the most credible method of analysis to address attribution 
given the data available. 
66 A comprehensive assessment of the existence of ‘data mining’ is not feasible particularly in quasi-
experimental designs where most studies do not have protocols and replication seems the only possible 
mechanism to examine rigorously the existence of data mining.   
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• authors conduct appropriate specification tests (e.g. reporting results of 
multicollinearity test, testing robustness of results to the inclusion of additional 
variables, etc).  
Where not reported or not convincing, score “UNCLEAR”. Otherwise, Score “NO”. 
 
7. Other: was the study free from other sources of bias? 
 
Important additional sources of bias may include: concerns about blinding of 
outcome assessors or data analysts; concerns about blinding of beneficiaries so that 
expectations, rather than the intervention mechanisms, are driving results 
(detection bias or placebo effects)67
 
; concerns about courtesy bias from outcomes 
collected through self-reporting; concerns about coherence of results; data on the 
baseline collected retrospectively; information is collected using an inappropriate 
instrument (or a different instrument/at different time/after different follow up 
period in the comparison and treatment groups). 
Score “YES” if: 
• the reported results do not suggest any other sources of bias.  
 
Score “UNCLEAR” if: 
• other important threats to validity may be present 
 
Score “NO” if: 
• it is clear that these threats to validity are present and not controlled for.  
 
 
  
                                                        
67 All interventions may create expectations (placebo effects), which might confound causal 
mechanisms. In social interventions, which usually require behaviour change from participants, 
expectations may form an important component of the intervention, so that isolating expectation 
effects from other mechanisms may be less relevant. 
146 
 
Annex 6: Study descriptive information 
Table A6.1. Study, intervention, participants and evaluation strategy 
Authors Title Location Method of allocation of 
treatment, stated 
identification method 
Data collection 
moment 
Data sample Characteristics of clients 
Amin et al. (1995) Poor women's 
participation in credit-
based self-employment: 
the impact on their 
empowerment, fertility, 
contraceptive use, and 
fertility desire in rural 
Bangladesh 
Bangladesh Self-selection, adjusted 
regression analysis 
Single data point 
measurement 
Total sample comprises:   
 2277 female  beneficiaries, 
 1166 non-beneficiaries. 
Poor married women aged 
between 14 and 49 years old 
Amin et al. (1998) NGO- Promoted 
Microcredit Programmes 
and Women's 
Empowerment in Rural 
Bangladesh: Quantitative 
and Qualitative Evidence 
Bangladesh Self-selection, adjusted 
regression analysis 
Single data point 
measurement 
Total sample comprises:  
2360 loanees from NGO areas, 
1200 non-loanees from non-
programme areas. 
Poor married women under age 
50 
Asim (2008) Evaluating the Impact of 
Microcredit on Women's 
Empowerment in Pakistan 
Pakistan Self-selection, adjusted 
regression analysis 
Single data point 
measurement 
Total sample comprises:  
196 mature clients, 
75 prospective clients. 
Sample varies for several indicators 
as observations from windowed 
Poor women 
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women who are household heads 
were dropped from the original 
sample. Likewise, for specific 
indicators observations from new 
mothers were also excluded. 
Banerjee et al. 
(2009) 
The Miracle of 
Microfinance? Evidence 
from a Randomized 
Evaluation 
India Cluster-randomised 
assignment, adjusted 
regression analysis 
Two data point 
measurement 
Total sample includes 104 areas 
(referred to as “slums”) divided as 
follows:  
52 intervention areas (slums), 
52 comparison areas (slums). 
A total of 6850 households (on 
average 65 households in each 
slum) were surveyed for this study. 
women aged between 18 and 55 
Crepon et al. 
(2011) 
Impact of microcredit in 
rural areas of Morocco: 
Evidence from a 
randomized evaluation 
Morocco Cluster-randomised 
assignment, adjusted 
regression analysis 
Two data point 
measurement 
81 pairs of villages matched, 
approximately 29 households per 
village surveyed 
4495 households in baseline, 
5551 households in end line (1400 
new households). 
Men and women between 18 
and 70 with an economic activity 
(at least 35 % women) 
Garikipati (2008) The Impact of Lending to 
Women on Household 
Vulnerability and Women's 
Empowerment: Evidence 
from India 
India Self-selection, adjusted 
regression analysis 
Single data point 
measurement 
Total sample comprises: 
117 participants, 
174 non-participants. 
Poor married women 
Hashemi et al. 
(1996) 
Rural credit programmes 
and women's 
empowerment in 
Bangladesh 
Bangladesh Self-selection, adjusted 
regression analysis 
Single data point 
measurement 
Total sample comprises: 
1225  women  divided into four sub- 
samples as follows:  
284 GB members, 
232 BRAC members, 
315 GB Non-members,  
394 Control group. 
Married women under age 50 
Holvoet (2005) The Impact of 
Microfinance on Decision-
Making Agency: Evidence 
India Self-selection, adjusted 
regression analysis 
Single data point 
measurement 
Total sample covers 300 
households divided as follows:  
250 programme households  
Female and male from rural 
areas 
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From South India divided into five sub-samples as 
follows: 
50  households with IRDP male 
participants, 
50  households with IRDP female 
participants, 
50  households with TNWDP 
Myrada young women,  
50  households with TNWDP 
Myrada  old women,  
50 households with TNWDP  Rido 
old women clients, 
and 50 non-programme households. 
Holvoet (2006) The differential impact on 
gender relations of 
'transformatory' and 
'instrumentalist' women's 
group intermediation in 
microfinance schemes: a 
case study for rural South 
India 
India Self-selection, adjusted 
regression analysis 
Two data point 
measurement 
Total sample comprises: 
50 Myrada group members, 
50 Rido group members. 
Women 
Hoque and Itohara 
(2009) 
Women Empowerment 
through Participation in 
Micro-Credit Programme: 
A Case Study from 
Bangladesh 
Bangladesh Self-selection, adjusted 
regression analysis 
Single data point 
measurement 
Total sample covers 180 women 
divided as follows:  
90 female clients  
(30 from each of the NGOs: BRAC, 
GB, TMSS), 
90 female non-clients. 
Poor women 
Husain et al. (2010) SHG and empowerment of 
women: Self-selection or 
actual benefits? 
India Self-selection, adjusted 
regression analysis 
Single data point 
measurement 
45 new members, 1995 old 
members. 
Poor women 
Jamal (2008) Exploring the impact of 
microfinance in Pakistan 
Pakistan Self-selection, adjusted 
regression analysis 
Single data point 
measurement 
Total sample comprises:  
2187 borrowers classified as 
follows:  
1599 mature borrowers, 
Poor women from rural and 
urban areas 
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588 pipeline borrowers. 
1206 non-borrowers divided as 
follows:  
601 living in project areas, 
605 living in non-project areas. 
Karlan and Zinman 
(2007) 
Expanding credit access: 
using randomized supply 
decisions to estimate 
impacts 
South Africa Randomised assignment, 
adjusted regression 
analysis 
Two data point 
measurement 
Total sample covers 787 applicants 
classified as follows: 
325 poor applicants (treated group), 
462 egregious applicants 
(comparison group). 
Poor first-time loan applicants 
(men and women) of African 
descent 
Kim et al. (2007) Understanding the impact 
of a microfinance-based 
intervention on women's 
empowerment and the 
reduction of intimate 
partner violence in South 
Africa 
South Africa Cluster-randomised 
assignment over 8 clusters 
(2x 4 pairs matched on size 
and accessibility), adjusted 
regression analysis 
Two data point 
measurement 
Total sample comprises 860 women 
divided as follows:  
430 loan recipients (4 villages), 
430 non-participants (4 villages). 
Poor women aged between 16 
and 96 years 
Lakwo  (2007) Microfinance, rural 
livelihoods, and women's 
empowerment in Uganda 
Uganda Self-selection, adjusted 
regression analysis 
Single data point 
measurement 
Total sample covers 180 female 
groups  divided as follows:  
90 female loan group,  
90 female non-loan group. 
Women groups 
Lastarria-Cornhiel 
and Shimamura 
(2008) 
Social Welfare Outcomes 
of Micro-credit in Malawi 
Malawi Self-selection, adjusted 
regression analysis 
Single data point 
measurement 
Total sample comprises 498 
households as follows:  
249 from programme village, 
249 from non-programme village. 
For empowerment:  Sample 
restricted to two-spouse households 
from which the authors could obtain 
responses from both spouses (282 
households). 
Women and men 
Mizan (1993) Women's Decision-making 
Power in Rural 
Bangladesh : A case 
Study of  Grameen  
Bangladesh Self-selection, adjusted 
regression analysis 
Single data point 
measurement 
Total sample covers 200 women 
divided as follows :  
100 GB  women participants, 
100 women non-participants. 
Poor women 
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Mohindra et al. 
(2008) 
Can microcredit help 
improve the health of poor 
women? Some findings 
from a cross-sectional 
study in Kerala, India 
India Self-selection, adjusted 
regression analysis 
Single data point 
measurement 
Total sample comprises 928 women 
divided as follows:  
592 SHG members (150 early 
joiners and 442 late joiners), 
336 non SHG-members. 
Women from households below 
the poverty line, aged between 
18 and 59 
 
Ngo (2008) Microfinance and Gender 
Empowerment in 
Kyrgyzstan 
Kyrgyzstan Self-selection, adjusted 
regression analysis 
Single data point 
measurement 
Total sample  comprises 500 
households divided  as follows:  
419 households from  programme 
and non-programme villages (186 
form North areas  and 122 from 
South areas), 
81 households from SHG. 
Poor households in remote rural 
areas 
Pitt et al. (2003) Does Micro-Credit 
Empower Women? 
Evidence from 
Bangladesh 
Bangladesh Self-selection, natural 
experiment (instrumental 
variables) adjusted 
regression analysis 
Single data point 
measurement 
The  initial sample comprises 1798 
households as follows: 
1538 target households, of which 
905 were in microcredit program. 
260 non-target households from 05 
non-programme areas. 
Due to the fact that some 
microcredit programmes expanded 
their operations to some of the 
former non-programme areas, new 
households were added to this 
sample. New additions are as 
follows:  
120 added to previous target 
households group. 
220 added to previous non target 
households group. 
Thus, final sample comprises 2074 
households. 
Women and men 
Pitt et al. (2006) Empowering women with 
micro finance: Evidence 
from Bangladesh 
Bangladesh Self-selection, natural 
experiment (instrumental 
variables) adjusted 
regression analysis 
Single data point 
measurement 
The  initial sample comprises 1798 
households as follows:  
1538 target households, of which 
905 were in microcredit program. 
Women and men 
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260 non-target households from 
non-programme areas. 
Due to the fact that some 
microcredit programmes expanded 
their operations to some of the 
former non-programme areas, new 
households were added to this 
sample.  New additions are as 
follows:  
120 added to previous target 
households group. 
220 added to previous non target 
households group. 
Thus, final sample comprises 2074 
households. 
Rahman et al. 
(2009) 
Factors influencing 
women's empowerment on 
microcredit borrowers: a 
case study in Bangladesh 
Bangladesh Self-selection, adjusted 
regression analysis 
Single data point 
measurement 
Total sample comprises:  
387 borrowers  from programme 
areas, 
184 non-borrowers from non-
programme areas. 
Women 
Schuler and 
Hashemi (1994) 
Credit Programs, 
Women’s Empowerment, 
and Contraceptive Use in 
Rural Bangladesh 
Bangladesh Self-selection, adjusted 
regression analysis 
Two data point 
measurement 
Total sample comprises:  
 990 married women (intervention 
group), 
 315 married women (comparison 
group). 
Married women  younger than 
50 
Setboonsarng and 
Parpiev (2008) 
Microfinance and the 
Millennium Development 
Goals in Pakistan: Impact 
Assessment Using 
Propensity Score 
Matching 
Pakistan Self-selection, adjusted 
regression analysis 
Single data point 
measurement 
Total sample covers 2881 
households divided as follows:  
1416 households borrowers,  
1465 households non-borrowers.  
Sample for  empowerment based on 
matching approach  is divided as 
follows:  
1204 households (treated), 
663 households (control). 
Female and male borrowers 
from urban and rural areas 
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Sharif (2002) Poor Female Youth and 
Human Capital 
Development in 
Bangladesh: What Role 
for Micro-Credit 
Programmes? 
Bangladesh Self-selection, adjusted 
regression analysis 
Single data point 
measurement 
Total sample includes 368 female 
participants divided as follows:  
79 youth participants  (bracket age 
for youth: between 16-24 years), 
289 adult participants (above 24 
years). 
Married women aged  between 
18 and 55 
Sharif (2004) Microcredit Programmes 
and Women's Decision-
Making Status: Further 
Evidence From 
Bangladesh 
Bangladesh Self-selection, adjusted 
regression analysis 
Single data point 
measurement 
Total sample comprises 483 women 
divided as follows:  
368 female participants,  
115 female non-participants. 
Married women aged  between 
18 and 55 
Wakoko (2003) Microfinance and women's 
empowerment in Uganda: 
A Socio economic 
approach 
Uganda Self-selection, adjusted 
regression analysis 
Single data point 
measurement 
Total sample comprises 528 
participants as follows:  
247 women, 
280 men. 
Women and men aged between 
16 to 99 years 
Zaman (1998) The links between BRAC 
input and ‘empowerment 
correlates 
Bangladesh Self-selection, adjusted 
regression analysis 
Single data point 
measurement 
Total sample comprises 2895 
women divided as follows:  
379 BRAC TG members, 
149 BRAC NTG members, 
1193 TG non-members, 
1174 NTG non-members. 
Married women aged 15-65 
years   
Zaman (1999) Assessing the Poverty and 
Vulnerability Impact of 
Micro-Credit in 
Bangladesh: A case study 
of BRAC 
Bangladesh Self-selection, adjusted 
regression analysis 
Single data point 
measurement 
Total sample includes 1568 women 
divided as follows:  
379 BRAC members, 
1189 non-members. 
Married women 
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Table A6.2. Credit variables and empowerment variables in included studies 
Study Services 
provided 
Solidarity 
group 
Credit Independent 
variable  
Dependent 
variable: 
decision-making 
household 
expenditures 
indicators 
Relationship 
independent 
- dependent 
variables 
Components of dependent  
(if index) 
Short description 
Amin et al. (1995) Credit, skill 
training, health 
education and 
family planning 
Yes Membership credit 
organization (yes/no) 
Authority index + • Family planning 
adoption 
• Child’s education 
• Purchase of a 
household item 
• Health related issues 
Women’s self-reported 
decision-making power 
over some important 
areas. 
0 = husband alone, 0,5 = 
jointly, 0,5 – 1 = woman 
alone depending on area. 
Responses were scored. 
The values for the 
questions are then 
summed up and 
standardised. 
Times loan received (#) Authority index + 
Utilization of loan by 
respondent herself 
(yes/no) 
Authority index + 
Amin et al. (1998) Credit Yes Membership NGO 
(yes/no) 
Interspouse 
consultation index 
 
 
0 • Buying household 
furniture and utensils 
• Purchase of land 
• Education expenses of 
children 
• Medical treatment of 
family 
• Purchasing women’s 
clothes 
• Purchasing children’s 
clothes 
• Purchasing daily food 
Questions seek to 
represent extent to which 
husbands consult their 
wives in household affairs. 
Generally = 1, never = 0, 
occasionally = 0,5. 
Responses were scored. 
The values are then 
summed up and 
standardised; indices 
controlled for statistical 
and conceptual 
distinctiveness and 
reliability. 
Membership NGO Autonomy index + Frequency of husband’s Questions seek to 
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Study Services 
provided 
Solidarity 
group 
Credit Independent 
variable  
Dependent 
variable: 
decision-making 
household 
expenditures 
indicators 
Relationship 
independent 
- dependent 
variables 
Components of dependent  
(if index) 
Short description 
(yes/no) restrictions on: 
• Visiting respondent’s 
parental home 
• Visiting hospital 
• Visiting village market 
• Helping a relative with 
money 
• Setting aside money for 
respondent’s own use 
represent women’s self-
reported autonomy in their 
physical movement 
outside the home and in 
their spending of some 
money on their own. 
Generally = 0, never = 1, 
occasionally = 0,5. 
Responses were scored. 
The values are then 
summed up and 
standardised; indices 
controlled for statistical 
and conceptual 
distinctiveness and 
reliability. 
Membership NGO 
(yes/no) 
Authority index + Decision-making on the 
following matters: 
• Voting in election 
• Child’s education in 
school 
• Family planning 
• Family day-to-day 
expenditures 
• Going outside of home 
• Medical treatment 
• Entertaining guests 
• Buying respondents 
traditionally favorite 
Questions seek to 
represent women’s self-
reported actual decision-
making power over some 
important areas. 
Wife alone = 1, husband 
alone = 0, jointly = 0,5. 
Responses were scored. 
The values are then 
summed up and 
standardise; indices 
controlled for statistical 
and conceptual 
distinctiveness and 
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Study Services 
provided 
Solidarity 
group 
Credit Independent 
variable  
Dependent 
variable: 
decision-making 
household 
expenditures 
indicators 
Relationship 
independent 
- dependent 
variables 
Components of dependent  
(if index) 
Short description 
things reliability. 
Asim (2008) Credit Yes Participation in 
programme (yes/no) 
 
Boy’s schooling 0  These ordered outcome 
variables measure the 
extent to which women 
preferences are reflected 
in these domains (see 
components) of household 
decisions.  
Girl’s schooling 0  
Child’s medical 
care 
0  
Medical checkup 0 
Purchase of 
household assets 
0 
House repair 0 
Sale/purchase of 
house 
0 
Grocery/fruits 0  Women do not require 
someone’s permission to 
purchase items 
mentioned. 
  
Medicine for 
herself 
0 
Personal 
clothes/cosmetics 
- 
Buy ice-
cream/sweets for 
children 
- 
Buy books/uniform 
for children 
0 
Take a child to the 
doctor 
0 
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Study Services 
provided 
Solidarity 
group 
Credit Independent 
variable  
Dependent 
variable: 
decision-making 
household 
expenditures 
indicators 
Relationship 
independent 
- dependent 
variables 
Components of dependent  
(if index) 
Short description 
Banerjee et  al. 
(2009) 
Credit Yes Credit intervention area 
(yes/no) 
Woman makes 
spending 
decisions 
0  
 
Decisions include 
household spending, 
investment, and savings.  
Woman makes 
non-food spending 
decisions 
0  
Crepon et al. 
(2011) 
Credit Yes and 
no 
Credit (yes/no) Women index 0 Index of qualitative 
indicators of women's 
empowerment, such as 
capacity of women to take 
some decisions and their 
mobility inside and outside 
the villages (full index not 
defined) 
 
Index not specified.  
Summary index of 
qualitative variables such 
as the capacity of women 
to take some decisions 
and their mobility inside 
and outside the villages. 
    % household self-
activities managed 
by women 
0  Full list of activities not 
specified 
    Number of 
activities managed 
by female 
household 
member 
0   
Garikipati (2008) Credit Yes Length of  membership 
of credit group (years = 
Say in household 
decisions 
0 • Woman deciding 
(individually or jointly 
The indicators intend to 
capture the extent to 
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Study Services 
provided 
Solidarity 
group 
Credit Independent 
variable  
Dependent 
variable: 
decision-making 
household 
expenditures 
indicators 
Relationship 
independent 
- dependent 
variables 
Components of dependent  
(if index) 
Short description 
0 for non-members) with others) about 
children’s education 
• Woman deciding on 
what crops to grow 
• Woman deciding to 
lease in/out agricultural 
land 
• Woman making a major 
financial decision (open 
a bank account, apply 
for a loan, and so on) 
• Woman initiating the 
financial decision 
• Woman deciding to sell 
crops 
• Woman deciding to 
buy/sell large livestock 
• Woman deciding to buy 
agricultural inputs 
• Woman participating in 
the sale negotiations for 
each item. 
which women have a say 
in household decisions 
(and control over 
finances). 
For each indicator, 
questions were scored 
with (different numbers of) 
points which were used to 
rank women as 
empowered or not in that 
domain. 
For the 3 composite 
indices, women with a 
score of 2 or 3 or better 
were classified as 
‘‘empowered.’’ 
Control over minor 
finances 
0 • Woman kept money 
from sale of livestock 
produce, or from: 
• Sale of poultry 
• Woman has regular 
personal spending 
money 
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Study Services 
provided 
Solidarity 
group 
Credit Independent 
variable  
Dependent 
variable: 
decision-making 
household 
expenditures 
indicators 
Relationship 
independent 
- dependent 
variables 
Components of dependent  
(if index) 
Short description 
• Woman has money for 
emergency use 
Control over major 
finances 
0 • Woman retains money 
from the sale of crops 
• Woman retains money 
from sale of goats 
• Woman retaining her 
own wage earnings, or 
children’s wages 
• Woman retaining 
husband’s wages 
Hashemi et al. 
(1996) 
Credit, 
new members 
attend 
training 
sessions so that 
they understand 
the program’s 
objectives and 
modes of 
operation, 
including the 
Bank’s  “Sixteen 
Decisions” 
having to do 
with self-
improvement, 
social reform, 
and community 
Yes GB member (yes/no) Ability to make 
small purchases 
+ • Woman purchasing 
small items used daily in 
food preparation for the 
family 
• Woman purchasing 
small items for oneself 
• Woman purchasing ice 
cream or sweets for the 
children 
 
 
These indicators intend to 
capture women's ability to 
make household spending 
and whether they have a 
say in decisions related to 
household expenditures.  
For each item an 
additional point if the 
purchases normally were 
made without asking for 
the husband’s permission, 
and another additional 
point if the purchases 
were made at least in part 
with money earned by the 
respondent herself. 
Respondent with a score 
of 7 or better considered 
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Study Services 
provided 
Solidarity 
group 
Credit Independent 
variable  
Dependent 
variable: 
decision-making 
household 
expenditures 
indicators 
Relationship 
independent 
- dependent 
variables 
Components of dependent  
(if index) 
Short description 
development. 
 
“empowered” and coded 
as 1. 
Ability to make 
large purchases 
+ • Woman purchasing pots 
and pans 
• Woman purchasing 
children’s clothing 
• Woman purchasing 
saris for oneself 
• Woman buying the 
family’s daily food 
 
  
These indicators intend to 
capture women's ability to 
make household spending 
and whether they have a 
say in decisions related to 
household expenditures.  
For each category 
additional point if purchase 
was made, at least in part, 
with money earned by the 
respondent herself. 
Respondent with a score 
of 5 or better considered 
“empowered” and coded 
as 1. 
Involvement in 
major decisions 
+ • Woman making a 
decision (individually or 
jointly with the husband) 
within the past few 
years about house 
repair or renovation 
• Woman’s decision to 
take in a goat to raise 
for profit 
• Woman deciding to 
lease land 
• Woman deciding to buy 
These indicators intend to 
capture women's ability to 
make household spending 
and whether they have a 
say in decisions related to 
household expenditures.  
Additional point was given 
for each category if money 
earned by the respondent 
was used.  
Respondent with a score 
of 2 or better considered 
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Study Services 
provided 
Solidarity 
group 
Credit Independent 
variable  
Dependent 
variable: 
decision-making 
household 
expenditures 
indicators 
Relationship 
independent 
- dependent 
variables 
Components of dependent  
(if index) 
Short description 
land, a boat or a bicycle 
rickshaw 
 
 
“empowered” and coded 
as 1. 
BRAC member (yes/no) Ability to make 
small purchases 
+ See above See above 
Ability to make 
large purchases 
+ See above See above 
Involvement in 
major decisions 
0 See above See above 
Membership duration ability to make 
small purchases 
0 See above See above 
ability to make 
large purchases 
0 See above See above 
Involvement in 
major decisions 
+ See above See above 
Holvoet (2005) Credit, 
enterprise 
development 
training, social 
welfare services 
versus only 
credit 
Yes and 
no 
Credit (Female/ male 
clients) 
Female decision-
making with 
respect to loan 
use  
+   The indicators seek to 
capture the degree of 
women's participation in 
decision-making on the 
use of the loan, household 
expenditures and 
household money 
management and 
particularly the change 
Female decision-
making with 
respect to 
household 
expenditures 
0 
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Study Services 
provided 
Solidarity 
group 
Credit Independent 
variable  
Dependent 
variable: 
decision-making 
household 
expenditures 
indicators 
Relationship 
independent 
- dependent 
variables 
Components of dependent  
(if index) 
Short description 
Female decision-
making with 
respect to 
household money 
management 
0 from conventional, norm-
following behavior or male 
decision-making to female 
decision-making. 
The analysis presented in 
the paper requires careful 
interpretation, e.g. the first 
relationship here connotes 
that if credit is allocated to 
a female client, there is a 
higher likelihood of the 
Woman deciding on loan 
use instead of societal 
norms being followed, 
than when credit is 
allocated to the male.  
Credit (Group/ individual 
credit) 
Female decision-
making with 
respect to loan 
use  
+ 
Female decision-
making with 
respect to 
expenditures 
0 
Female decision-
making with 
respect to money 
management 
+ 
Credit (old/new) Female decision-
making with 
respect to loan 
use  
+ 
Female decision-
making with 
respect to 
expenditures 
0 
Female decision-
making with 
0 
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Study Services 
provided 
Solidarity 
group 
Credit Independent 
variable  
Dependent 
variable: 
decision-making 
household 
expenditures 
indicators 
Relationship 
independent 
- dependent 
variables 
Components of dependent  
(if index) 
Short description 
respect to money 
management 
Organizational model 
(Rido/Myrada) 
Female decision-
making with 
respect to loan 
use  
+ 
Female decision-
making with 
respect to 
expenditures 
0 
Female decision-
making with 
respect to money 
management 
0 
Holvoet (2006) Credit with only 
financial 
intermediation 
or also with 
social 
intermediation 
(awareness-
raising on 
gender and 
development 
issues) 
Yes Myrada membership  Female Control 
over Resources 
 
+  The indicator intends to 
capture the degree of 
control of women over 
resources. Descending 
scores for increasing 
levels of empowerment. 
Index constructed on the 
basis of: 
% assets in own name 
(=0),  
% assets in both names 
(=1),  
% assets only in men’s 
name (=2). 
Rido membership  Female Control 
over Resources 
 
+ 
Financial + social 
intermediation 
Female Control 
over Resources 
 
+ 
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Study Services 
provided 
Solidarity 
group 
Credit Independent 
variable  
Dependent 
variable: 
decision-making 
household 
expenditures 
indicators 
Relationship 
independent 
- dependent 
variables 
Components of dependent  
(if index) 
Short description 
The analysis requires 
careful interpretation, e.g., 
more elaborate ‘social’ 
intervention approach of 
Myrada results in 
significantly higher level of 
female control over 
resources than Rido’s 
‘financial only’ approach. 
Hoque and  Itohara 
(2009) 
Credit Yes Amount of credit Status of 
empowerment 
0 Status of Empowerment 
based on 4 Indicators: 
• Contribution to 
household income 
• Access to resources: 
measure based on 
scoring of 8 issues 
• Participation in family 
decision making 
process: measure 
based on scoring of 10 
issues 
• Perception on gender 
awareness 
Status of empowerment 
has 2 values: 
1 ‘empowered’ or 0 ‘not 
empowered’. Duration of credit use Status of empowerment 
0 
Credit use by woman 
(yes/no) 
Status of 
empowerment 
+ 
Husain et al. (2010) Credit Yes  New members SHG (< 6 
months) versus older 
members 
Control over 
respondents’ 
income 
0  1 if (female) respondent 
herself decides, 
0,5 in case of joint control, 
0 in all other cases. 
Who spends 0   
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Study Services 
provided 
Solidarity 
group 
Credit Independent 
variable  
Dependent 
variable: 
decision-making 
household 
expenditures 
indicators 
Relationship 
independent 
- dependent 
variables 
Components of dependent  
(if index) 
Short description 
husbands’ income/ 
control of family 
income 
Who decides on 
treatment of 
respondent 
0 
Who decides on 
major household 
purchases 
0 
Who decides on 
daily purchases 
0 
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Study Services 
provided 
Solidarity 
group 
Credit Independent 
variable  
Dependent 
variable: 
decision-making 
household 
expenditures 
indicators 
Relationship 
independent 
- dependent 
variables 
Components of dependent  
(if index) 
Short description 
Jamal (2008) Credit No Credit (yes/pipeline/no 
credit) 
Economic aspects 
of empowerment 
0 • Do you take decisions on the 
aspects of purchase, 
construction, modification or 
repair of house? 
• Does your husband discuss 
with you when a decision on 
construction/modification/repa
ir of house is made? 
• Do you take decisions on the 
purchase or sale of livestock? 
• Did your husband discuss 
with you before sale or 
purchase of livestock? 
• Do you purchase dresses for 
the family? 
• Do you purchase utensils for 
your family? 
• Do you purchase gold and 
jewelry for your family? 
• Do you take decisions on 
borrowing money? 
• Do your husband discuss with 
you issues of borrowing 
money? 
• Do you spend the money you 
have borrowed? 
• Do you repay the money you 
have borrowed? 
• Do you take decisions on 
transactions involving 
household equipment? 
• Do you have any debt 
in your name? 
• Does your husband 
discuss with you when he has 
incurred the debt?  
Women’s empowerment 
index in each category 
uses responses to 
questions about the 
perception of women 
regarding the role of 
women in household 
decision-making.  After 
assigning a score to each 
response, the final score 
of a particular aspect is 
obtained by summing up 
across all types of 
decisions in that category. 
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Study Services 
provided 
Solidarity 
group 
Credit Independent 
variable  
Dependent 
variable: 
decision-making 
household 
expenditures 
indicators 
Relationship 
independent 
- dependent 
variables 
Components of dependent  
(if index) 
Short description 
Income and 
expenditure 
0 • Do you have your own 
income? 
• Do you spend it for the 
family yourself? 
• Do you need the 
permission of your 
husband to spend your 
income? 
• Do you get any part of 
your family income or 
husband’s income in 
your hands regularly? 
• Do your husband 
discuss with you when 
he spends income for 
the family or his own 
requirements? 
Asset transactions + • Do you possess any 
household asset? 
• Do you have cash 
savings in your own 
name? 
• Do you operate a bank 
account in your name? 
• Do you pledge, sell, or 
exchange any of the 
above said assets 
yourself? 
• Do you need permission 
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Study Services 
provided 
Solidarity 
group 
Credit Independent 
variable  
Dependent 
variable: 
decision-making 
household 
expenditures 
indicators 
Relationship 
independent 
- dependent 
variables 
Components of dependent  
(if index) 
Short description 
from your husband to 
sell, pledge, exchange 
any of the assets? 
• Do you have or have 
you purchased land in 
your own name? 
• Is the house you stay in 
registered in your 
name? 
• Is the house you stay in 
registered in your and 
your husband’s name? 
Credit recent credit 
organization 
(yes/pipeline/no credit) 
Economic aspects 
of empowerment 
0 As above 
Income and 
expenditure 
0 As above 
Asset transactions 0 As above 
Credit more established 
organization 
(yes/pipeline/no credit) 
Economic aspects 
of empowerment 
0 As above 
Income and 
expenditure 
0 As above 
Asset transactions 0 As above 
Karlan and Zinman 
(2007) 
Credit No Credit (yes/no; female 
sample) 
Decision-making 
scale 
0 Decision-making scale 
based on questions about 
how the household decides 
about: 
Questions asked to 
married applicants whose 
loan applications were 
rejected (as being 
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Study Services 
provided 
Solidarity 
group 
Credit Independent 
variable  
Dependent 
variable: 
decision-making 
household 
expenditures 
indicators 
Relationship 
independent 
- dependent 
variables 
Components of dependent  
(if index) 
Short description 
• Routine purchases 
• Expensive purchases 
•  Giving assistance to 
family members 
• Family purchases 
• Recreational use of 
money  
• Personal use of money  
• Number- of children 
• Use of family planning 
• Method of family 
planning  
• Assistance given to 
relatives 
• Decision to borrow  
• Amount to borrow 
• Where/who to borrow 
from  
‘marginally 
uncreditworthy’). 
Value for each item 0 if 
decision-making by the 
respondent's spouse or 
someone else in the 
household, 1 if decision-
making by the couple, and 
2 if decision-making by 
respondent.  
Index is sum of the 13 
responses (range: 0-26). 
Kim et al. (2007) Credit , savings, 
learning 
programme 
(health, 
reproduction, 
gender, 
community 
action) 
Yes Credit (yes/no) Autonomy in 
decision-making 
+ 10 questions about 
household decisions, e.g., 
making small, medium, or 
large purchases, taking 
children to the clinic, visiting 
family or friends. (No further 
details on components 
provided.) 
Study defines 9 indicators 
of empowerment amongst 
which autonomy in 
decision-making. Others 
are: self-confidence, 
financial confidence, 
challenging gender norms, 
perceived contribution to 
household income, 
household communication, 
partner relationship, social 
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Study Services 
provided 
Solidarity 
group 
Credit Independent 
variable  
Dependent 
variable: 
decision-making 
household 
expenditures 
indicators 
Relationship 
independent 
- dependent 
variables 
Components of dependent  
(if index) 
Short description 
group membership, 
collective action. 
Autonomy in decision-
making means: does not 
need partner’s permission 
for 5 of 10. 
Lakwo (2007) Credit, savings, 
training 
Yes Membership (yes/no) Cattle 0   Variables refer to decision- 
making on livelihood 
assets and strategies. 
The indicators seeks to 
capture the extent to 
which women have 
achieved empowerment in 
household decision-
making (e.g. decision over 
buying and selling of 
poultry). 
Values of variables not 
clearly defined in study. 
Interpretation of direction 
of relationship based on 
text, not on table. 
Shoat 0 
Poultry + 
Radio 0 
Bicycles 0 
Bed/ mattresses + 
Business 0 
Bank account 0 
Lastarria-Cornhiel 
and Shimamura 
(2008) 
Credit, training Yes  Female client (yes/no) Female spouse 
decision-making 
on food 
consumption 
0  This indicator captures the 
household decision-
making on food 
consumption with options: 
female spouse decision, 
joint decision or male 
spouse decision. 
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Study Services 
provided 
Solidarity 
group 
Credit Independent 
variable  
Dependent 
variable: 
decision-making 
household 
expenditures 
indicators 
Relationship 
independent 
- dependent 
variables 
Components of dependent  
(if index) 
Short description 
Mizan (1993) Credit, social 
education 
Yes Grameen bank 
participation (yes/no) 
Household 
decision-
making scale 
+ Decision-making on:  
• Purchase of daily food 
• Expenses on education 
and marriage of children 
• Expense on medicine 
for self and husband 
• Investing respondent’s 
earning in business 
• Purchase and selling of 
land 
• Hiring labor 
• Buying cows, goats and 
agricultural implements 
• Providing financial 
support to respondent’s 
or husband’s parents 
• Buying clothes for self 
and other family 
members 
This indicator is measured 
by a composite scale 
consisting of several 
decision-making items.  
Decisions by: 1=husband 
only, 2=jointly, 3=wife 
only. 
Years of loan from GB Household 
decision-
making scale 
+ 
Monthly income from GB 
investment 
Household 
decision-
making scale 
+ 
Mohindra et al.  
(2008) 
Credit, skills 
training, 
awareness 
campaigns 
Yes Credit (yes/ no) (early 
joiner, > 2 years versus 
non-member) 
Male decision-
making 
0 Decision-making agency in: 
• Seeking health care of 
family member 
• Daily household 
expenditures 
• Child’s education in 
school 
• Family planning 
• Voting in an election 
 
Dichotomous indicator 
capturing whether a 
woman's husband (or 
male relative) was sole 
decision-maker on a 
number of household 
issues.  
Female only and joint 
decision-making 
considered to reflect a 
Late joiner Male decision-
making 
- 
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Study Services 
provided 
Solidarity 
group 
Credit Independent 
variable  
Dependent 
variable: 
decision-making 
household 
expenditures 
indicators 
Relationship 
independent 
- dependent 
variables 
Components of dependent  
(if index) 
Short description 
high level of 
empowerment.  
Male decision-making is 
when woman reported at 
least 1 situation in which 
husband or male relative 
was sole decision-maker. 
So negative relation 
means an increase in 
female influence in 
decision-making. 
Ngo (2008) Credit, training 
business skills 
Yes Women with credit 
(North and South 
Kyrgyzstan separately) 
Female residents 
programme versus idem 
control villages in North 
and South Kyrgyzstan 
separately 
Large purchases 
(appliances 
and furniture) 
0  Selected categorical 
variables that intend to 
capture female 
respondent’s participation 
in decision-making on 
household expenditures 
with categories: ‘alone’, 
‘jointly’ and ‘no say’. 
Purchase/ sell/ 
rent land, 
property 
0 
Getting a credit 0 
Purchase/ sell 
large animals 
0 
Purchase/ sell 
smaller 
animals 
0 
Pitt et al. (2003) Credit Yes Female credit (yes/ no)  
Household s in 
programme villages with 
Purchasing ability 
(factor) 
+ • Food  
• Cosmetics  
• Candy  
The subsets of 
empowerment variables 
are treated as containing a 
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Study Services 
provided 
Solidarity 
group 
Credit Independent 
variable  
Dependent 
variable: 
decision-making 
household 
expenditures 
indicators 
Relationship 
independent 
- dependent 
variables 
Components of dependent  
(if index) 
Short description 
female credit groups 
versus non-programme 
villages 
• Utensils  
• Furniture  
• Children’s clothing  
• Own clothing  
• Wife can buy asset 
• Wife can buy asset 
without husband’s 
permission 
latent factor. In this 
context, factor analysis is 
used to estimate index 
“weights” for numerical 
estimates of latent factor. 
2 relevant factors result: 
1. Purchasing 
capacity: women’s 
capacity to make particular 
purchases independently. 
2. Transaction 
management:  describes 
decision-making ranging 
from full power in wife’s 
hands to full power in 
husband’s) and likelihood 
that wife spends money. 
Transaction 
management 
(factor) 
+ • House repair decision  
• House repair 
implementation  
• House repair spending  
• Livestock purchase 
decision  
• Livestock purchase 
implementation  
• Livestock spending  
• Household loans 
decision 
• Household loans 
implementation 
• Household loans 
spending 
• Land/equipment 
purchase or sale 
decision  
• Land/equipment 
implementation  
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Study Services 
provided 
Solidarity 
group 
Credit Independent 
variable  
Dependent 
variable: 
decision-making 
household 
expenditures 
indicators 
Relationship 
independent 
- dependent 
variables 
Components of dependent  
(if index) 
Short description 
Pitt et al. (2006) Credit Yes Female credit (yes/ no)  
Household s in 
programme villages with 
female credit groups 
versus non-programme 
villages 
Purchasing ability 
(factor) 
+ • Food  
• Cosmetics  
• Candy  
• Utensils  
• Furniture  
• Children’s clothing  
• Own clothing  
• Wife can buy asset  
• Wife can buy asset 
without husband’s 
permission 
The subsets of 
empowerment variables 
are treated as containing a 
latent factor. In this 
context, factor analysis is 
used to estimate index 
“weights” for numerical 
estimates of latent factor. 
2 relevant factors result:  
1. Purchasing 
capacity: women’s 
capacity to make particular 
purchases independently. 
2. Transaction 
management:  describes 
decision-making ranging 
from full power in wife’s 
hands to full power in 
husband’s) and likelihood 
that wife spends money. 
Transaction 
management 
(factor) 
+ • House repair decision  
• House repair 
implementation  
• House repair spending  
• Livestock purchase 
decision  
• Livestock purchase 
implementation  
• Livestock spending  
• Household loans 
decision 
• Household loans 
implementation 
• Household loans 
spending 
• Land/equipment 
purchase or sale 
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Study Services 
provided 
Solidarity 
group 
Credit Independent 
variable  
Dependent 
variable: 
decision-making 
household 
expenditures 
indicators 
Relationship 
independent 
- dependent 
variables 
Components of dependent  
(if index) 
Short description 
decision  
• Land/equipment 
implementation  
• Land/equipment 
spending 
Rahman et al. 
(2009) 
Credit Yes Credit (yes/ no) Empowerment 
index 
0 The following indices used 
as a proxy for 
empowerment: 
• Economic security  
• Purchase decision  
• Control over assets  
• Mobility index  
• Awareness 
The latent variable 
empowerment is 
measured through an 
index called empowerment 
index (EI). To calculate the 
EI, all the 5 indices shown 
left are added. 
Someone scoring 3 or 
more out of 5 indices is 
considered empowered 
and scores 1, otherwise 0. 
 
Schuler and 
Hashemi (1994) 
Credit, training, 
awareness 
raising 
Yes Credit (yes/ no)68 Empowerment 
indicator 
 + Empowerment indicator 
composite of following 8 
variables/ indices: 
• Physical mobility  
• Economic security 
• Ability to make small 
purchases on her own 
• Ability to make larger 
purchases 
To combine the 8 
indicators into a single 
score, a woman was 
classified as empowered if 
she had a positive score 
on 5 or more of the eight 
separated indicators. 
Credit (yes/ no)1 Empowerment 
indicator 
+ 
Credit (yes/ no)1 Empowerment 
indicator 
+ 
Credit (yes/ no)1 Empowerment 
indicator 
+ 
                                                        
68 Adult female) Grameen or BRAC Bank member versus eligible adult females living in non-programme village. 
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Study Services 
provided 
Solidarity 
group 
Credit Independent 
variable  
Dependent 
variable: 
decision-making 
household 
expenditures 
indicators 
Relationship 
independent 
- dependent 
variables 
Components of dependent  
(if index) 
Short description 
• involvement in major 
(investment) decisions 
• Freedom from 
domination and violence 
in family 
• Political and legal 
awareness 
• Participation in politics 
Setboonsarng and 
Parpiev (2008) 
Credit,  training 
and consulting 
Yes Credit (yes/ no) Women have say 
in schooling 
matters 
 
0  Variables capturing 
women’s participation on 
household decision-
making over issues that 
imply expenditures. Women have say 
in  health care 
0 
Sharif (2002) Credit Yes  Young female borrowers 
(16 – 24) versus adult 
female borrowers 
Daily food 
purchases 
-  In each domain, women 
were asked to rank on 5-
point scale in each area, 
where 1 = no participation 
in decision-making, 2 = 
possibly influence, 3 = 
joint decision, 4 = partially 
own decision, 5 = own 
decision.  
Empowered (=1) if 
decision is joint, partially 
or completely her own (> 
3). 
Large Purchases - 
Education of 
children 
0 
Health 
expenditures 
- 
Sharif (2004) Credit Yes  Credit (yes/ no) Daily food +  For each of the 6 decision-
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Study Services 
provided 
Solidarity 
group 
Credit Independent 
variable  
Dependent 
variable: 
decision-making 
household 
expenditures 
indicators 
Relationship 
independent 
- dependent 
variables 
Components of dependent  
(if index) 
Short description 
purchases making domains listed, 
participation in decision-
making ranked along 5-
point scale: 1 = no 
participation in decision-
making, 2 = possibly 
influence, 3 = joint 
decision, 4 = partially own 
decision, 5 = own 
decision.  
Large Purchases 
(housing, furniture, 
assets, etc.) 
+ 
Education children + 
Health 
expenditures 
+ 
Post-1996 participants  
versus non-participants 
Daily food 
purchases 
+ 
Large Purchases 
(housing, furniture, 
assets, etc.) 
+ 
Education children + 
Health 
expenditures 
+ 
Pré 1996 participants (in 
1997) versus post-1996 
participants 
Daily food 
purchases 
0 
Large Purchases 
(housing, furniture, 
assets, etc.) 
0 
Education children 0 
Health 
expenditures 
0 
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Study Services 
provided 
Solidarity 
group 
Credit Independent 
variable  
Dependent 
variable: 
decision-making 
household 
expenditures 
indicators 
Relationship 
independent 
- dependent 
variables 
Components of dependent  
(if index) 
Short description 
Wakoko (2003) Credit, training 
and deposits by 
some 
institutions 
Yes and 
no 
Membership of 2 or 
more informal financial 
groups (women) 
Income use 
decisions 
+  Relying on a factor 
analysis approach, binary 
responses to a set of 
decision-making questions 
were used to construct the 
index on household 
income use. These 
questions capture who 
makes the decision on a 
specific household issue 
3 questions on household 
income use decisions 
loaded on index:  
• When to sell farm 
produce?  
• How to use income 
from farm activities?  
• Whether or not to 
save?  
Higher score = more 
decisions by respondent 
herself = more 
empowerment 
Credit (from informal 
sources) (yes/ no) 
(women) 
Income use 
decisions 
0 
Zaman (1998/ 
1999) 
individual loans 
(ca. 75% of 
BRAC’s 
lending) for 
traditional 
activities 
Yes  Non-borrowing BRAC 
member versus member 
with more than 10,000 
taka in loans 
Owns poultry +  Sixteen binary correlates 
were constructed from 
responses to questions 
about whether woman 
respondents owned and 
controlled assets. All More than 10,000 taka borrowed versus non-
Can sell poultry 
independently 
+ 
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Study Services 
provided 
Solidarity 
group 
Credit Independent 
variable  
Dependent 
variable: 
decision-making 
household 
expenditures 
indicators 
Relationship 
independent 
- dependent 
variables 
Components of dependent  
(if index) 
Short description 
Loans with 
complementary 
inputs, such as 
facilities for 
savings, and 
depending on 
sector support 
structure  
including 
training, 
consciousness-
raising for 
relatively new 
activities 
 
borrowing member sixteen indicators were 
treated separately.  Less than 5,000 taka 
borrowed  versus non-
borrowing BRAC-
member 
Owns livestock  + 
More than 10,000 taka 
borrowed versus non-
borrowing member 
Can sell jewelry 
independently 
+ 
Non-borrowing BRAC 
member versus eligible 
non-member 
Has savings + 
BRAC members and – 
borrowers versus 
eligible non-members 
Can use savings 
independently 
- 
Loan size Has savings + 
Loan size Can use savings 
independently 
+ 
All credit variables Owns land  0 
All credit variables Can sell livestock 
independently  
0 
All credit variables Owns jewelry  0 
Note 1: + means significant positive relation between independent and dependent variable (p < 0.05); – means significant inverse relation (p < 0.05); 0 means no 
significant relation (p > 0.05). Note 2: components in italics refer to aspects of women’s control over household expenditures. 
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Annex 7: Methods for effect size 
calculation 
Table A7.1. Effect size formulae used 
 
No. Study Effect size formula Effect size 
calculation 
possible? 
1 Amin et al., 
1995 
SMD8, OR Yes 
2 Amin et al., 
1998 
SMD 4, SMD8 
 
Yes 
3 Asim, 2008 SMD3, probit, SMD1 Yes 
4 Banerjee et 
al., 2009 
SMD7 using assumptions made regarding sample size in TR 
and CTL; pooled SMD calculated assuming same SD in TR 
and CTL. 
Yes 
5 Crepon et al., 
2011 
SMD1 not possible since no sd of either treated or controls 
given. Only overall N and SE given which is not sufficient. No 
other formula applicable. We therefore calculated the SMD 
by transforming the estimated OR from regression analysis.  
Yes 
6 Garikipati, 
2008 
SMD1, logit, multinomial logit Yes 
7 Hashemi et al., 
1996 
OR Yes 
8 Holvoet, 2005 Not possible, the data reported not sufficient to do any effect 
size calculation. 
No 
9 Holvoet, 2006 SMD2 Yes 
10 Hoque and 
Itohara,  2009 
SMD1, logit Yes 
11 Husain et al.,  
2010 
SMD3. SMD1 not possible since no sds are given. SMD8 not 
possible since sd of dep var not given, also reg coeff given 
Yes 
180 
 
No. Study Effect size formula Effect size 
calculation 
possible? 
but only their sign but not their actual values. 
12 Jamal, 2008 SMD8 not possible since TR n, CTL n and sd of dep var 
missing. No other formula applicable. 
No 
13 Karlan and 
Zinman, 2007 
SMD1 not possible. Not sufficient information given, e.g. no 
TR n and CTL n as well as no TR SD and CTL SD. We 
therefore approximated SMD7 assuming TR n and CTL n the 
same as overall N and SD given. 
Yes 
14 Kim et al., 
2007 
OR Yes 
15 Lakwo, 2007 Logit Yes 
 
16 Lastarria-
Cornhiel and 
Shimamura, 
2008 
Tobit, linear probability model. SMD8 not possible since sd of 
dep var not given. Considered SMD10 but not possible either 
since TR SE and CTL SE not given separately. Only overall 
SE given which is not sufficient. PSM ATT values given, but 
TR sd as well as CTL sd of outcome variables needed which 
are not given, hence SMD1 not possible either. 
Yes 
17 Mizan, 1993 SMD7 and SMD8 both not possible since sd of dep var 
missing. No other formula applicable. 
No 
18 Mohindra et 
al., 2008 
OR Yes 
19 Ngo, 2008 SMD1 (see Table 5.2  same as 8.5.1, 8.5.2) – SMD3 
might be possible for these 2 tables as well but we are not 
using SMD3 here, SMD11 (see Tables 5.7, 5.8, 5.9A, 5.9B), 
SMD5 ok, SMD8 (see Table 5.11) not possible since sd of 
dep var isn’t reported. Table 11 also reports logit coeff 
(OR/RR1) but outcome variable unclear, determinants of 
SHG membership investigated, not sufficient data for OR. 
Yes 
20 Pitt et al., 2003 SMD8 not possible since sd of dep var not reported. No 
other formula applicable. Factor analysis model used and 
factor loading, uniqueness and Eigenvalue report but not 
useful. 
No 
21 Pitt et al., 2006 Peer-reviewed version of previous paper but more results 
reported. SMD7 and SMD9 (Tables 4, 5) possible. 
Yes 
22  Rahman et al., 
2009 
Probit (tables 5, 6) BUT: probit coeff possibly not useful since 
they investigate factors affecting the empowerment index 
Yes 
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No. Study Effect size formula Effect size 
calculation 
possible? 
without investigating the impact of microfinance participation 
on this index. 
23 Schuler and 
Hashemi, 
1994 
Logit Yes 
24  Setboonsarng 
and Parpiev, 
2008 
SMD3 possible. SMD1 potentially possible but mean and sd 
not given separately for TR and CTL groups. PSM ATT, SE 
and t-stats reported (Tables 12, 14; Kernel matching Table 
A2, stratification matching Table A3), descriptives for 
outcome variables reported (Table A1). 
Yes 
25 Sharif, 2002  SMD1, however, the comparison is not treated versus 
controls but youth participants versus adult participants. 
Probit possible too (Table 12.4). 
Yes 
26 Sharif, 2004 Ordered probit model (Table 5) looking at 6 dimensions of 
decision-making, new versus old participant comparison, t-
ratios given 
No 
27 Wakoko, 2003 SMD6 possible (Table 6.1), SMD3 possible (Tables 6.6, 6.7, 
6.8, 6.9, 6.10, 6.11), OR and logit (Tables 6.12, 6.13, 6.14 – 
Odds ratios and betas) 
Yes 
28 Zaman, 1998 SMD7, logit (Tables 1.4, 1.5), but overall standard error not 
calculable so study not included in meta-analysis 
Yes 
29 Zaman, 1999 SMD8 (Table 5), logit (Tables 4, 11 (which is equal to 1.4 in 
his 1998 paper)), but overall standard error not calculable so 
study not included in meta-analysis 
Yes 
Note: OR findings transformed to SMD for meta-analysis using Chinn’s (2000) 
transformation.  
Table A7.2. Further information on effect size calculations 
Method Effect size formula Requirements for effect size calculation 
Comparison of means SMD1 N, mean and sd of treatment and control 
groups 
 SMD2 t-value and total N 
 SMD3 t-value, n_treatment  and control 
 SMD4 f-statistic of t-test and total N 
 SMD5  p-value of t-test and total N 
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Comparison of frequencies SMD6 Chis-sq and total N 
OLS regression SMD7 Unstandardised beta, sd depvar, n_t and n_c 
 SMD8 Standardised beta, sd depvar, n_t and n_c 
Contingency table  SMD11 p-value of Chisq and total N 
Odds ratio 12 Beta and cis from logistic regression 
Logit 13 Beta and se_beta (from se, t- or z-values) 
Multinomial logit 14 “ 
Probit 15 “ 
Ordered probit 16 “ 
Linear probability 17 “ 
Tobit 18 “ 
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Table A7.3. Studies using unconventional estimation methods 
Study Estimation Variance Other statistics Formula Comments 
Asim, 2008 Probit Se Total n;  
N_cov 
 log itse
se
β
=  
Garikpati, 
2008 
Logit 
 
Multinomial logit 
z-value 
 
z-value 
N,mean, sd _treat 
and control  
Total_n  
Treat_n 
*
df
t z
N
=  
log itse
se
β
=  4.3.1.1.1 OR 
an
d 
SM
D1 
 
t=z*df^.5/n^.5 
se = beta/se 
Hashemi et 
al., 2006 
Logit Confidence 
interval 
 SMD = ln(OR)/1.65  
Hoque and 
Itohara, 2009 
Logit t-value (Wald 
test) 
N_cov;  
Tot_n 
_ *
df
t Wald t
N
=  
log itse
β
=  
T=wald_t 
Se=beta / se 
Lakwo, 2007 Logit Se Tot_n 
Covs not clear 
  
Lastarria et 
al., 2008 
Linear probability Se N_covs 
Tot_n 
log itse
se
β
=   
Rahman et 
al., 2009 
Probit z-values N_covs 
Tot_n 
log itse
se
β
=   
Schuler et al., 
1994 
Logit Significance 
level ‘stars’ 
N_covs 
Tot_n 
Not possible  
Sharif, 2002 
and 2004 
Probit 
Ordered probit 
t-value; r2 
t-value 
N_cov; no tot_n 
N_cov; tot_n treat_n 
log itse
se
β
=   
Wakoko, 
2003 
Logit Significance 
level ‘stars’ 
 Not possible  
Zaman, 1998 
and 1999 
Logit Significance 
level ‘stars’ 
 Not possible  
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Annex 8: Further discussion and 
background to meta-analysis of 
quasi-experimental studies 
This Annex presents a more comprehensive discussion and analysis of 
empowerment-related variables in the included studies.  
 
A8.1. Introduction 
 
Meta-analysis aims to combine results of studies to gain greater confidence in 
conclusions than would be warranted by the individual studies taken separately. The 
presumption is that this is legitimate when there is homogeneity with respect to 
treatment, context and outcome; that the studies are testing a common hypothesis in 
a comparable way (Petticrew and Roberts, 2006:205, box 6.13).  This is not the case 
in many of the quasi-experimental and regression studies discussed here, hence 
results of these analyses should be treated with caution.  
 
Thus, a further relevant characteristic of the mainstream literature and application 
of quantitative research synthesis is that both treatment and outcome in the studies 
are equivalent in the relevant way, and generally fairly standardised in the field; they 
also employ common methods of analysis and reporting (Hedges and Olkin, 1985; 
Sutton et al., 1998; Chalmers et al., 2002).  
 
Before describing the range of treatment indicators we are faced with, we discuss the 
various outcomes we came across in the studies included in this review. The 
definitions and metrics of the outcomes we dealt with were very diverse. We 
extracted 1,031 estimates from just over 200 different outcome indicators across 29 
reports summarising 25 independent included studies which we then categorised 
into broader constructs such as economic, social and general empowerment 
constructs. Overall we allocated these over 200 outcome indicators to 18 different 
constructs, these constructs were then further summarised into 3 different 
dimensions: control, decision and other empowerment. The dimension ‘other 
empowerment’ contained everything that could not be labelled either as control or 
decision and thus included a variety of different indicators ranging from economic to 
social and broader empowerment and poverty indicators/indices, discrete to 
continuous which made it very difficult to obtain any meaningful information from 
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this rather diverse dimension. Hence, the meta-analysis excluded these other 
measures of empowerment. 
 
We found a high degree of heterogeneity among treatment indicators, which 
suggested that further analysis by subgroups was required, i.e. we needed to pool the 
various studies using particular characteristics such as treatment indicators, 
outcome dimension and/or method (which is a combination of research design and 
analytical method) and others. However, this was a challenging task as discussed 
further below. 
 
Studies using decision as main outcome dimension 
Amin et al. (1998), Husain et al. (2010), Wakoko (2003), Hashemi et al. (1996) and 
Lakwo (2007) used MF membership as their main treatment indicator. In addition, 
all these studies used decisions as their main outcome dimension. Hence, it 
appeared that the common treatment indicator as well as the similar outcome 
dimension across these studies allowed us to pool them. However, they are different 
in many other aspects. For example, these studies all used different methods in 
terms of research design and analytical method which in turn led to different effect 
size calculations. Husain et al. (2010) followed a pipeline design and used mainly 
OLS, SMD3 is calculated for this study. The remaining four studies applied a with-
and-without design but a range of analytical techniques were employed and three 
different effects size calculations were used: SMD4, OR and logit. Also, the country 
context and time matters; Amin et al. (1998) and Hashemi et al. (1996) examined 
Bangladesh while Husain et al. (2010) investigated India, Lakwo (2007) and 
Wakoko (2003) looked at Uganda; the studies were published between 1996 and 
2010. Moreover, in terms of methodological quality, apart from Husain et al. (2010), 
all studies suffered from threats to validity; hence the importance of sensitivity 
analysis by risk of bias assessment.   
MF membership 
 
Asim (2008), Ngo (2008), Setboornsarg and Parpiev (2008), Sharif (2002 and 
2004), Lastarria-Cornhiel and Shimamura (2008) and Mohindra et al. (2008) used 
MF participation as their main treatment indicator. All studies investigated 
decisions as the main outcome dimension. These seven studies cover Pakistan, 
Malawi, India, Kyrgyzstan, and Bangladesh. We decided to pool the studies that 
apply MF membership and MF participation, since many of them used these two 
concepts interchangeably. This, however, can be misleading since many MF 
members do not have loans but still receive some of the benefits of being part of an 
MF group such as group discussions, access to training, and so on (see Steele et al., 
2001). The studies included here did not provide a clear descriptive account of what 
exactly MF membership or participation entailed, whether it was just receiving a 
loan or other services as well, which very much depends on the MFI, country-context 
MF participation 
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and so on. Nevertheless, we pooled these studies knowing quite well that this is not 
ideal. 
 
Only one study (Garikipati, 2008) in the decision dimension used another treatment 
indicator which was length of membership. 
Other treatment indicators 
 
Studies using control as main outcome dimension 
The following studies used MF membership as well as control as an outcome 
dimension: Amin et al. (1995), Holvoet (2006), Amin et al. (1998) and Husain et al. 
(2010); the latter two also look at decision dimension. These four studies cover India 
and Bangladesh. Pipeline (Husain et al., 2010), cross-section (Holvoet, 2006) and 
with and without designs are employed using a range of analytical methods as well 
as five differed effect size calculations: SMD2 (Holvoet, 2006), SMD3 (Husain et al., 
2010), SMD4 (Amin et al., 1998), SMD8 and OR (Amin et al., 1995). 
MF membership 
 
Only one study used MF participation as a treatment indicator: Lastarria-Cornhiel 
and Shimamura (2008) which also looks at decision dimension. 
MF participation 
 
Garikipati (2008) used length of membership and also looked at decision 
dimension. The study by Amin et al. (1995) used times loan received as well as 
utilisation of loan by respondent in addition to MF membership. 
Other treatment indicators 
 
Other empowerment as main outcome dimension 
Only four studies in this outcome dimension used MF membership: Lakwo (2007) 
which also looked at decision dimension and was discussed above, Hoque and 
Itohara (2009) and Zaman (1998 and 1999) which used multiple treatment 
indicators (see further below). SMD1, SMD7, SMD8 and logit are used across all four 
studies for effect size calculations.  
MF membership 
 
Mohindra et al. (2008) and Ngo (2008) which looked at decision dimensions also 
investigated other empowerment dimensions using MF participation as the only 
treatment indicator. Further studies using MF participation as the treatment 
indicator were Pitt et al. (2003 and 2006), Rahman et al. (2009) and Schuler and 
Hashemi (1994). These six studies covered three countries: Bangladesh (4), India 
(1), and Kyrgyzstan (1). They are all with and without studies, though Schuler and 
Hashemi (1994) is a panel. Pooling these 6 studies was challenging due to the nature 
of the outcome dimension which covered a range of empowerment indices as well as 
MF participation 
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socio-economic indicators. In addition, numerous effect size formulas were 
applicable for these studies which made pooling even more difficult. 
 
The remaining studies in this outcome dimension used a range of treatment 
indicators; Garikipati (2008) used length of membership and also looked at decision 
and control dimensions. Hoque and Itohara (2009) used multiple treatment 
indicators such as MF membership, amount of credit, duration of credit use and 
credit use by woman. Zaman (1998 and 1999) used amount of credit as well as MF 
membership as treatment indicators. 
Other treatment indicators 
 
Concluding remarks 
We can see from the above discussion that there were studies that applied several 
treatment indicators within one study (Amin et al., 1995; Hoque and Itohara, 2009; 
Zaman 1998 and 1999). Some studies also investigated several outcome dimensions 
(e.g. Amin et al., 1998; Garikipati, 2008, Husain et al., 2010, Lakwo, 2007; 
Lastarria-Cornhiel and Shimamura, 2008; Mohindra et al., 2008; Ngo, 2008) and at 
times several effects size calculations could be applicable for the data from one 
particular study (e.g. Amin et al., 1995; Asim, 2008; Garikipati, 2008; Hoque and 
Itohara, 2009; Lastarria-Cornhiel and Shimamura, 2008; Ngo, 2008; Pitt et al. 
2006; Sharif, 2002; Wakoko, 2003; Zaman 1998 and 1999). In addition, eight 
countries were covered by the studies in this meta-analysis between 1993 and 2011 
and a wide range of research designs and analytical methods were employed. Given 
this diversity, it was difficult to make a sensible decision as to how to pool these 
studies. 
 
It appears that focusing on the decision construct was most sensible and within that 
dimension pooling the studies using MF membership and MF participation as 
treatment indicators seemed appropriate. 
 
A question that also arose was whether and how to extract a single effect size when 
there were multiple estimates in a given study of impact of a given indicator of 
treatment on a given outcome variable (study/treatment/dimension). The approach 
we took to deal with effect size dependence is outlined in section 2 following Lipsey 
and Wilson (2001).  
 
A8.2. Requirements for effect size estimates 
 
The 25 independent findings were selected on the basis of including particular 
proxies of women’s control over household spending. As to other empowerment-
related variables, the studies do not constitute a representative or complete set of 
studies that deal with these issues, since our search and inclusion strategies were not 
aligned to this focus. Consequently, we did not attempt to pool effect sizes based on 
these outcome variables. As noted earlier, a very wide range of effect size 
188 
 
calculations was necessary; the calculation acronym and the data required for each 
are given in Table A8.1.
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Table A8.1. Effect size calculations and data requirements 
         t-test Chi-square Regression models  
Effect 
size 
calcu- 
lation 
Comments 
 
TR  
mean 
 
TR  
sd 
CTL  
mean 
CTL 
sd 
TR  
n 
CTL 
 n 
Tol 
N 
t- 
val 
 
 
 
p- 
val 
  
f- 
val 
 
2
X
2 
 
p- 
val 
  
Sd 
dep 
var 
Unstand  
reg 
coeff 
Sd 
reg 
coeff 
Logit 
coeff 
Probit/ 
tobit  
coeff 
t-val  
of  
beta 
Studies1 
SMD1 N, mean and sd 
of treatment and 
controls 
                  Asim, 2008, Garikipati 2008, Hoque and 
Itohara 2009, Ngo 2008, Sharif 2002 
SMD2 t-test equal 
sample size 
                  Holvoet 2006 
SMD3 t-test unequal 
sample size 
                  Asim, 2008, Husain 2010, Setboornsarg 
and Parpiev 2008, Wakoko 2003 
SMD4 F-statistic of t-
test 
                  Amin et al., 1998 
SMD5 p-value of t-test                   Ngo, 2008 
SMD6 Chisq and total N                   Wakoko 2003 
SMD7 Unstan-dardised 
beta, sd dep var, 
n_t and n_c 
                  Banerjee et al. 2009, Karlan and Zinman 
2007, Pitt 2006, Zaman 1998 
SMD8 Standardised 
beta, sd dep var, 
n_t and n_c 
                  Amin 1995, Amin et al., 1998, Zaman 1999 
SMD9 Unstand. beta 
and t-value 
                  Pitt 2006 
SMD11 p-value of Chisq 
and total N 
                  Ngo 2008 
OR Odds ratio and 
confidence 
intervals 
                  Amin 1995, Crepon et al., 2011, Hashemi 
1996, Kim 2007, Mohindra 2008, Wakoko 
2003 
Logit, 
mnl 
logit; 
Probit; 
Oprobit; 
tobit, 
Linear 
prob2 
Beta and its se, 
t-value, p-value 
or z-value   
                  Asim 2008, Garikipati 2008, Hoque and 
Itohara 2009, Lakwo 2007, Lastarria 2008, 
Rahman 2009, Schuler and Hashemi 
1994, Sharif 2002 and 2004, Wakoko 
2003, Zaman 1998 and 1999 
Note: Effect size calculation not possible for: Holvoet 2005, Jamal 2008, Mizan 1993, and Pitt 2003. 
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Table A8.1 presents the methodologies and opportunities for ES calculation with 
respect to all empowerment-related variables in the included studies. The table 
summarizes our extraction of statistics from which impact effect sizes may be 
calculated. Meta-analysis requires estimates both of a comparable effect size, either 
a standardized mean difference (SMD), an “r” statistic, odds ratio (OR), or risk ratio 
(RR), and their standard errors. Of the 29 reports summarising 25 unique studies, 7 
did not provide statistics which could be used for this purpose; 14 provided statistics 
which clearly could be used (SMD1-11),  5 provided OR statistics (however two of the 
studies that provided OR statistics also provided data for SMD calculations), and 12 
provided tobit or probit coefficients and their standard errors (or t-values) but not 
sufficient covariate coefficients and descriptive statistics to compute marginal effects 
(of those 12 studies, seven also provided statistics for SMD calculations). OR 
estimates may be transformed into SMD using the transformations suggested by 
Chinn (2000). Our effect size calculations followed those set for Lipsey and Wilson 
(2001)69
 
. Annex 7 outlines the effect size formula applicable for each study and 
provides a justification should a calculation not have been possible. Table A8.2 
presents a further summary of outcomes, treatments and methodological remarks 
on effect size calculations.  
 
                                                        
69  http://gunston.gmu.edu/cebcp/EffectSizeCalculator/index.html 
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Table A8.2. Summary of outcomes, treatments, methods, and effect size calculations 
No. Study Treatment 
variable 
Outcome variables Outcome 
construct 
Outcome 
dimension 
Analytical method Effect size 
formula 
Comments 
1 Amin et al., 
1995 
Membership 
credit 
organization 
(yes/no),  
Times loan 
received (#), 
Utilization of 
loan by 
respondent 
herself 
(yes/no). 
Mobility, 
Authority,  
Aspiration, 
Recent fertility, Contraceptive 
use, Desire for no more 
children. 
Authority index Control Multivariate/OLS/logit SMD8, OR SMD8: Only three quite 
extreme values positive 
versus rest which are 
near to zero - no clear 
pattern - differ by 
outcome and by 
treatment. 
2 Amin et al., 
1998 
Membership 
NGO (yes/no) 
Authority index, Autonomy 
index, Consultation index. 
Authority 
index, 
Autonomy 
index, 
Consultation 
index. 
Control, 
Decisions. 
Multivariate/tables SMD4, 
SMD8 
Authority index low d 
value – maybe not 
appropriate. 
3 Asim, 2008 Participation in 
programme 
(y/n) 
 
Boy’s schooling, 
Girl’s schooling, 
Child’s medical care, 
Medical checkup. 
Purchase of household assets, 
House repair, 
Sale/purchase of house, 
Decision-
making 
Decisions IV/PSM 
 
SMD1, 
SMD3, 
ordered 
probit 
Ordered probit: quite 
heterogeneous, 
outcomes are decisions 
about consumption 
goods. 
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No. Study Treatment 
variable 
Outcome variables Outcome 
construct 
Outcome 
dimension 
Analytical method Effect size 
formula 
Comments 
Grocery/fruits, 
Medicine for herself, 
Personal clothes/cosmetics, 
Buy ice-cream/sweets for 
children, 
Buy books/uniform for children, 
Take a child to the doctor. 
4 Banerjee et 
al., 2009 
Credit 
intervention 
area (yes/no) 
Woman makes spending 
decisions, 
Woman makes non-food 
spending decisions. 
Decision-
making 
Decisions ITT SMD7  
5 Crepon et al., 
2011 
Credit (yes/ no) Number of activities managed 
by female member HH, 
Women index. 
Activities 
managed by 
female,  
Women index. 
Other 
empowerment 
ITT OR  
6 Garikipati, 
2008 
Length of  
membership of 
credit group 
(years = 0 for 
non-members) 
Say in household decisions, 
Control over minor finances, 
Control over major finance. 
Decision-
making, 
Vulnerability, 
Control. 
Control, 
decisions,  
Other 
empowerment. 
Multivariate/logit SMD1, 
logit, 
multinomial 
logit 
Multinomial logit: very 
narrow confidence 
intervals - check out 
logit coefficient and z-
value - check formula 
for z-value to t-value; 
three large negative ES 
- dependent variables 
are use of loan - 
exclude Table 6 as 
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No. Study Treatment 
variable 
Outcome variables Outcome 
construct 
Outcome 
dimension 
Analytical method Effect size 
formula 
Comments 
outcome. Variables are 
not indicators of 
empowerment. 
No multinomial logit 
estimates. 
7 Hashemi et 
al., 1996 
GB member 
(yes/no) 
Ability to make small purchases, 
Ability to make large purchases, 
Involvement in major decisions, 
Ability to make small purchases, 
Ability to make large purchases, 
Involvement in major decisions, 
Ability to make small purchases, 
Ability to make large purchases, 
Involvement in major decisions. 
Decision-
making 
Decisions Multivariate/logit OR Mainly positive, but 
some extreme positive. 
8 Holvoet, 2005 Credit (Female/ 
male clients), 
Credit (Group/ 
individual 
credit), Credit 
(Old/new), 
Organizational 
model 
(Rido/Myrada) 
Female decision-making with 
respect to loan use,  
Female decision-making with 
respect to HH expenditures, 
Female decision-making with 
respect to HH money 
management, 
Female decision-making with 
respect to loan use,  
Female decision-making with 
respect to expenditures, 
Decision-
making 
Decisions Multivariate/logit Not 
possible, 
the data 
reported 
not 
sufficient to 
do any 
effect size 
calculation. 
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No. Study Treatment 
variable 
Outcome variables Outcome 
construct 
Outcome 
dimension 
Analytical method Effect size 
formula 
Comments 
Female decision-making with 
respect to money management, 
Female decision-making with 
respect to loan use,  
Female decision-making with 
respect to expenditures, 
Female decision-making with 
respect to money management, 
Female decision-making with 
respect to loan use,  
Female decision-making with 
respect to expenditures, 
Female decision-making with 
respect to money management. 
9 Holvoet, 2006 Myrada 
membership, 
Rido 
membership, 
Financial + 
social 
intermediation. 
Female Control over resources, 
Female Control over resources, 
Female Control over resources. 
Control over 
resources 
Control Mean gain scores/t-
tests 
SMD2 Needs to be entered 
the raw scores and the 
means and standard 
deviations. 
10 Hoque and 
Itohara,  2009 
Membership 
(yes/no),  
Amount of 
credit, Duration 
Status of empowerment. Status of 
empowerment 
Other 
empowerment 
Multivariate/logit SMD1, 
logit 
Logit: two rather high 
estimates - Table 4, two 
large positive logit 
coefficients on a 
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No. Study Treatment 
variable 
Outcome variables Outcome 
construct 
Outcome 
dimension 
Analytical method Effect size 
formula 
Comments 
of credit use,  
Credit use by 
woman 
(yes/no). 
dummy (0/1) variable 
for utilization of credit 
explaining 0/1 variable. 
11 Husain, 
Mukherjee 
and Dutta,  
2010 
New members 
SHG (< 6 
months) versus 
older members 
Control over respondents’ 
income, 
Who spends husbands’ income/ 
control of family income, 
Who decides on treatment of 
respondent, 
Who decides on major HH 
purchases, 
Who decides on daily 
purchases. 
Decision-
making, 
Control. 
Control, 
Decisions. 
basic OLS/tables SMD3  
12 Jamal, 2008 Credit 
(yes/pipeline/no 
credit),  
Credit recent 
credit 
organization 
(yes/pipeline/no 
credit),  
Credit more 
established 
organization 
Economic aspects of 
empowerment, 
Income and expenditure, 
Asset transactions, 
Economic aspects of 
empowerment, 
Income and expenditure, 
Asset transactions, 
Economic aspects of 
empowerment, 
Income and expenditure, 
Decision-
making 
Decisions DID Not 
possible. 
E.g. SMD8 
not 
possible 
since TR n, 
CTL n and 
sd of 
dependent 
variables 
missing. 
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No. Study Treatment 
variable 
Outcome variables Outcome 
construct 
Outcome 
dimension 
Analytical method Effect size 
formula 
Comments 
(yes/pipeline/no 
credit). 
Asset transactions. No other 
formula 
applicable. 
13 Karlan and 
Zinman, 2007 
Credit (yes/no; 
female sample) 
Decision-making scale (how the 
household decides about: 
routine purchases, expensive 
purchases, giving assistance to 
family members, family 
purchases, recreational use of 
money, personal use of money, 
number- of children, use of 
family planning, method of 
family planning, assistance 
given to relatives, decision to 
borrow, amount to borrow, and 
where/who to borrow from). 
Decision-
making 
Decisions ITT SMD7  
14 Kim, Watts, 
Hargreaves, 
Ndhlovu, 
Ohetia, 
Morioson, 
Busra, Porter, 
Pronyk, 2007 
Credit (yes/no) Autonomy in decision-making. Empowerment Other 
empowerment 
Multivariate OR  
15 Lakwo, 2007 Membership 
(yes/no) 
Cattle, 
Shoat, 
Decision-
making,  
Decisions, 
Other 
Multivariate/logit logit Quite heterogeneous 
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No. Study Treatment 
variable 
Outcome variables Outcome 
construct 
Outcome 
dimension 
Analytical method Effect size 
formula 
Comments 
Poultry, 
Radio, 
Bicycles, 
Bed/ mattresses, 
Business, 
Bank account. 
Well-being 
indicators,  
Asset 
ownership. 
empowerment. 
16 Lastarria-
Cornhiel and 
Shimamura, 
2008 
Female client 
(yes/no) 
Female spouse decision-making 
on food consumption 
Economic, 
Social,  
Health, 
Empowerment 
indicators, 
Decision-
making. 
Decisions, 
Other 
empowerment. 
PSM/tobit Tobit, 
linear 
probability 
model 
Linear probability 
model: one larger 
negative ES – not clear 
why. 
Tobit: very 
heterogeneous ES 
estimate. 
17 Mizan, 1993 Grameen bank 
participation 
(yes/no),  
Years of loan 
from GB,  
Monthly income 
from GB invest-
ment. 
Household decision-making. Decision-
making 
Decisions Multivariate Not 
possible. 
E.g. SMD7 
and SMD8 
both not 
possible 
since sd of 
dep var 
missing. 
No other 
formula 
applicable. 
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No. Study Treatment 
variable 
Outcome variables Outcome 
construct 
Outcome 
dimension 
Analytical method Effect size 
formula 
Comments 
18 Mohindra, 
Haddad and 
Narayana, 
2008 
Credit (yes/ no) 
(early joiner, > 
2 years versus 
non-member),  
Late joiner. 
Male decision-making. Health,  
Well-being 
indicators, 
Decision-
making, 
Satisfaction. 
Decisions, 
Other 
empowerment. 
Multivariate/logit OR Mainly negative and 
some outliers with low d 
values. 
19 Ngo, 2008 Women with 
credit (North 
and South 
Kyrgyzstan 
separately), 
Female 
residents 
programme 
versus idem 
control villages 
in North and 
South 
Kyrgyzstan 
separately 
Large purchases (appliances 
and furniture), 
Purchase/ sell/ rent land,  
Property, 
Getting a credit, 
Purchase/ sell large animals, 
Purchase/ sell smaller animals. 
Decision-
making,  
Well-being 
indicators. 
Decisions, 
Other 
empowerment. 
ITT SMD1,  
SMD5, 
SMD11, 
SMD3 
possible 
too but not 
used 
 
SMD5: quite 
heterogeneous - is 
confidence interval too 
low 
SMD11: wide 
confidence intervals - 
low heterogeneity. 
 
 
 
20 Pitt, 
Khandker and 
Cartwright, 
2003 
Female credit 
(yes/ no) , 
Household s in 
programme 
villages with 
Purchasing ability (factor), 
Food, 
Cosmetics,  
Candy, 
Utensils, 
Empowerment 
indicators 
Other 
empowerment 
2SLS Not 
possible. 
E.g. SMD8 
not 
possible 
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No. Study Treatment 
variable 
Outcome variables Outcome 
construct 
Outcome 
dimension 
Analytical method Effect size 
formula 
Comments 
female credit 
groups versus 
non-
programme 
villages 
Furniture,  
Children’s clothing,  
Own clothing,  
Wife can buy asset,  
Wife can buy asset without 
husband’s permission, 
Transaction management 
(factor), 
House repair decision,  
House repair implementation,  
House repair spending,  
Livestock purchase decision,  
Livestock purchase 
implementation,  
Livestock spending,  
HH loans decision, 
HH loans implementation, 
HH loans spending, 
Land/equipment purchase or 
sale decision,  
Land/equipment 
implementation,  
Land/equipment spending. 
since sd of 
dep var not 
reported. 
No other 
formula 
applicable. 
21 Pitt, 
Khandker and 
Cartwright, 
Female credit 
(yes/ no) , 
Households in 
Purchasing ability (factor), 
Transaction management 
(factor). 
Empowerment 
indicators 
Other 
empowerment 
2SLS SMD7, 
SMD9 
SMD7: Very narrow 
confidence intervals 
and some outliers - 
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No. Study Treatment 
variable 
Outcome variables Outcome 
construct 
Outcome 
dimension 
Analytical method Effect size 
formula 
Comments 
2006 programme 
villages with 
female credit 
groups versus 
non-
programme 
villages 
diverse outcomes - not 
clear what to exclude 
SMD9: some very large 
d values - not clear if 
calculated. correctly 
22  Rahman, 
Junankar and 
Mallik, 2009 
Credit (yes/ no) Empowerment index. Empowerment 
index 
Other 
empowerment 
Probit Probit Low standard errors; 
not useful since they 
investigate factors 
affecting the 
empowerment index 
without investigating the 
impact of MF 
participation on this 
index. 
23 Schuler and 
Hashemi, 
1994 
Credit (yes/ no) Empowerment indicator. Empowerment 
indicator, 
Composite. 
Other 
empowerment 
Multivariate/logit logit  
24  Setboonsarng 
and Parpiev, 
2008 
Credit (yes/ no) Women have say in schooling 
matters, 
Women have say in health care. 
Decision-
making 
Decisions PSM SMD3 Very narrow confidence 
intervals - t-value and 
unequal sample 
actually is standard 
error and t-value of ATT 
from matching. 
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No. Study Treatment 
variable 
Outcome variables Outcome 
construct 
Outcome 
dimension 
Analytical method Effect size 
formula 
Comments 
25 Sharif, 2002  Young female 
borrowers (16 – 
24) versus 
adult female 
borrowers 
Daily food purchases, 
Large purchases, 
Education of children, 
Health expenditures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decision-
making 
Decisions Probit/tables SMD1, 
probit 
Probit: Very 
heterogeneous - some 
larger positive ES - 
large probit; the 
comparison is not 
treated versus controls 
but youth participants 
versus adult 
participants. 
26 Sharif , 2004 Credit (yes/ no) Daily food purchases, 
Large purchases (housing, 
furniture, assets, etc.), 
Education children, 
Health expenditures, 
Daily food purchases, 
Large Purchases (housing, 
furniture, assets, etc.), 
Education children, 
Health expenditures, 
Daily food purchases, 
Large purchases (housing, 
furniture, assets, etc.), 
Education children, 
Decision-
making 
Decisions Ordered probit/t-tests Ordered 
probit 
model 
Outcomes are 
decisions about 
marriage, fertility.  
generally positive 
 but check out ES 
estimator; 
new versus old 
participant comparison. 
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No. Study Treatment 
variable 
Outcome variables Outcome 
construct 
Outcome 
dimension 
Analytical method Effect size 
formula 
Comments 
Health expenditures. 
27 Wakoko, 
2003 
Membership of  
2 or more 
informal 
financial groups 
(women),  
Credit (from 
informal 
sources) (yes/ 
no) (women). 
Income use decisions. Decision-
making 
Decisions Multivariate/logit SMD3, 
SMD6, 
OR, logit 
SMD3: Some low 
means of d. 
SMD6: family members 
will eat - total outlier - 
very large chi-square - 
pretty obvious - this is 
only testing women 
versus men - not effect 
of mf (thus take out 
Table 6.1). 
28 Zaman, 1998 Non-borrowing 
BRAC member 
versus member 
with more than 
10,000 taka in 
loans, 
 More than 
10,000 taka 
borrowed 
versus non-
borrowing 
member,  
Less than 
5,000 taka 
Owns poultry, 
Can sell poultry independently, 
Owns livestock, 
Can sell jewelry independently, 
Has savings, 
Can use savings independently, 
Has savings, 
Can use savings independently, 
Owns land,  
Can sell livestock 
independently, 
Owns jewellery.  
Empowerment  Other 
empowerment 
OLS/logit SMD7, 
logit 
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No. Study Treatment 
variable 
Outcome variables Outcome 
construct 
Outcome 
dimension 
Analytical method Effect size 
formula 
Comments 
borrowed  
versus non-
borrowing 
BRAC-
member,  
Non-borrowing 
BRAC member 
versus eligible 
non-member, 
BRAC 
members and – 
borrowers 
versus eligible 
non-members, 
loan size. 
29 Zaman, 1999 Non-borrowing 
BRAC member 
versus member 
with more than 
10,000 taka in 
loans,  
More than 
10,000 taka 
borrowed 
versus non-
borrowing 
Owns poultry, 
Can sell poultry independently, 
Owns livestock,  
Can sell jewelry independently, 
Has savings, 
Can use savings independently, 
Has savings, 
Can use savings independently, 
Owns land, 
Can sell livestock 
independently, 
Empowerment, 
Poverty. 
Other 
empowerment 
OLS/logit SMD8, 
logit 
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No. Study Treatment 
variable 
Outcome variables Outcome 
construct 
Outcome 
dimension 
Analytical method Effect size 
formula 
Comments 
member, 
Less than 
5,000 taka 
borrowed  
versus non-
borrowing 
BRAC-
member,  
Non-borrowing 
BRAC member 
versus eligible 
non-member, 
BRAC 
members and – 
borrowers 
versus eligible 
non-members, 
loan size. 
Owns jewellery.  
Notes: See Section 3.2 in the main text of the report for more details on treatment and outcome variables. See also Annex 7
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